General

  • Target

    49e7e1c431dbf5f07257c2aae77f67c3e5cc3af412de7c448ecae7eea42f8e0c.bin

  • Size

    1018KB

  • Sample

    241204-1xt63stkh1

  • MD5

    e0d0eab5e2e5a50ad970a5ad44886359

  • SHA1

    5c5a1f0f7026780a420e1064ad809e66cc393423

  • SHA256

    49e7e1c431dbf5f07257c2aae77f67c3e5cc3af412de7c448ecae7eea42f8e0c

  • SHA512

    5f3fffae46c768944122050d408c6e9d0d4f8e1c65aa5e34062384e20d650cbb07d90eb6ef093d1e559bdea16000324d053298201ac80021e01948585126c641

  • SSDEEP

    24576:4tgRsqeoSbbNJz3gSDU+rUACACYnkUfq+ICv:4sZSbhJbgSTrhCYnkUfq+Ia

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://45.158.14.11:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      49e7e1c431dbf5f07257c2aae77f67c3e5cc3af412de7c448ecae7eea42f8e0c.bin

    • Size

      1018KB

    • MD5

      e0d0eab5e2e5a50ad970a5ad44886359

    • SHA1

      5c5a1f0f7026780a420e1064ad809e66cc393423

    • SHA256

      49e7e1c431dbf5f07257c2aae77f67c3e5cc3af412de7c448ecae7eea42f8e0c

    • SHA512

      5f3fffae46c768944122050d408c6e9d0d4f8e1c65aa5e34062384e20d650cbb07d90eb6ef093d1e559bdea16000324d053298201ac80021e01948585126c641

    • SSDEEP

      24576:4tgRsqeoSbbNJz3gSDU+rUACACYnkUfq+ICv:4sZSbhJbgSTrhCYnkUfq+Ia

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks