General

  • Target

    81d3e738365de796d3af82aedfad54224858577074af34931ef8a84b509f3df6

  • Size

    9.5MB

  • Sample

    241216-dxeeastjem

  • MD5

    81de421b5be2dabbb92fd8492c1544cb

  • SHA1

    a3f45148638ee6eee1bf5dc83fa06f4b9154bf8b

  • SHA256

    81d3e738365de796d3af82aedfad54224858577074af34931ef8a84b509f3df6

  • SHA512

    e725a3cfec025f2906201c5d04821a85d6e6bd568c4e58d4413956bf03544777a5fa972fa20ed142fe9eba1dfd8767001cf0165230db305e323b3da778932e54

  • SSDEEP

    196608:HOMLw5IrwUYgwdGRdnd3X0UchfWNrp7BjdS:zLw5IrwUYgIdlhfAPg

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

octo

C2

https://6cbe12d804e423a2e6f3631799f16cb5.com

AES_key
AES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      81d3e738365de796d3af82aedfad54224858577074af34931ef8a84b509f3df6

    • Size

      9.5MB

    • MD5

      81de421b5be2dabbb92fd8492c1544cb

    • SHA1

      a3f45148638ee6eee1bf5dc83fa06f4b9154bf8b

    • SHA256

      81d3e738365de796d3af82aedfad54224858577074af34931ef8a84b509f3df6

    • SHA512

      e725a3cfec025f2906201c5d04821a85d6e6bd568c4e58d4413956bf03544777a5fa972fa20ed142fe9eba1dfd8767001cf0165230db305e323b3da778932e54

    • SSDEEP

      196608:HOMLw5IrwUYgwdGRdnd3X0UchfWNrp7BjdS:zLw5IrwUYgIdlhfAPg

    • Octo

      Octo is a banking malware with remote access capabilities first seen in April 2022.

    • Octo family

    • Octo payload

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks