General

  • Target

    2bad5d3f3eaa350b15966f2556de99a4e0fa06632c79c282a07df83d25aa2794.bin

  • Size

    1.1MB

  • Sample

    241213-1wn9fazjes

  • MD5

    696083849beb1457b64dc1b213e4f231

  • SHA1

    74f2dc2b32359bc10fe41d8fc223293d7c6b09c2

  • SHA256

    2bad5d3f3eaa350b15966f2556de99a4e0fa06632c79c282a07df83d25aa2794

  • SHA512

    a91374a20073f6599ccc3ac0d86495a0c92469d41d0fe64d72a2f381ed15f80f9f0937c796e96dae40f4dcecaa44a0a29af7bb018070ff33fdcd950914d9e846

  • SSDEEP

    24576:1g/zryozMA78Fm1I+Tw78WE3uZLeiZKSrwA+tYaaly9KOKWot9ce58s5C:1g/VYAwF8wwWE3Uei9wSaSJBWuSs4

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://45.94.31.93:3434

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      2bad5d3f3eaa350b15966f2556de99a4e0fa06632c79c282a07df83d25aa2794.bin

    • Size

      1.1MB

    • MD5

      696083849beb1457b64dc1b213e4f231

    • SHA1

      74f2dc2b32359bc10fe41d8fc223293d7c6b09c2

    • SHA256

      2bad5d3f3eaa350b15966f2556de99a4e0fa06632c79c282a07df83d25aa2794

    • SHA512

      a91374a20073f6599ccc3ac0d86495a0c92469d41d0fe64d72a2f381ed15f80f9f0937c796e96dae40f4dcecaa44a0a29af7bb018070ff33fdcd950914d9e846

    • SSDEEP

      24576:1g/zryozMA78Fm1I+Tw78WE3uZLeiZKSrwA+tYaaly9KOKWot9ce58s5C:1g/VYAwF8wwWE3Uei9wSaSJBWuSs4

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks