General
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Target
RNSM00426.7z
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Size
17.3MB
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Sample
241027-takkssxjgt
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MD5
8cf2c7d415775b5196246520c2b59271
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SHA1
82ef631a57e81daf3bb2e417eab8da6430ad20dc
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SHA256
5eac949abc1ffef1ef1674274a591d10ba4007bd56162cc0c5bb43a99644506d
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SHA512
cbd349f83deaaea2c0774e51eefc6863e3a0845f2e93b829c797e845c9852f5fd82922e7d6308322dd22b92d08cf9d4c166f6ee09eb04b024f85da7cbdba8ce1
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SSDEEP
393216:4Y+JuAQ92vSTTF6Bmbm6+f90VZ5WT1J0o5ji7XyB1lczJ:WJOwGoBymJfY5WT1J0ayqjcl
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
RNSM00426.7z
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
Malware Config
Extracted
crimsonrat
172.245.87.12
Extracted
C:\Users\Admin\Desktop\HOW-TO-DECRYPT-4lrb9.txt
Extracted
C:\Program Files\7-Zip\Lang\!!! ALL YOUR FILES ARE ENCRYPTED !!!.TXT
buran
Targets
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Target
RNSM00426.7z
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Size
17.3MB
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MD5
8cf2c7d415775b5196246520c2b59271
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SHA1
82ef631a57e81daf3bb2e417eab8da6430ad20dc
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SHA256
5eac949abc1ffef1ef1674274a591d10ba4007bd56162cc0c5bb43a99644506d
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SHA512
cbd349f83deaaea2c0774e51eefc6863e3a0845f2e93b829c797e845c9852f5fd82922e7d6308322dd22b92d08cf9d4c166f6ee09eb04b024f85da7cbdba8ce1
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SSDEEP
393216:4Y+JuAQ92vSTTF6Bmbm6+f90VZ5WT1J0o5ji7XyB1lczJ:WJOwGoBymJfY5WT1J0ayqjcl
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Buran
Ransomware-as-a-service based on the VegaLocker family first identified in 2019.
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Buran family
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CrimsonRAT main payload
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Crimsonrat family
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Detects Zeppelin payload
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Hades Ransomware
Ransomware family attributed to Evil Corp APT first seen in late 2020.
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Hades family
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Hades payload
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ModiLoader, DBatLoader
ModiLoader is a Delphi loader that misuses cloud services to download other malicious families.
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Modifies WinLogon for persistence
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Modiloader family
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Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
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VashSorena Golang binary
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VashSorena Ransomware
Ransomware family with multiple versions/spinoffs. Decryption of files is generally possible without paying the ransom.
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Vashsorena family
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Zeppelin Ransomware
Ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) written in Delphi and first seen in 2019.
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Zeppelin family
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Deletes shadow copies
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
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ModiLoader Second Stage
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Renames multiple (163) files with added filename extension
This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.
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Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine.
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Downloads MZ/PE file
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Checks BIOS information in registry
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
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Checks computer location settings
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
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Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
Suspicious access to Credentials History.
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Executes dropped EXE
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Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot
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Loads dropped DLL
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Modifies file permissions
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Adds Run key to start application
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Checks installed software on the system
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
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Drops desktop.ini file(s)
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Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
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Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2
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Looks up external IP address via web service
Uses a legitimate IP lookup service to find the infected system's external IP.
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Drops file in System32 directory
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Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
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Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
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MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
3Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Winlogon Helper DLL
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
3Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Winlogon Helper DLL
1Defense Evasion
File and Directory Permissions Modification
1Hide Artifacts
2Hidden Files and Directories
2Impair Defenses
1Safe Mode Boot
1Indicator Removal
1File Deletion
1Modify Registry
5Subvert Trust Controls
1Install Root Certificate
1Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
2Credentials from Web Browsers
1Windows Credential Manager
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1