General

  • Target

    4a55b500b6f19a08245fd9a06601933fdc5b7e1ab19975c0058dcc7cd58d2a4f.bin

  • Size

    1.2MB

  • Sample

    240711-11mamswelr

  • MD5

    8bd2143870f954032d93cc03f6d0f75b

  • SHA1

    3f9bf9dafb037e9aba94d03e571a40953e3eb793

  • SHA256

    4a55b500b6f19a08245fd9a06601933fdc5b7e1ab19975c0058dcc7cd58d2a4f

  • SHA512

    8ce532ee02013588b1e08d03e1f2ad977f32396e4359cafb9c4afebb0f148f2cd2221ad821c1099c065ddfe8a14b5ad92fa650703c04008f4baaac579133f3cd

  • SSDEEP

    24576:poG9uMkqxybVYd6okIxt4l0kmNPF/juhKCJFxcxPo3j139dgypD1:aydgbGd6vIcl0kYF/oxcg3j139dg6

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://89.213.56.192:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      4a55b500b6f19a08245fd9a06601933fdc5b7e1ab19975c0058dcc7cd58d2a4f.bin

    • Size

      1.2MB

    • MD5

      8bd2143870f954032d93cc03f6d0f75b

    • SHA1

      3f9bf9dafb037e9aba94d03e571a40953e3eb793

    • SHA256

      4a55b500b6f19a08245fd9a06601933fdc5b7e1ab19975c0058dcc7cd58d2a4f

    • SHA512

      8ce532ee02013588b1e08d03e1f2ad977f32396e4359cafb9c4afebb0f148f2cd2221ad821c1099c065ddfe8a14b5ad92fa650703c04008f4baaac579133f3cd

    • SSDEEP

      24576:poG9uMkqxybVYd6okIxt4l0kmNPF/juhKCJFxcxPo3j139dgypD1:aydgbGd6vIcl0kYF/oxcg3j139dg6

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks