Analysis

  • max time kernel
    149s
  • max time network
    150s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20241007-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    16-12-2024 12:23

General

  • Target

    1ba1ccfacffbb6be9480380f5535a30d3eee1dd7787f3c649ebf8ea2a6a5de51.bin.exe

  • Size

    969KB

  • MD5

    b666ea987c7dff545e984ad88ce80a9b

  • SHA1

    77abcfd111c8ca024c2d8f1f8faf22723c03fbfc

  • SHA256

    1ba1ccfacffbb6be9480380f5535a30d3eee1dd7787f3c649ebf8ea2a6a5de51

  • SHA512

    21846821d51e2b58aaeb29eabe0980610d8ae562e25bed78637168af41bf130abe2648a11521ff9733f82240c2de3ca55a4bd0985b72267f16ded3d347d0061a

  • SSDEEP

    12288:snYNH8o1dLrWmhn9DvHQ0FxXKvI6+/605qrg/Z7FLIXaQ0t2xlS:sYJLrWmjw0FxXKvIj605ig7IXaCo

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\Users\akira_readme.txt

Family

akira

Ransom Note
Hi friends, Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption. Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know: 1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal. 2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help. 3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data. 4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion. 5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us. If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions: 1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/. 2. Paste this link - https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion. 3. Use this code - 5988-RS-MVEF-RKIP - to log into our chat. Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
URLs

https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion

https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion

Signatures

  • Akira

    Akira is a ransomware first seen in March 2023 and targets several industries, including education, finance, real estate, manufacturing, and consulting.

  • Akira family
  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Renames multiple (8388) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell command to delete shadowcopy.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 31 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1ba1ccfacffbb6be9480380f5535a30d3eee1dd7787f3c649ebf8ea2a6a5de51.bin.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\1ba1ccfacffbb6be9480380f5535a30d3eee1dd7787f3c649ebf8ea2a6a5de51.bin.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops startup file
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:4972
  • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject"
    1⤵
    • Process spawned unexpected child process
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1556
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:1220
  • C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc
    1⤵
      PID:1064

    Network

    MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

    Replay Monitor

    Loading Replay Monitor...

    Downloads

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log

      Filesize

      3KB

      MD5

      1e3ce05979fe7aa9d26d4df7821ad9ad

      SHA1

      05bcf7d95eb0c5b97db13d2f19da185531b06849

      SHA256

      04a42098c1d98786eaff11a761c37ede795717f1e591138b7995001beca1f91d

      SHA512

      960524c52d616d9a8367c05e45b93b022c6f1e5cfad2c1fa02e53989ccd17942c143d0191504b073d0e00b89fcab192f4c160cb9b74fa74548d8815276c8a9da

    • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_to1h0gef.wyz.ps1

      Filesize

      60B

      MD5

      d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

      SHA1

      6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

      SHA256

      96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

      SHA512

      5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

    • C:\Users\akira_readme.txt

      Filesize

      2KB

      MD5

      2d8bb4415ac117a7fc4281f8eefe17fa

      SHA1

      9bd7d1bd77dbe6bbc6f4e71e5c019dcd52ea525e

      SHA256

      b0706ec31bb021641868041b7e28ccb7b69b0b1e7a6d14501b1f4d788c935dd8

      SHA512

      ac65bf02d0af251fe31482d1f80c42c6c57e15fdb5f9c46944518a5d5a84711585b4395441cfb65d06663526fed8307d04fc8ad69aaeed22ee8e6c186d0e3784

    • memory/1556-0-0x00007FFCC7F03000-0x00007FFCC7F05000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      8KB

    • memory/1556-1-0x00000114F1720000-0x00000114F1742000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      136KB

    • memory/1556-11-0x00007FFCC7F00000-0x00007FFCC89C1000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/1556-12-0x00007FFCC7F00000-0x00007FFCC89C1000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB

    • memory/1556-15-0x00007FFCC7F00000-0x00007FFCC89C1000-memory.dmp

      Filesize

      10.8MB