General

  • Target

    5c8b8b4c8891dc210cec633a1a57ed28ec654ebb186d9fc3da315c768b82744f.bin

  • Size

    958KB

  • Sample

    241103-116dhswbmb

  • MD5

    46d6498acfb25f92b2f3324bd1a6b7f6

  • SHA1

    3630a1e1e819afbeabf432c813c33a214bf6f260

  • SHA256

    5c8b8b4c8891dc210cec633a1a57ed28ec654ebb186d9fc3da315c768b82744f

  • SHA512

    54d88c69af759a9f3ca37c8ce879bb6dd02470a725a86264d5559071d3d91327f6d09885c7cf8372e460f82e1c385d7467d274d2efdce16874bc281971362271

  • SSDEEP

    24576:2AHLNoRNZM8lAlQbcDeoPP8woZFfVyZVUQP+:2AHkovV833T

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.18.138:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      5c8b8b4c8891dc210cec633a1a57ed28ec654ebb186d9fc3da315c768b82744f.bin

    • Size

      958KB

    • MD5

      46d6498acfb25f92b2f3324bd1a6b7f6

    • SHA1

      3630a1e1e819afbeabf432c813c33a214bf6f260

    • SHA256

      5c8b8b4c8891dc210cec633a1a57ed28ec654ebb186d9fc3da315c768b82744f

    • SHA512

      54d88c69af759a9f3ca37c8ce879bb6dd02470a725a86264d5559071d3d91327f6d09885c7cf8372e460f82e1c385d7467d274d2efdce16874bc281971362271

    • SSDEEP

      24576:2AHLNoRNZM8lAlQbcDeoPP8woZFfVyZVUQP+:2AHkovV833T

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks