General

  • Target

    f013e9c8259fc864ee1fea67f706ef0d49cb15c03dace196a5da5d28e5e5c7d1.bin

  • Size

    958KB

  • Sample

    241002-14t5nazdpp

  • MD5

    74c183839829db36c2aa62bbd57a2c84

  • SHA1

    98c8f943163fa154a657cebc0bef5f8cf7060c19

  • SHA256

    f013e9c8259fc864ee1fea67f706ef0d49cb15c03dace196a5da5d28e5e5c7d1

  • SHA512

    7e2fb6a67a1ba8a0d5fe9ca2baaef82aee87009b558320c14b3747c444c26775fdc5efe4fd797515ac30f00d8f50f8cdb18f4318e4c1f4053236327c341dc317

  • SSDEEP

    12288:YAHJxONmFUxiUNZPUoUcUfgfcI7FMU6f6VaUa0f8sUxUZMUnUxnDOUv:YAHiNnBNZMxlfgEIJy6sxyZVUxnPv

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.19.53:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      f013e9c8259fc864ee1fea67f706ef0d49cb15c03dace196a5da5d28e5e5c7d1.bin

    • Size

      958KB

    • MD5

      74c183839829db36c2aa62bbd57a2c84

    • SHA1

      98c8f943163fa154a657cebc0bef5f8cf7060c19

    • SHA256

      f013e9c8259fc864ee1fea67f706ef0d49cb15c03dace196a5da5d28e5e5c7d1

    • SHA512

      7e2fb6a67a1ba8a0d5fe9ca2baaef82aee87009b558320c14b3747c444c26775fdc5efe4fd797515ac30f00d8f50f8cdb18f4318e4c1f4053236327c341dc317

    • SSDEEP

      12288:YAHJxONmFUxiUNZPUoUcUfgfcI7FMU6f6VaUa0f8sUxUZMUnUxnDOUv:YAHiNnBNZMxlfgEIJy6sxyZVUxnPv

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks