General

  • Target

    a68b6eb3b9a4e8c721f62e066f28ef32fb446365e77957228a55b94b13ab1a02.bin

  • Size

    1017KB

  • Sample

    241023-1zhaas1grb

  • MD5

    8a44bb8afa4fc226eaec4ade79495b3b

  • SHA1

    d3c43e0b0c4a3fe1e758348483a0efd469b039da

  • SHA256

    a68b6eb3b9a4e8c721f62e066f28ef32fb446365e77957228a55b94b13ab1a02

  • SHA512

    2a5e64906de4e3190bede914a59894b6fc0bf3cf2a867ac64be0548d417add06ea0525e204526a094aac03e877d5ebeb70eeebf52c1091ba127a1f353882567a

  • SSDEEP

    24576:Og/p01RkkuXyXLscyxeVbDmi6khEi8qR3yCgo4:Og/MvXLFyxedyi6khDiCgo4

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://173.231.207.95:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      a68b6eb3b9a4e8c721f62e066f28ef32fb446365e77957228a55b94b13ab1a02.bin

    • Size

      1017KB

    • MD5

      8a44bb8afa4fc226eaec4ade79495b3b

    • SHA1

      d3c43e0b0c4a3fe1e758348483a0efd469b039da

    • SHA256

      a68b6eb3b9a4e8c721f62e066f28ef32fb446365e77957228a55b94b13ab1a02

    • SHA512

      2a5e64906de4e3190bede914a59894b6fc0bf3cf2a867ac64be0548d417add06ea0525e204526a094aac03e877d5ebeb70eeebf52c1091ba127a1f353882567a

    • SSDEEP

      24576:Og/p01RkkuXyXLscyxeVbDmi6khEi8qR3yCgo4:Og/MvXLFyxedyi6khDiCgo4

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks