General

  • Target

    0efe931a0d32a1fe52b11d258b09d189d3c0a3345966cac362f5d22b97efaabc.bin

  • Size

    845KB

  • Sample

    241116-137z5avemd

  • MD5

    ab5ad396b602bef20d75a41bfd4a455e

  • SHA1

    e252ddf58f259fc735d38a94feb51c4ca9a6005e

  • SHA256

    0efe931a0d32a1fe52b11d258b09d189d3c0a3345966cac362f5d22b97efaabc

  • SHA512

    03b45a30c36273e8fac272e274369f8209e8c5c69ba105ae7ff497775cd9afb5c54c4a80ff744cc0b72e608a9ee424d31b849a6a9437b626a9c12853d08a2544

  • SSDEEP

    24576:bgSLU5u/H1D6wgXvKo9opF/DfWqqtaJyLU:bgSBUvNOpF7/qtGyLU

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.16.134:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      0efe931a0d32a1fe52b11d258b09d189d3c0a3345966cac362f5d22b97efaabc.bin

    • Size

      845KB

    • MD5

      ab5ad396b602bef20d75a41bfd4a455e

    • SHA1

      e252ddf58f259fc735d38a94feb51c4ca9a6005e

    • SHA256

      0efe931a0d32a1fe52b11d258b09d189d3c0a3345966cac362f5d22b97efaabc

    • SHA512

      03b45a30c36273e8fac272e274369f8209e8c5c69ba105ae7ff497775cd9afb5c54c4a80ff744cc0b72e608a9ee424d31b849a6a9437b626a9c12853d08a2544

    • SSDEEP

      24576:bgSLU5u/H1D6wgXvKo9opF/DfWqqtaJyLU:bgSBUvNOpF7/qtGyLU

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks