General

  • Target

    77ed2df9d2ca2b9c3d6979bc48e48c0940f7b9ff625315168e20565ee3ed81ea.bin

  • Size

    1018KB

  • Sample

    250216-1zxpzszpaq

  • MD5

    39be32bc2d7b1edbaa2c75bcebf56ca8

  • SHA1

    b33609bf1f3f04cc791023134b202add292151a1

  • SHA256

    77ed2df9d2ca2b9c3d6979bc48e48c0940f7b9ff625315168e20565ee3ed81ea

  • SHA512

    aadfe05e488648eba9c0fbbf7836ff66283e945b9973f98334aa6472ae93d5d585048e6078f9c185881f1cec990ed910d3b4b5b469b77518331526d31a8eb4ac

  • SSDEEP

    12288:CoMbyZK5G+biuvip5RBlguC5gApVD5U+rUA5LgA4R4P4E4f4j444p454n4dQm:CoRI5eRBlO5gSDU+rUACACYnkUfq+II

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://20.199.76.181

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      77ed2df9d2ca2b9c3d6979bc48e48c0940f7b9ff625315168e20565ee3ed81ea.bin

    • Size

      1018KB

    • MD5

      39be32bc2d7b1edbaa2c75bcebf56ca8

    • SHA1

      b33609bf1f3f04cc791023134b202add292151a1

    • SHA256

      77ed2df9d2ca2b9c3d6979bc48e48c0940f7b9ff625315168e20565ee3ed81ea

    • SHA512

      aadfe05e488648eba9c0fbbf7836ff66283e945b9973f98334aa6472ae93d5d585048e6078f9c185881f1cec990ed910d3b4b5b469b77518331526d31a8eb4ac

    • SSDEEP

      12288:CoMbyZK5G+biuvip5RBlguC5gApVD5U+rUA5LgA4R4P4E4f4j444p454n4dQm:CoRI5eRBlO5gSDU+rUACACYnkUfq+II

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries a list of all the installed applications on the device (Might be used in an attempt to overlay legitimate apps)

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Reads information about phone network operator.

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks