General
-
Target
2025-01-31_9c1ad9353ebaf125a5b7b432e428926b_medusalocker
-
Size
1.2MB
-
Sample
250131-car67sxlgs
-
MD5
9c1ad9353ebaf125a5b7b432e428926b
-
SHA1
bbf3803f1918041a0ae000c0e9a75ee5b2e3dcca
-
SHA256
f5e3aeee5aec053a0b2cc222787fc4a448c2e7cb1c1241f324910f6eb71ffe18
-
SHA512
fdadf57cb953c19105460bd5d78aa963e994ab95159dc68cd2f7a19f669746c2898d93c47f60a552d38c765f116111e4288ae1c15fd004e586fef774eb2af581
-
SSDEEP
12288:ZmHAIqyfF/5ebyz1dpPlRnMRTD410ALP68kG3Jz4S9FUmnyJtgoiOHmabd8ornX9:oHRFfauvpPXnMKqJtfiOHmUd8QTHt
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
2025-01-31_9c1ad9353ebaf125a5b7b432e428926b_medusalocker.exe
Resource
win7-20240903-en
Behavioral task
behavioral2
Sample
2025-01-31_9c1ad9353ebaf125a5b7b432e428926b_medusalocker.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20250129-en
Malware Config
Extracted
C:\Users\Admin\!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.mht
[email protected]<BR>[email protected]<BR>In
http-equiv=3D"X
Extracted
C:\ProgramData\Mozilla-1de4eec8-1241-4177-a864-e594e8d1fb38\!!!HOW_TO_DECRYPT!!!.mht
[email protected]<BR>[email protected]<BR>In
http-equiv=3D"X
Targets
-
-
Target
2025-01-31_9c1ad9353ebaf125a5b7b432e428926b_medusalocker
-
Size
1.2MB
-
MD5
9c1ad9353ebaf125a5b7b432e428926b
-
SHA1
bbf3803f1918041a0ae000c0e9a75ee5b2e3dcca
-
SHA256
f5e3aeee5aec053a0b2cc222787fc4a448c2e7cb1c1241f324910f6eb71ffe18
-
SHA512
fdadf57cb953c19105460bd5d78aa963e994ab95159dc68cd2f7a19f669746c2898d93c47f60a552d38c765f116111e4288ae1c15fd004e586fef774eb2af581
-
SSDEEP
12288:ZmHAIqyfF/5ebyz1dpPlRnMRTD410ALP68kG3Jz4S9FUmnyJtgoiOHmabd8ornX9:oHRFfauvpPXnMKqJtfiOHmUd8QTHt
-
Deletes shadow copies
Ransomware often targets backup files to inhibit system recovery.
-
Modifies boot configuration data using bcdedit
-
Renames multiple (925) files with added filename extension
This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.
-
Drops file in Drivers directory
-
Checks computer location settings
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
-
Credentials from Password Stores: Windows Credential Manager
Suspicious access to Credentials History.
-
Deletes itself
-
Adds Run key to start application
-
Drops desktop.ini file(s)
-
Enumerates connected drives
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
-
Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Adversaries may delete files left behind by the actions of their intrusion activity.
-
Drops file in System32 directory
-
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Defense Evasion
Direct Volume Access
1Indicator Removal
4File Deletion
4Modify Registry
2Credential Access
Credentials from Password Stores
2Credentials from Web Browsers
1Windows Credential Manager
1Unsecured Credentials
1Credentials In Files
1