Analysis

  • max time kernel
    121s
  • max time network
    148s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20241007-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    05-11-2024 12:23

General

  • Target

    Ransomware Akira.exe

  • Size

    1.0MB

  • MD5

    feb81a8d7e0f91d6f74b440cdd3c2f28

  • SHA1

    8c479629f45d8d9ea5e6ed48a3eeb9917fb7ad07

  • SHA256

    aaa7799edfd86b52438a9e0d71f8069cbcbe1988036b95888fcdc553e729b7b9

  • SHA512

    bf83affcd1ea656e05f18e55eb23cce2e2cb33ca6f24f5c22374c6f1d41f6277794c21f926939028326c043798bf34f14194b3ad51cee763b053e7a519199623

  • SSDEEP

    12288:Vpp+QIEmDzuImC01vbUE98pik+2i1NkshdMMK+AX99etq2dTd7f:Vpp+Q+u5bUI8pij1NkshdMf99etb5R

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Program Files (x86)\akira_readme.txt

Family

akira

Ransom Note
Hi friends, Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption. Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know: 1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal. 2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help. 3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data. 4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion. 5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us. If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions: 1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/. 2. Paste this link - https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion/d/3175904882-XTBIJ 3. Use this code - 9683-QE-ETXZ-GHWN - to log into our chat. Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
URLs

https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion

https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion/d/3175904882-XTBIJ

Signatures

  • Akira

    Akira is a ransomware first seen in March 2023 and targets several industries, including education, finance, real estate, manufacturing, and consulting.

  • Akira family
  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Renames multiple (8430) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell command to delete shadowcopy.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 31 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Ransomware Akira.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Ransomware Akira.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops startup file
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:1480
  • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject"
    1⤵
    • Process spawned unexpected child process
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1648
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2776

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Replay Monitor

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Downloads

  • C:\Program Files (x86)\akira_readme.txt

    Filesize

    2KB

    MD5

    08f762538499795b3fabc40857f2caea

    SHA1

    e9bf41d36e249f29877fe7f5211e3b3197edb5d4

    SHA256

    6dd6401da86a4fa1e8b74802fa9417b573dec2c29beaa8827494702f07024c4b

    SHA512

    e0466a5c878361ed2a3caff2a0df1f22a7772760bc81546a59f9a0e3e7402db4d67a82ceabb378857eea143d9834d6eb7284bbe10027322f648229981ab47b2a

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log

    Filesize

    3KB

    MD5

    95940cc0d67efa0b0374d064dac43708

    SHA1

    b0fb2cfa93e9b71a3808613f62160129fe5926ea

    SHA256

    8bfc6049175ba1fefb5e93620fddc14cda5aa5f09877c98ca5c99887ff737499

    SHA512

    5752806adad668a203415f3a1e4b52123424b4722027b706efbabcf3eddeaf92fba07da172b64eb3341962bd2c07af78d51f97c3dbc814b82bae1fbd8ff332b8

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_zu34csth.1z3.ps1

    Filesize

    60B

    MD5

    d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

    SHA1

    6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

    SHA256

    96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

    SHA512

    5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

  • memory/1648-0-0x00007FFA393E3000-0x00007FFA393E5000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    8KB

  • memory/1648-1-0x0000029E39FE0000-0x0000029E3A002000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    136KB

  • memory/1648-11-0x00007FFA393E0000-0x00007FFA39EA1000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/1648-12-0x00007FFA393E0000-0x00007FFA39EA1000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/1648-15-0x00007FFA393E0000-0x00007FFA39EA1000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    10.8MB