Analysis

  • max time kernel
    95s
  • max time network
    151s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20240709-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240709-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    16-07-2024 12:03

General

  • Target

    win.exe

  • Size

    1005KB

  • MD5

    773fcd0432808e74bfb863489799dd05

  • SHA1

    c8008c0d50ddf9757c2e11b11d94dae0c5307915

  • SHA256

    2bfe3fba2e94b1a4f8ae0ea767b64084390155bb4d57cc39e13c15b181f8d377

  • SHA512

    7714265c16c7bfd5786eb423583a3ab8f71daec5d6ace00d7613522aaa26b8fcea28c63bc294e99a84e8131896d6ca425abde4c354b2d78059fb5075b42adb45

  • SSDEEP

    12288:wbWIqB/A1gv9XQ7ZNlZDV3LEWI+Xx+uBW6y4qNmhE:wbyxv9XQ7B3oWI+XHW6y48

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Program Files\7-Zip\akira_readme.txt

Family

akira

Ransom Note
Hi friends, Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption. Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know: 1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal. 2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help. 3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data. 4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion. 5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us. If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions: 1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/. 2. Paste this link - https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion. 3. Use this code - 2872-CR-DSLO-CSRQ - to log into our chat. Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
URLs

https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion

https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion

Signatures

  • Akira

    Akira is a ransomware first seen in March 2023 and targets several industries, including education, finance, real estate, manufacturing, and consulting.

  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Renames multiple (8411) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell command to delete shadowcopy.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 31 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\win.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\win.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops startup file
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:4796
  • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject"
    1⤵
    • Process spawned unexpected child process
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4732
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:4676

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix ATT&CK v13

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

1
T1059

PowerShell

1
T1059.001

Credential Access

Unsecured Credentials

1
T1552

Credentials In Files

1
T1552.001

Discovery

System Information Discovery

1
T1082

Collection

Data from Local System

1
T1005

Replay Monitor

Loading Replay Monitor...

Downloads

  • C:\Program Files\7-Zip\akira_readme.txt
    Filesize

    2KB

    MD5

    a88c166459b4ea3be8cd01ceb6154444

    SHA1

    c7784fea209117fab94b1c6d6ac032ad52beb1d6

    SHA256

    61c11e3aba48570c779457d1833c2c7c2a50048f80af59a81c1b9668ba32c13d

    SHA512

    c71e39364c909549a51fd1c48bc2adae9ee1573d0c37d3b89870b10e51e6a646e12fde5d290d9d700fb28b98652e48bb5aa72adee2b246e5142a169a182bbd0c

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
    Filesize

    3KB

    MD5

    05c109cb855e74a49a383e54e5fbbc85

    SHA1

    3ed5689a28ea30d900b3bb47a32bc4441a173186

    SHA256

    c5a9d496b4ecf07ba1d6daeb3064f13cba3d8f1b2f3bcd835dac09ef90874579

    SHA512

    9f74a85de04d0a05151b12cbdebdcf5562d60026b4af94dd8a56f5abd1a42cca4acff9051f58fef5f1a58b5234c96bb0726288579b3cf697440bd30c5d34bbcb

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_yjsfa032.q5o.ps1
    Filesize

    60B

    MD5

    d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

    SHA1

    6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

    SHA256

    96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

    SHA512

    5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

  • memory/4732-2-0x00007FF8D2070000-0x00007FF8D2265000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    2.0MB

  • memory/4732-1-0x00007FF8D2070000-0x00007FF8D2265000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    2.0MB

  • memory/4732-0-0x00007FF8D2070000-0x00007FF8D2265000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    2.0MB

  • memory/4732-3-0x0000023BDCC10000-0x0000023BDCC32000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    136KB

  • memory/4732-15-0x00007FF8D2070000-0x00007FF8D2265000-memory.dmp
    Filesize

    2.0MB