General

  • Target

    82a8181e20cb19e11cc2af9144b8ab135e8ca8245f39c025a23d820a526f2d92.bin

  • Size

    2.6MB

  • Sample

    250319-1wttxsyl18

  • MD5

    9a7a600daac480476394145a9f57b9bf

  • SHA1

    8d729325e7c964d401d62c235f117f8f7a9f67ce

  • SHA256

    82a8181e20cb19e11cc2af9144b8ab135e8ca8245f39c025a23d820a526f2d92

  • SHA512

    f8948999a6dd8a0f0bad92be808073030a4038e08cefcdeb07a8d30db3466a569d78182416e2588dbf9803d9e6aa1b79244b0ebc919eb71398bb0ea0dce3a8ee

  • SSDEEP

    49152:89mTfBTWdDnO6lYdsuHq6pr4f/n3WjdyrZtNFz78vRbLw9:8ATJLcV6pGn3Wjd2KZnG

Malware Config

Extracted

Family

ermac

C2

http://193.106.191.121

AES_key
AES_key

Targets

    • Target

      82a8181e20cb19e11cc2af9144b8ab135e8ca8245f39c025a23d820a526f2d92.bin

    • Size

      2.6MB

    • MD5

      9a7a600daac480476394145a9f57b9bf

    • SHA1

      8d729325e7c964d401d62c235f117f8f7a9f67ce

    • SHA256

      82a8181e20cb19e11cc2af9144b8ab135e8ca8245f39c025a23d820a526f2d92

    • SHA512

      f8948999a6dd8a0f0bad92be808073030a4038e08cefcdeb07a8d30db3466a569d78182416e2588dbf9803d9e6aa1b79244b0ebc919eb71398bb0ea0dce3a8ee

    • SSDEEP

      49152:89mTfBTWdDnO6lYdsuHq6pr4f/n3WjdyrZtNFz78vRbLw9:8ATJLcV6pGn3Wjd2KZnG

    • Ermac

      An Android banking trojan first seen in July 2021.

    • Ermac family

    • Ermac2 payload

    • Removes its main activity from the application launcher

    • Loads dropped Dex/Jar

      Runs executable file dropped to the device during analysis.

    • Makes use of the framework's Accessibility service

      Retrieves information displayed on the phone screen using AccessibilityService.

    • Obtains sensitive information copied to the device clipboard

      Application may abuse the framework's APIs to obtain sensitive information copied to the device clipboard.

    • Queries the phone number (MSISDN for GSM devices)

    • Acquires the wake lock

    • Makes use of the framework's foreground persistence service

      Application may abuse the framework's foreground service to continue running in the foreground.

    • Performs UI accessibility actions on behalf of the user

      Application may abuse the accessibility service to prevent their removal.

    • Queries the mobile country code (MCC)

    • Queries the unique device ID (IMEI, MEID, IMSI)

    • Requests disabling of battery optimizations (often used to enable hiding in the background).

MITRE ATT&CK Mobile v15

Tasks