General

  • Target

    8a13bf7566967093e863d02e9a8cf2587345e4f7d2a22a5ebd94559a47a49145.bin

  • Size

    994KB

  • Sample

    240928-1xq5esxhqj

  • MD5

    beac8031f4815d45ad5c951855ef8813

  • SHA1

    17ca3bee43c2b4b62cd4cec5c1dfd4c261e2aea6

  • SHA256

    8a13bf7566967093e863d02e9a8cf2587345e4f7d2a22a5ebd94559a47a49145

  • SHA512

    bb8af51ad8a19c7b2e342154ca04fcd1cb11079b7f4cc9872fc7c828e206ed401d23b70a46d242e988e9d4c83454822e187e713604e7bc1f0a78b6db21803bf2

  • SSDEEP

    24576:JxbhQnUnZEKdJDIEoIY3XSrw3CECyC7CvCIC9CMCTC4CKgSDUeg:ZQUGKdJDKIKicFrOuZoNapTgS/g

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://149.100.138.254:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      8a13bf7566967093e863d02e9a8cf2587345e4f7d2a22a5ebd94559a47a49145.bin

    • Size

      994KB

    • MD5

      beac8031f4815d45ad5c951855ef8813

    • SHA1

      17ca3bee43c2b4b62cd4cec5c1dfd4c261e2aea6

    • SHA256

      8a13bf7566967093e863d02e9a8cf2587345e4f7d2a22a5ebd94559a47a49145

    • SHA512

      bb8af51ad8a19c7b2e342154ca04fcd1cb11079b7f4cc9872fc7c828e206ed401d23b70a46d242e988e9d4c83454822e187e713604e7bc1f0a78b6db21803bf2

    • SSDEEP

      24576:JxbhQnUnZEKdJDIEoIY3XSrw3CECyC7CvCIC9CMCTC4CKgSDUeg:ZQUGKdJDKIKicFrOuZoNapTgS/g

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks