General

  • Target

    f5b14d5b068f5f0b4ff0ce54ebac9d16fe57d1dfbe571441d11f8ad014d38ae2.bin

  • Size

    2.1MB

  • Sample

    240929-1zxpzswgmf

  • MD5

    32c53b6ff8f3f834e554321b385810e5

  • SHA1

    b3bd943262572ce0705fc8e478cacaa5bd62f6f0

  • SHA256

    f5b14d5b068f5f0b4ff0ce54ebac9d16fe57d1dfbe571441d11f8ad014d38ae2

  • SHA512

    8ee411658b8e92adabcbdfbf614caeb93f89151468d1669228415852bb909180dbd4982773d5cf0926c24f7ddbfc8f6a6b9931e321c9b049d75c41540f333ca9

  • SSDEEP

    49152:zkM0799ib9i7ARHg8nCUpUm4g6XGv8pyw8hrHYxEtFlL2:wM07uUuCUWpsA+hLYxEtFc

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://91.215.85.23:3434

AES_key

Extracted

Family

hook

C2

http://91.215.85.23:3434

AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      f5b14d5b068f5f0b4ff0ce54ebac9d16fe57d1dfbe571441d11f8ad014d38ae2.bin

    • Size

      2.1MB

    • MD5

      32c53b6ff8f3f834e554321b385810e5

    • SHA1

      b3bd943262572ce0705fc8e478cacaa5bd62f6f0

    • SHA256

      f5b14d5b068f5f0b4ff0ce54ebac9d16fe57d1dfbe571441d11f8ad014d38ae2

    • SHA512

      8ee411658b8e92adabcbdfbf614caeb93f89151468d1669228415852bb909180dbd4982773d5cf0926c24f7ddbfc8f6a6b9931e321c9b049d75c41540f333ca9

    • SSDEEP

      49152:zkM0799ib9i7ARHg8nCUpUm4g6XGv8pyw8hrHYxEtFlL2:wM07uUuCUWpsA+hLYxEtFc

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Hook

      Hook is an Android malware that is based on Ermac with RAT capabilities.

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries information about running processes on the device

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about running processes on the device.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about the current Wi-Fi connection.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks