General

  • Target

    f814b6716eaecf680e3f905c7670a96954774606d5be1c2d3fc051636f65e04d.bin

  • Size

    4.9MB

  • Sample

    241012-1x2wxsxhjr

  • MD5

    c32c9917cd24a4bf07e3eeebdf58337c

  • SHA1

    096f4f0050569d0420452e576728d3ae5ee0c245

  • SHA256

    f814b6716eaecf680e3f905c7670a96954774606d5be1c2d3fc051636f65e04d

  • SHA512

    c5d3157a85d2e3358ee5a2238316873baa30632964697dca97ab13817ef583891b8fe51bcce102ed2e55e2d020c5c9ea183f0ffebd5a5e182b0d1df3e6570f88

  • SSDEEP

    98304:HWrQ5w03ftD32h+5RHVPK/x6DYV2B/i0fiRIAr9jMj7+nCPhEXxk:7G03f932hYPK/x68MB/i9245Mo4EXxk

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

hydra

C2

http://taniyemezdoledked21.com

DES_key

Targets

    • Target

      f814b6716eaecf680e3f905c7670a96954774606d5be1c2d3fc051636f65e04d.bin

    • Size

      4.9MB

    • MD5

      c32c9917cd24a4bf07e3eeebdf58337c

    • SHA1

      096f4f0050569d0420452e576728d3ae5ee0c245

    • SHA256

      f814b6716eaecf680e3f905c7670a96954774606d5be1c2d3fc051636f65e04d

    • SHA512

      c5d3157a85d2e3358ee5a2238316873baa30632964697dca97ab13817ef583891b8fe51bcce102ed2e55e2d020c5c9ea183f0ffebd5a5e182b0d1df3e6570f88

    • SSDEEP

      98304:HWrQ5w03ftD32h+5RHVPK/x6DYV2B/i0fiRIAr9jMj7+nCPhEXxk:7G03f932hYPK/x68MB/i9245Mo4EXxk

    • Hydra

      Android banker and info stealer.

    • Hydra payload

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Reads the contacts stored on the device.

    • Looks up external IP address via web service

      Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries information about active data network

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks