General

  • Target

    9ebea357516638a32bd1022b946a561ec848e9de456da210291dc80863577e2a.bin

  • Size

    4.1MB

  • Sample

    241229-1w26asxqhz

  • MD5

    e04bfabcc135c8899271fdaf3fb0b3a9

  • SHA1

    97e79aee40b9d4d9b1c5ed153fc585b62d7f0496

  • SHA256

    9ebea357516638a32bd1022b946a561ec848e9de456da210291dc80863577e2a

  • SHA512

    c5ff6515cab103b3b0432ff3effb0117c4ad7f699d1dddf44dc600bb9e81a10ac278c8611a8f78e116aa4a2344bb43d37528275b49a28df28cf99e1107aa1d59

  • SSDEEP

    98304:4WqwE2sbRpJluzDN7Qoq7icd3wgIbZGDsLVgvXMeiCtBzbkIU+jqEWwb:VbE2sbRxuzDN7Qoq+cd3wg8GDsCPMelb

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.20.225:3434

DES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      9ebea357516638a32bd1022b946a561ec848e9de456da210291dc80863577e2a.bin

    • Size

      4.1MB

    • MD5

      e04bfabcc135c8899271fdaf3fb0b3a9

    • SHA1

      97e79aee40b9d4d9b1c5ed153fc585b62d7f0496

    • SHA256

      9ebea357516638a32bd1022b946a561ec848e9de456da210291dc80863577e2a

    • SHA512

      c5ff6515cab103b3b0432ff3effb0117c4ad7f699d1dddf44dc600bb9e81a10ac278c8611a8f78e116aa4a2344bb43d37528275b49a28df28cf99e1107aa1d59

    • SSDEEP

      98304:4WqwE2sbRpJluzDN7Qoq7icd3wgIbZGDsLVgvXMeiCtBzbkIU+jqEWwb:VbE2sbRxuzDN7Qoq+cd3wg8GDsCPMelb

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks