General
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Target
2024-08-21_2b50a6e9c09437dd1a5b17f86410c232_medusalocker
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Size
1.2MB
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Sample
240821-be537asdrf
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MD5
2b50a6e9c09437dd1a5b17f86410c232
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SHA1
e98158c75973fd3166c33029da347d565ca6f3bd
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SHA256
1b0afa3285edab717aea40c6213e11a95ea3881173280a63bbda2d254d194217
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SHA512
0174063243f8b31bcf7faee05b46b87d095aec248197b5b32a88c016de743aca2231ee683908541da02c72cd72a4400988fe04517937f6049b4e71bb4b666f8f
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SSDEEP
12288:zmHAIqyfF/5ebyz1dpPlRnMRTD410ALP68kG3Jz4S9FUmnyJtgoiOHmabd8ornXb:qHRFfauvpPXnMKqJtfiOHmUd8QTHL
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2024-08-21_2b50a6e9c09437dd1a5b17f86410c232_medusalocker.exe
Resource
win7-20240704-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2024-08-21_2b50a6e9c09437dd1a5b17f86410c232_medusalocker.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
Malware Config
Extracted
C:\Users\Admin\!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.mht
[email protected]<BR>[email protected]<BR>In
http-equiv=3D"X
Extracted
\Device\HarddiskVolume1\Boot\da-DK\!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.mht
[email protected]<BR>[email protected]<BR>In
http-equiv=3D"X
Targets
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Target
2024-08-21_2b50a6e9c09437dd1a5b17f86410c232_medusalocker
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Size
1.2MB
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MD5
2b50a6e9c09437dd1a5b17f86410c232
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SHA1
e98158c75973fd3166c33029da347d565ca6f3bd
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SHA256
1b0afa3285edab717aea40c6213e11a95ea3881173280a63bbda2d254d194217
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SHA512
0174063243f8b31bcf7faee05b46b87d095aec248197b5b32a88c016de743aca2231ee683908541da02c72cd72a4400988fe04517937f6049b4e71bb4b666f8f
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SSDEEP
12288:zmHAIqyfF/5ebyz1dpPlRnMRTD410ALP68kG3Jz4S9FUmnyJtgoiOHmabd8ornXb:qHRFfauvpPXnMKqJtfiOHmUd8QTHL
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Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
Malicious Access or copy of Web Browser Credential store.
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Deletes shadow copies
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
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Renames multiple (912) files with added filename extension
This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.
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Drops file in Drivers directory
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Checks computer location settings
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
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Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
Suspicious access to Credentials History.
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Deletes itself
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Adds Run key to start application
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Drops desktop.ini file(s)
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Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
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Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.
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Drops file in System32 directory
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MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Defense Evasion
Direct Volume Access
1Indicator Removal
4File Deletion
4Modify Registry
2Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
2Credentials from Web Browsers
1Windows Credential Manager
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1