General

  • Target

    c0cc42224ea8df0a2dbbd9f4c3db89f8ae78d9ddfe3a49ef72f1fd3bf89557ad.bin

  • Size

    1.8MB

  • Sample

    240810-1w649avaka

  • MD5

    9ecef82f8c9a01f4e0a2c5c574d8c252

  • SHA1

    8963de40dfb0e89480c0fd44b7625df7ab5f8025

  • SHA256

    c0cc42224ea8df0a2dbbd9f4c3db89f8ae78d9ddfe3a49ef72f1fd3bf89557ad

  • SHA512

    8075ffc5677efe796cf766a9e13b8a9ed3355faf1c829ffbae295214de35de772c49fe846056b17f7afe44f68a601bf7a77478634f134b2b97ea4810d6e5c39c

  • SSDEEP

    49152:9g/t4Z1SUmjLzvzbaNho5ZmlWMmSlTkVt+NcNVOqOO1+Yi6q:1m7riKmlRmCkDXNVOjU7i6q

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://194.59.31.188:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      c0cc42224ea8df0a2dbbd9f4c3db89f8ae78d9ddfe3a49ef72f1fd3bf89557ad.bin

    • Size

      1.8MB

    • MD5

      9ecef82f8c9a01f4e0a2c5c574d8c252

    • SHA1

      8963de40dfb0e89480c0fd44b7625df7ab5f8025

    • SHA256

      c0cc42224ea8df0a2dbbd9f4c3db89f8ae78d9ddfe3a49ef72f1fd3bf89557ad

    • SHA512

      8075ffc5677efe796cf766a9e13b8a9ed3355faf1c829ffbae295214de35de772c49fe846056b17f7afe44f68a601bf7a77478634f134b2b97ea4810d6e5c39c

    • SSDEEP

      49152:9g/t4Z1SUmjLzvzbaNho5ZmlWMmSlTkVt+NcNVOqOO1+Yi6q:1m7riKmlRmCkDXNVOjU7i6q

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks