General

  • Target

    2947377c8888b686cf37ac1a8789def6e6a6975b4ccf93a3897aba98f08c93b6.bin

  • Size

    4.1MB

  • Sample

    241230-1wslvstlc1

  • MD5

    83c87f074b21e1df0e65bc0cd8a57dda

  • SHA1

    3b2ee27b573370e2cc1b8e958af14afff51c9b35

  • SHA256

    2947377c8888b686cf37ac1a8789def6e6a6975b4ccf93a3897aba98f08c93b6

  • SHA512

    5de6df06c004fa616c24d724a15e5b176243bf85879f99ddcefb6394a11c28a75e5736f5dff72de8d6857cdd9c6b8889234433ecc0fcd25be6b0a03df13b490f

  • SSDEEP

    98304:mlWRgc3l1EHBkeWGq34ziYHfgo9oWRLAKyNStVxAu8AuIufuMuCpO:vRgc3l1EHBkeWGq34ziC4QXLPlxFufLS

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.20.225:3434

DES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      2947377c8888b686cf37ac1a8789def6e6a6975b4ccf93a3897aba98f08c93b6.bin

    • Size

      4.1MB

    • MD5

      83c87f074b21e1df0e65bc0cd8a57dda

    • SHA1

      3b2ee27b573370e2cc1b8e958af14afff51c9b35

    • SHA256

      2947377c8888b686cf37ac1a8789def6e6a6975b4ccf93a3897aba98f08c93b6

    • SHA512

      5de6df06c004fa616c24d724a15e5b176243bf85879f99ddcefb6394a11c28a75e5736f5dff72de8d6857cdd9c6b8889234433ecc0fcd25be6b0a03df13b490f

    • SSDEEP

      98304:mlWRgc3l1EHBkeWGq34ziYHfgo9oWRLAKyNStVxAu8AuIufuMuCpO:vRgc3l1EHBkeWGq34ziC4QXLPlxFufLS

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks