General

  • Target

    e165525d93e01c5ce086981f84383320f8c7f4311dcd9a071e45e99df2583022.bin

  • Size

    4.4MB

  • Sample

    250105-1xb1haxmay

  • MD5

    3179804417ace63329e453f1156a05bf

  • SHA1

    69c00664f7324700bdd39dd875bbbc0861cb1752

  • SHA256

    e165525d93e01c5ce086981f84383320f8c7f4311dcd9a071e45e99df2583022

  • SHA512

    3cf9adf8afcddffb0961c2f5b77d550138c689ef1cc33cab7df2d1de22f59ba309eca0fd45bc6deba3444eba484b9ae7ad6c4d004fce4179118af4fceca5ba08

  • SSDEEP

    98304:pansYH+8ZX4aKh5D7Ok4cppM1G9c7iI04nrZ+zhuZb/Vk51GmK22tij+6ca:8neQ3Kh5D7Ok4cppzO04nr8Cb/VWGHBA

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://154.216.20.225:3434

DES_key
AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      e165525d93e01c5ce086981f84383320f8c7f4311dcd9a071e45e99df2583022.bin

    • Size

      4.4MB

    • MD5

      3179804417ace63329e453f1156a05bf

    • SHA1

      69c00664f7324700bdd39dd875bbbc0861cb1752

    • SHA256

      e165525d93e01c5ce086981f84383320f8c7f4311dcd9a071e45e99df2583022

    • SHA512

      3cf9adf8afcddffb0961c2f5b77d550138c689ef1cc33cab7df2d1de22f59ba309eca0fd45bc6deba3444eba484b9ae7ad6c4d004fce4179118af4fceca5ba08

    • SSDEEP

      98304:pansYH+8ZX4aKh5D7Ok4cppM1G9c7iI04nrZ+zhuZb/Vk51GmK22tij+6ca:8neQ3Kh5D7Ok4cppzO04nr8Cb/VWGHBA

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks