General
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Target
PONYDOODOO.png
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Size
186KB
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Sample
241101-1pvgwaxmek
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MD5
868076ce3956526083cf3f29bf156c2c
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SHA1
432d9335d2cb2dee2dde6f6301ae3349e3d239b7
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SHA256
7682efae2c4916c1750fe643fd85f2fdc2b8209e2fedb8691b4612a811e61ce5
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SHA512
49481e1bae76ba838f7e006f960c6f5bff5978317c5f3b4905effefde8c65394aacf91c9ad465816a08b279aa4cc81c28e4fbd01859bc59935a7fb0e08bd13d8
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SSDEEP
3072:snx5651LC8bLMxnBozjxGPwgbKwLZfoNTtd3SP4AuD2Nrn0ZqeYm/zvyQbpCkef:x+8bLMxnBozQPwyKwltVxnkYm/zvFbpu
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
PONYDOODOO.png
Resource
win11-20241007-en
Malware Config
Targets
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Target
PONYDOODOO.png
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Size
186KB
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MD5
868076ce3956526083cf3f29bf156c2c
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SHA1
432d9335d2cb2dee2dde6f6301ae3349e3d239b7
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SHA256
7682efae2c4916c1750fe643fd85f2fdc2b8209e2fedb8691b4612a811e61ce5
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SHA512
49481e1bae76ba838f7e006f960c6f5bff5978317c5f3b4905effefde8c65394aacf91c9ad465816a08b279aa4cc81c28e4fbd01859bc59935a7fb0e08bd13d8
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SSDEEP
3072:snx5651LC8bLMxnBozjxGPwgbKwLZfoNTtd3SP4AuD2Nrn0ZqeYm/zvyQbpCkef:x+8bLMxnBozQPwyKwltVxnkYm/zvFbpu
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Chaos Ransomware
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Chaos family
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Modifies WinLogon for persistence
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Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine.
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Disables Task Manager via registry modification
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Downloads MZ/PE file
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Event Triggered Execution: Image File Execution Options Injection
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Possible privilege escalation attempt
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Event Triggered Execution: Component Object Model Hijacking
Adversaries may establish persistence by executing malicious content triggered by hijacked references to Component Object Model (COM) objects.
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Executes dropped EXE
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Loads dropped DLL
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Modifies file permissions
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Adds Run key to start application
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Checks installed software on the system
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
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Drops desktop.ini file(s)
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Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
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Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2
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Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
Bootkits write to the MBR to gain persistence at a level below the operating system.
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Checks system information in the registry
System information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
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Drops file in System32 directory
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Sets desktop wallpaper using registry
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Suspicious use of NtCreateThreadExHideFromDebugger
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Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
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MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
3Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Winlogon Helper DLL
1Browser Extensions
1Event Triggered Execution
2Component Object Model Hijacking
1Image File Execution Options Injection
1Pre-OS Boot
1Bootkit
1Privilege Escalation
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
1Bypass User Account Control
1Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
3Active Setup
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Winlogon Helper DLL
1Event Triggered Execution
2Component Object Model Hijacking
1Image File Execution Options Injection
1Defense Evasion
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
1Bypass User Account Control
1File and Directory Permissions Modification
1Impair Defenses
1Disable or Modify Tools
1Modify Registry
9Pre-OS Boot
1Bootkit
1Subvert Trust Controls
1SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking
1