General

  • Target

    3a1727e0da1a37aeab5926ae26ea4889cdff3d43bfd37a0f8ca07ccffe381442.bin

  • Size

    3.6MB

  • Sample

    241026-1z37rsxmbj

  • MD5

    9c64d5fc9d3b9d41767e0879e40f01c7

  • SHA1

    8d02556d0e5418c2ffbf9945d5e9eea45cfa68d0

  • SHA256

    3a1727e0da1a37aeab5926ae26ea4889cdff3d43bfd37a0f8ca07ccffe381442

  • SHA512

    a3228d4a3a47996638ed77f7e92ad9f1ee467a7e0f1030ad8e670e0eddb042e791b2f7e592fed223bb795604532d690c2cf0e464d9282cc0691a5e7b7be15029

  • SSDEEP

    49152:fkXrvK3uPBNE+/cEljRGbpkVxxTicHaHODvOjDP2mAphTSWERYpU7hcUXvjT9smB:fgy3u5gwAMxTiIOPR0+OiniMHmAiYMDG

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://81.177.140.60:3434

AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
rsa_pubkey
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Extracted

Family

hook

C2

http://81.177.140.60:3434

AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
rsa_pubkey
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      3a1727e0da1a37aeab5926ae26ea4889cdff3d43bfd37a0f8ca07ccffe381442.bin

    • Size

      3.6MB

    • MD5

      9c64d5fc9d3b9d41767e0879e40f01c7

    • SHA1

      8d02556d0e5418c2ffbf9945d5e9eea45cfa68d0

    • SHA256

      3a1727e0da1a37aeab5926ae26ea4889cdff3d43bfd37a0f8ca07ccffe381442

    • SHA512

      a3228d4a3a47996638ed77f7e92ad9f1ee467a7e0f1030ad8e670e0eddb042e791b2f7e592fed223bb795604532d690c2cf0e464d9282cc0691a5e7b7be15029

    • SSDEEP

      49152:fkXrvK3uPBNE+/cEljRGbpkVxxTicHaHODvOjDP2mAphTSWERYpU7hcUXvjT9smB:fgy3u5gwAMxTiIOPR0+OiniMHmAiYMDG

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Hook

      Hook is an Android malware that is based on Ermac with RAT capabilities.

    • Hook family

    • Checks if the Android device is rooted.

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries information about the current Wi-Fi connection

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to collect information about the current Wi-Fi connection.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests changing the default SMS application.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks