Analysis
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max time kernel
121s -
max time network
122s -
platform
windows7_x64 -
resource
win7-20240704-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20240704-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system -
submitted
19-08-2024 04:48
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
orden010221.exe
Resource
win7-20240704-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
orden010221.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
General
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Target
orden010221.exe
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Size
482KB
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MD5
d35463b27bc9d531685c21d6b25bcb23
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SHA1
44222b7cc9de3847bef8c6b5f5639a824edbaf7b
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SHA256
2348ad3a4247f29ff40fbbdcbf559dedf6396e2fda0a1a9693d48fa0f0bc14b7
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SHA512
de042bf76e89376c444b58f1ac055ca60306d1526c9cbd5de17334b8b6923098d67002b8579565347f7c1790da25b8ac0a32ba05647be84abe414c47f860c365
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SSDEEP
12288:gb09CXxbZi970MGS33h3fIzRIBfzG7qCv7d6:gUIbZnSnhHfzGuCDI
Malware Config
Signatures
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404 Keylogger
Information stealer and keylogger first seen in 2019.
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404 Keylogger Main Executable 5 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/2620-9-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000422000-memory.dmp family_404keylogger behavioral1/memory/2620-11-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000422000-memory.dmp family_404keylogger behavioral1/memory/2620-17-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000422000-memory.dmp family_404keylogger behavioral1/memory/2620-19-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000422000-memory.dmp family_404keylogger behavioral1/memory/2620-15-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000422000-memory.dmp family_404keylogger -
Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers 1 TTPs
Malicious Access or copy of Web Browser Credential store.
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CustAttr .NET packer 1 IoCs
Detects CustAttr .NET packer in memory.
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/2864-3-0x0000000000310000-0x0000000000318000-memory.dmp CustAttr -
Loads dropped DLL 5 IoCs
pid Process 484 WerFault.exe 484 WerFault.exe 484 WerFault.exe 484 WerFault.exe 484 WerFault.exe -
Reads data files stored by FTP clients 2 TTPs
Tries to access configuration files associated with programs like FileZilla.
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Reads user/profile data of local email clients 2 TTPs
Email clients store some user data on disk where infostealers will often target it.
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Reads user/profile data of web browsers 2 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
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Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files 1 TTPs
Steal credentials from unsecured files.
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Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3450744190-3404161390-554719085-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 orden010221.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3450744190-3404161390-554719085-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 orden010221.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3450744190-3404161390-554719085-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\15.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 orden010221.exe -
Looks up external IP address via web service 1 IoCs
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
flow ioc 4 checkip.dyndns.org -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2864 set thread context of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 -
Program crash 1 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 484 2620 WerFault.exe 31 -
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language orden010221.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language orden010221.exe -
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\CABD2A79A1076A31F21D253635CB039D4329A5E8 orden010221.exe Set value (data) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT\Certificates\CABD2A79A1076A31F21D253635CB039D4329A5E8\Blob = 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 orden010221.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 1 IoCs
pid Process 2620 orden010221.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2620 orden010221.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 2620 orden010221.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 13 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2864 wrote to memory of 2620 2864 orden010221.exe 31 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 484 2620 orden010221.exe 33 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 484 2620 orden010221.exe 33 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 484 2620 orden010221.exe 33 PID 2620 wrote to memory of 484 2620 orden010221.exe 33 -
outlook_office_path 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3450744190-3404161390-554719085-1000\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Outlook\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 orden010221.exe -
outlook_win_path 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3450744190-3404161390-554719085-1000\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows Messaging Subsystem\Profiles\Outlook\9375CFF0413111d3B88A00104B2A6676 orden010221.exe
Processes
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\orden010221.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\orden010221.exe"1⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2864 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\orden010221.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\orden010221.exe"2⤵
- Accesses Microsoft Outlook profiles
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Modifies system certificate store
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
- outlook_office_path
- outlook_win_path
PID:2620 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 2620 -s 11243⤵
- Loads dropped DLL
- Program crash
PID:484
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
482KB
MD5d35463b27bc9d531685c21d6b25bcb23
SHA144222b7cc9de3847bef8c6b5f5639a824edbaf7b
SHA2562348ad3a4247f29ff40fbbdcbf559dedf6396e2fda0a1a9693d48fa0f0bc14b7
SHA512de042bf76e89376c444b58f1ac055ca60306d1526c9cbd5de17334b8b6923098d67002b8579565347f7c1790da25b8ac0a32ba05647be84abe414c47f860c365