Overview

overview

10

Static

static

10

cc3652c078...18.exe

windows7-x64

10

cc3652c078...18.exe

windows10-2004-x64

10

Analysis

  • max time kernel
    117s
  • max time network
    118s
  • platform
    windows7_x64
  • resource
    win7-20241010-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win7-20241010-enlocale:en-usos:windows7-x64system
  • submitted
    06-12-2024 09:16

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General

  • Target

    cc3652c078fa2bdfbbfae33335c30bda_JaffaCakes118.exe

  • Size

    1.2MB

  • MD5

    cc3652c078fa2bdfbbfae33335c30bda

  • SHA1

    b3d3ad0c2c9d526717f55c431d51c2f1e957325b

  • SHA256

    0abb4a302819cdca6c9f56893ca2b52856b55a0aa68a3cb8bdcd55dcc1fad9ad

  • SHA512

    d027e1df8c10516b81e47ef840f0e2baf971c0e0c4e77ff0fdc0122bbbb66ed210fd78336cb40d05c76d91838ae89ebb3304050dbf7fb7eeec73d47d1d26ec3d

  • SSDEEP

    12288:QKMzISi3LAStu+KxSgNrc+YCiYKjqxJUZGhEzXMOalwmtnvXigwwdAnIK4RHLrog:vMsSibWXpNrcVEnvXigwwdAIK4R/W3

Score
10/10
credential_accessdefense_evasiondiscoveryevasionexecutionimpactpersistenceransomwarespywarestealer

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Users\Admin\!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.mht

Ransom Note
From: =?utf-8?B?0RFQctTF0YDQcNC60IXQvdC+IEludGVybmV0IED4cGxvseVyIDEz?= Subject: Date: San, 00 Jan 2000 00:00:00 +0000 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/html; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE =EF=BB=BF<!DOCTYPE HTML> <!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC "" "">=20 <HTML lang=3D"ru">=20 <HEAD>=20 <META = content=3D"IE = 3D11.0000" http-equiv=3D"X - UA - Compatible">=20 <META charset=3D"utf-8">=20 <TITLE>!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!</TITLE>=20 <LINK href=3D"style.css" rel=3D"stylesheet">=20 <META name=3D"GENERATOR" content=3D"MSHTML 11.00.10570.1001">=20 </HEAD>=20 <BODY>=20 <p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><span class=3DSpellE><b>=20 <span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:20.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-bidi-font-family:Arial;color:#C9211E'>=20 All your valiable data has been encrypted!</span></b></span></p><BR><BR>=20 <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph'>=20 <span class=3DSpellE><span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:13.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-bidi-font-family:Arial'>=20 Hello!<BR>Sorry, but we have inform you that your order has been blocked due to the issue of securities. Make sure your data is not blocked.=20 All your valuable files were encrypted with strong encryption algorithms AES-256 + RSA-2048 + CHACHA and renamed. You can read about these algorithms in Google.=20 Your unique encryption key is stored securely on our server and your data can be decrypted quickly and securely.<BR><BR>=20 We can prove that we can decrypt all of your data. Please just send us 3 small encrypted files which are randomly stored on your server.=20 We will decrypt these files and send them to you as a proof. Please note that files for free test decryption should not contain valuable information.<BR><BR>=20 As you know information is the most valuable resource in the world. That's why all of your confidential data was uploaded to our servers.=20 If you need proof, just write us and we will show you that we have your files. If you will not start a dialogue with us in 72 hours=20 we will be forced to publish your files in the Darknet. Your customers and partners will be informed about the data leak by email or phone.<BR><BR>=20 This way, your reputation will be ruined. If you will not react, we will be forced to sell the most important information such as databases=20 to interested parties to generate some profit.<BR><BR>Please understand that we are just doing our job. We don't want to harm your company.=20 Think of this incident as an opportunity to improve your security. We are opened for dialogue and ready to help you. We are professionals,=20 please don't try to fool us.<BR></span></span></p><BR><BR><p class=3DMsoNormal align=3Dcenter style=3D'text-align:center'><b>=20 <span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:14.0pt;font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-bidi-font-family:Arial'>=20 If you want to resolve this situation,<BR>please write to ALL of these 2 email addresses:<BR>=20 [email protected]<BR>[email protected]<BR>In subject line please write your ID: 8894338990327332297</span></b></p><BR><BR>=20 <p class=3DMsoNormal style=3D'text-align:justify;text-justify:inter-ideograph'><b>=20 <span lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";mso-bidi-font-family: Arial;color:#C9211E'>=20 Important!<BR>=20 * We asking to send your message to ALL of our 2 email adresses because for various reasons, your email may not be delivered.<BR>=20 * Our message may be recognized as spam, so be sure to check the spam folder.<BR>=20 * If we do not respond to you within 24 hours, write to us from another email address. Use Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, or any other well-known email service.<BR>=20 Important<BR>=20 * Please don't waste the time, it will result only additinal damage to your company!<BR>=20 * Please do not try to decrypt the files yourself. We will not be able to help you if files will be modified.<BR>=20 </span></b></p>=20 <BR>=20 </BODY><BR>=20 </HTML>
URLs

http-equiv=3D"X

Signatures

  • Deletes shadow copies 3 TTPs

    Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.

    ransomwaredefense_evasionimpactexecution
  • Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
    ransomwareevasion
  • Renames multiple (911) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

    ransomware
  • Deletes System State backups 3 TTPs 2 IoCs

    Uses wbadmin.exe to inhibit system recovery.

    ransomware
  • Drops file in Drivers directory 13 IoCs
  • Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager 1 TTPs

    Suspicious access to Credentials History.

    credential_accessstealer
  • Deletes itself 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

    spywarestealer
  • Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
    persistence
  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 1 IoCs
  • Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 39 IoCs

    Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

  • Indicator Removal: File Deletion 1 TTPs

    Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.

    defense_evasion
  • Drops file in System32 directory 64 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Drops file in Windows directory 50 IoCs
  • Browser Information Discovery 1 TTPs

    Enumerate browser information.

    discovery
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Interacts with shadow copies 3 TTPs 13 IoCs

    Shadow copies are often targeted by ransomware to inhibit system recovery.

    ransomware
  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 23 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 57 IoCs
  • System policy modification 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
    evasion
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

    ransomware

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cc3652c078fa2bdfbbfae33335c30bda_JaffaCakes118.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\cc3652c078fa2bdfbbfae33335c30bda_JaffaCakes118.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops file in Drivers directory
    • Adds Run key to start application
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Enumerates connected drives
    • Drops file in System32 directory
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Drops file in Windows directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    • System policy modification
    PID:2124
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=401MB
      2⤵
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2800
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=c: /on=c: /maxsize=unbounded
      2⤵
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2652
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=401MB
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2728
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=d: /on=d: /maxsize=unbounded
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:1440
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=401MB
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:3008
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=e: /on=e: /maxsize=unbounded
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:1724
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=401MB
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2064
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=f: /on=f: /maxsize=unbounded
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2864
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=401MB
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2876
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=g: /on=g: /maxsize=unbounded
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2968
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=401MB
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:1796
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Resize ShadowStorage /for=h: /on=h: /maxsize=unbounded
      2⤵
      • Enumerates connected drives
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2016
    • C:\Windows\system32\vssadmin.exe
      vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet
      2⤵
      • Interacts with shadow copies
      PID:2836
    • C:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exe
      bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoveryenabled No
      2⤵
      • Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
      PID:684
    • C:\Windows\system32\bcdedit.exe
      bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures
      2⤵
      • Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
      PID:536
    • C:\Windows\system32\wbadmin.exe
      wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP
      2⤵
      • Deletes System State backups
      • Drops file in Windows directory
      PID:776
    • C:\Windows\system32\wbadmin.exe
      wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTATEBACKUP -deleteOldest
      2⤵
      • Deletes System State backups
      • Drops file in Windows directory
      PID:2152
    • C:\Windows\System32\Wbem\wmic.exe
      wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive
      2⤵
      • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
      PID:2224
    • C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe
      "C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe" /c del C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\CC3652~1.EXE >> NUL
      2⤵
      • Deletes itself
      PID:2268
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:2888

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

1
T1059

Windows Management Instrumentation

1
T1047

Persistence

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

1
T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

1
T1547.001

Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

1
T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

1
T1547.001

Defense Evasion

Direct Volume Access

1
T1006

Indicator Removal

4
T1070

File Deletion

4
T1070.004

Modify Registry

2
T1112

Credential Access

Credentials from Password Stores

2
T1555

Credentials from Web Browsers

1
T1555.003

Windows Credential Manager

1
T1555.004

Unsecured Credentials

1
T1552

Credentials In Files

1
T1552.001

Discovery

Browser Information Discovery

1
T1217

Peripheral Device Discovery

1
T1120

Query Registry

1
T1012

System Information Discovery

2
T1082

Lateral Movement

Collection

Data from Local System

1
T1005

Command and Control

Exfiltration

Impact

Inhibit System Recovery

4
T1490

Replay Monitor

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Downloads

  • C:\Users\Admin\!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.mht
    Filesize

    4KB

    MD5

    aa893f5e5b5066777df56f91165c0110

    SHA1

    e15ad248d0c65cf0aff108f258bd5817ec93a464

    SHA256

    9f5970914bd7ceb8ac86752b47a4b18865b5138e21b89e1f158654e2341c5ac3

    SHA512

    8f6bba494d68991d48efa5ae27992a87d9ba2d636283b36a82bfc0f1bebfd9672eca6be3dade417508c6317e7cab949ed904eec06376d586f21a3d7734cdf3a4

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