Analysis

  • max time kernel
    148s
  • max time network
    150s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20241007-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    08-12-2024 09:18

General

  • Target

    d07b379369e9faea0fed406b9b37652b2fc6453044ab17c1e2189cf61640ab90.exe

  • Size

    1.0MB

  • MD5

    5eadd67bec799465fa27a17d6bf93e2d

  • SHA1

    aa5bf7a9520cfdd620b4ba98064aa5e2f2f45521

  • SHA256

    d07b379369e9faea0fed406b9b37652b2fc6453044ab17c1e2189cf61640ab90

  • SHA512

    cbbf7cf190e81ef30cfc0e352bf8fe2050c5771dc5259f633dd45e968fa4b529cb5158a4115a07c6b95de9da0e53f9430044b8b912ddb6e6cab2c2c28035cb06

  • SSDEEP

    12288:Vpp+QIEmDzuImC01vbUE98pik+2i1NkshdMMK+AX99etq2dTd5f:Vpp+Q+u5bUI8pij1NkshdMf99etb5D

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Program Files (x86)\akira_readme.txt

Family

akira

Ransom Note
Hi friends, Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption. Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know: 1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal. 2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help. 3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data. 4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion. 5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us. If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions: 1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/. 2. Paste this link - https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion/si 3. Use this code - 5825-KH-BOVL-EBSP - to log into our chat. Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
URLs

https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion

https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion/si

Signatures

  • Akira

    Akira is a ransomware first seen in March 2023 and targets several industries, including education, finance, real estate, manufacturing, and consulting.

  • Akira family
  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Renames multiple (8446) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell command to delete shadowcopy.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 31 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\d07b379369e9faea0fed406b9b37652b2fc6453044ab17c1e2189cf61640ab90.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\d07b379369e9faea0fed406b9b37652b2fc6453044ab17c1e2189cf61640ab90.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops startup file
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:3084
  • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject"
    1⤵
    • Process spawned unexpected child process
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1672
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1232
  • C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
    1⤵
      PID:3152

    Network

    MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

    Replay Monitor

    Loading Replay Monitor...

    Downloads

    • C:\Program Files (x86)\akira_readme.txt

      Filesize

      2KB

      MD5

      c09c43e24a17fc73616add9c00f3f0fa

      SHA1

      2045ed30f2757081201f06f87e442a0227beca40

      SHA256

      6d583ae416eaa1b65b0c9c433852f6edfacba96e39c85a005ca6d5828d4e70f0

      SHA512

      be9312440d658dfe7dc97ddb0e77f24f3e1028a6f6f96b6f7e73275b0ad06abb0bd1729506d11c47102fed482c75fe3d8202002ea0250c6126d14deb24c717de

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log

      Filesize

      3KB

      MD5

      61eb1fc038f1e5a84348523d0c7c3d5d

      SHA1

      3efc9a502d38c5a95a678b124716a01fd0eeb0fc

      SHA256

      c76aa3e56645039b4166b49025bc3d3f8c8de01a6f4a792414d44baafbca2614

      SHA512

      4b16be971a0ce1dba9e01c5b109864df258e5fd45580a4fdcf4e099476866715254fd7baaf7a3871b5eb85fb0f466c910414aeffce9d01dafe2c741530769da0

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_gaqdmnbn.nkn.ps1

      Filesize

      60B

      MD5

      d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

      SHA1

      6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

      SHA256

      96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

      SHA512

      5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

    • memory/1672-0-0x00007FFD857F3000-0x00007FFD857F5000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      8KB

    • memory/1672-6-0x000001F767F90000-0x000001F767FB2000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      136KB

    • memory/1672-11-0x00007FFD857F0000-0x00007FFD862B1000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/1672-12-0x00007FFD857F0000-0x00007FFD862B1000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/1672-15-0x00007FFD857F0000-0x00007FFD862B1000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB