General

  • Target

    RNSM00426.7z

  • Size

    17.3MB

  • Sample

    241027-takkssxjgt

  • MD5

    8cf2c7d415775b5196246520c2b59271

  • SHA1

    82ef631a57e81daf3bb2e417eab8da6430ad20dc

  • SHA256

    5eac949abc1ffef1ef1674274a591d10ba4007bd56162cc0c5bb43a99644506d

  • SHA512

    cbd349f83deaaea2c0774e51eefc6863e3a0845f2e93b829c797e845c9852f5fd82922e7d6308322dd22b92d08cf9d4c166f6ee09eb04b024f85da7cbdba8ce1

  • SSDEEP

    393216:4Y+JuAQ92vSTTF6Bmbm6+f90VZ5WT1J0o5ji7XyB1lczJ:WJOwGoBymJfY5WT1J0ayqjcl

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

crimsonrat

C2

172.245.87.12

Extracted

Path

C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\HOW-TO-DECRYPT-4lrb9.txt

Ransom Note
[+] What happened? [+] Your files are encrypted, and currently unavailable. You can check it: all files on you computer has extension *.4lrb9 By the way, everything is possible to recover (restore), but you need to follow our instructions. Otherwise, you cant get back your data (NEVER). [+] What guarantees? [+] Its just a business. We absolutely do not care about you and your deals, except getting benefits. If we do not do our work and liabilities - nobody will cooperate with us. Its not in our interests. To check the ability of returning files, You should go to our website. There you can decrypt one file for free. That is our guarantee. If you will not cooperate with our service - for us, its does not matter. But you will lose your time and data, cause just we have the private key. In practice - time is much more valuable than money. [+] How to get access on website? [+] Using a TOR browser! - Download and install TOR browser from this site: hxxps://torproject.org/ - Open our website: hxxp://5lyi3c7x3ioakru4.onion - Follow the on-screen instructions Extension name: *.4lrb9 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- !!! DANGER !!! DONT try to change files by yourself, DONT use any third party software for restoring your data or antivirus solutions - its may entail damge of the private key and, as result, The Loss all data. !!! !!! !!! ONE MORE TIME: Its in your interests to get your files back. From our side, we (the best specialists) will make everything possible for restoring, but please do not interfere. !!! !!! !!! ��

Extracted

Path

C:\Program Files\7-Zip\Lang\!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT

Family

buran

Ransom Note
!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!! All your files, documents, photos, databases and other important files are encrypted. You are not able to decrypt it by yourself! The only method of recovering files is to purchase an unique private key. Only we can give you this key and only we can recover your files. To be sure we have the decryptor and it works you can send an email: [email protected] and decrypt one file for free. But this file should be of not valuable! Do you really want to restore your files? Write to email: [email protected] Reserved email: [email protected] Your personal ID: C6C-677-A9C Attention! * Do not rename encrypted files. * Do not try to decrypt your data using third party software, it may cause permanent data loss. * Decryption of your files with the help of third parties may cause increased price (they add their fee to our) or you can become a victim of a scam.

Targets

    • Target

      RNSM00426.7z

    • Size

      17.3MB

    • MD5

      8cf2c7d415775b5196246520c2b59271

    • SHA1

      82ef631a57e81daf3bb2e417eab8da6430ad20dc

    • SHA256

      5eac949abc1ffef1ef1674274a591d10ba4007bd56162cc0c5bb43a99644506d

    • SHA512

      cbd349f83deaaea2c0774e51eefc6863e3a0845f2e93b829c797e845c9852f5fd82922e7d6308322dd22b92d08cf9d4c166f6ee09eb04b024f85da7cbdba8ce1

    • SSDEEP

      393216:4Y+JuAQ92vSTTF6Bmbm6+f90VZ5WT1J0o5ji7XyB1lczJ:WJOwGoBymJfY5WT1J0ayqjcl

    • Buran

      Ransomware-as-a-service based on the VegaLocker family first identified in 2019.

    • Buran family

    • CrimsonRAT main payload

    • CrimsonRat

      Crimson RAT is a malware linked to a Pakistani-linked threat actor.

    • Crimsonrat family

    • Detects Zeppelin payload

    • Hades Ransomware

      Ransomware family attributed to Evil Corp APT first seen in late 2020.

    • Hades family

    • Hades payload

    • ModiLoader, DBatLoader

      ModiLoader is a Delphi loader that misuses cloud services to download other malicious families.

    • Modifies WinLogon for persistence

    • Modiloader family

    • Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess

    • VashSorena Golang binary

    • VashSorena Ransomware

      Ransomware family with multiple versions/spinoffs. Decryption of files is generally possible without paying the ransom.

    • Vashsorena family

    • Zeppelin Ransomware

      Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) written in Delphi and first seen in 2019.

    • Zeppelin family

    • Deletes shadow copies

      Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.

    • ModiLoader Second Stage

    • Renames multiple (163) files with added filename extension

      This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

    • Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup

      Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine.

    • Downloads MZ/PE file

    • Checks BIOS information in registry

      BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

    • Checks computer location settings

      Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.

    • Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager

      Suspicious access to Credentials History.

    • Executes dropped EXE

    • Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot

    • Loads dropped DLL

    • Modifies file permissions

    • Reads user/profile data of web browsers

      Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

    • Adds Run key to start application

    • Checks installed software on the system

      Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.

    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)

    • Enumerates connected drives

      Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

    • Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2

    • Looks up external IP address via web service

      Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.

    • Drops file in System32 directory

    • Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories

    • Suspicious use of SetThreadContext

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Tasks