General

  • Target

    b83b96cb3af5226d7472a3dbe78f40b0d04877f0a0a23c74931e3a117c911ed5.bin

  • Size

    898KB

  • Sample

    241106-1wth6axqgy

  • MD5

    b30d5136de687cf9b8ed47411cdd1820

  • SHA1

    708c42e2835595ae3dd0b2fe4d53807d92a04e87

  • SHA256

    b83b96cb3af5226d7472a3dbe78f40b0d04877f0a0a23c74931e3a117c911ed5

  • SHA512

    d8492b800da1bb3a4e4c3d0ba1aa21a7102ac0b806975a96ece038096838bcaf9714faba8c877f3f2e6c3e7497a09d1ebd92bbf76360ebff8fdb0cc56bc55b27

  • SSDEEP

    12288:2AHJxiNFQ6rZBzXxl7avpEpazcAFrQMOYG0jmmYmoxPZK/+IMgqrDs:2AHWNPZRBlGqa4orQMOGjmMoxPZYlqro

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.18.138:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      b83b96cb3af5226d7472a3dbe78f40b0d04877f0a0a23c74931e3a117c911ed5.bin

    • Size

      898KB

    • MD5

      b30d5136de687cf9b8ed47411cdd1820

    • SHA1

      708c42e2835595ae3dd0b2fe4d53807d92a04e87

    • SHA256

      b83b96cb3af5226d7472a3dbe78f40b0d04877f0a0a23c74931e3a117c911ed5

    • SHA512

      d8492b800da1bb3a4e4c3d0ba1aa21a7102ac0b806975a96ece038096838bcaf9714faba8c877f3f2e6c3e7497a09d1ebd92bbf76360ebff8fdb0cc56bc55b27

    • SSDEEP

      12288:2AHJxiNFQ6rZBzXxl7avpEpazcAFrQMOYG0jmmYmoxPZK/+IMgqrDs:2AHWNPZRBlGqa4orQMOGjmMoxPZYlqro

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks