Analysis

  • max time kernel
    63s
  • max time network
    151s
  • platform
    windows10-2004_x64
  • resource
    win10v2004-20250314-en
  • resource tags

    arch:x64arch:x86image:win10v2004-20250314-enlocale:en-usos:windows10-2004-x64system
  • submitted
    26/03/2025, 10:09

General

  • Target

    fd84c9c09358e721173725d0a1eeae08cd0c6d74b2f44646552adc4b19883e90.exe

  • Size

    1.0MB

  • MD5

    df0dcae2fbd51e2319f9ea46517f4398

  • SHA1

    f8a6fa6649f0d887099f5a573a49a20c19ad0ce8

  • SHA256

    fd84c9c09358e721173725d0a1eeae08cd0c6d74b2f44646552adc4b19883e90

  • SHA512

    d31939dd0ac1dfa837ce9a56470f1452a4c5647d3466e23183700fcad4c14cdf66a54b7886fd99117931c2fa59b15397ba33c866d08adca67c21a73a2e2857a3

  • SSDEEP

    24576:FTyLPsJjVjzhWwiENiUGC86pNV2GNxgr+oBwGyGs:FTyLPsJjVjzliE0opNV2G7gr+o+Gg

Malware Config

Extracted

Path

C:\PerfLogs\akira_readme.txt

Family

akira

Ransom Note
Hi friends, Whatever who you are and what your title is if you're reading this it means the internal infrastructure of your company is fully or partially dead, all your backups - virtual, physical - everything that we managed to reach - are completely removed. Moreover, we have taken a great amount of your corporate data prior to encryption. Well, for now let's keep all the tears and resentment to ourselves and try to build a constructive dialogue. We're fully aware of what damage we caused by locking your internal sources. At the moment, you have to know: 1. Dealing with us you will save A LOT due to we are not interested in ruining your financially. We will study in depth your finance, bank & income statements, your savings, investments etc. and present our reasonable demand to you. If you have an active cyber insurance, let us know and we will guide you how to properly use it. Also, dragging out the negotiation process will lead to failing of a deal. 2. Paying us you save your TIME, MONEY, EFFORTS and be back on track within 24 hours approximately. Our decryptor works properly on any files or systems, so you will be able to check it by requesting a test decryption service from the beginning of our conversation. If you decide to recover on your own, keep in mind that you can permanently lose access to some files or accidently corrupt them - in this case we won't be able to help. 3. The security report or the exclusive first-hand information that you will receive upon reaching an agreement is of a great value, since NO full audit of your network will show you the vulnerabilities that we've managed to detect and used in order to get into, identify backup solutions and upload your data. 4. As for your data, if we fail to agree, we will try to sell personal information/trade secrets/databases/source codes - generally speaking, everything that has a value on the darkmarket - to multiple threat actors at ones. Then all of this will be published in our blog - https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion. 5. We're more than negotiable and will definitely find the way to settle this quickly and reach an agreement which will satisfy both of us. If you're indeed interested in our assistance and the services we provide you can reach out to us following simple instructions: 1. Install TOR Browser to get access to our chat room - https://www.torproject.org/download/. 2. Paste this link - https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion/d/3725638364-YWFJC 3. Use this code - 8827-VJ-UFZH-XFYZ - to log into our chat. Keep in mind that the faster you will get in touch, the less damage we cause.
URLs

https://akiral2iz6a7qgd3ayp3l6yub7xx2uep76idk3u2kollpj5z3z636bad.onion

https://akiralkzxzq2dsrzsrvbr2xgbbu2wgsmxryd4csgfameg52n7efvr2id.onion/d/3725638364-YWFJC

Signatures

  • Akira

    Akira is a ransomware first seen in March 2023 and targets several industries, including education, finance, real estate, manufacturing, and consulting.

  • Akira family
  • Process spawned unexpected child process 1 IoCs

    This typically indicates the parent process was compromised via an exploit or macro.

  • Renames multiple (9541) files with added filename extension

    This suggests ransomware activity of encrypting all the files on the system.

  • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell 1 TTPs 1 IoCs

    Run Powershell command to delete shadowcopy.

  • Drops startup file 1 IoCs
  • Reads user/profile data of web browsers 3 TTPs

    Infostealers often target stored browser data, which can include saved credentials etc.

  • Drops desktop.ini file(s) 31 IoCs
  • Drops file in Program Files directory 64 IoCs
  • Enumerates physical storage devices 1 TTPs

    Attempts to interact with connected storage/optical drive(s).

  • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses 64 IoCs
  • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken 4 IoCs
  • Uses Volume Shadow Copy service COM API

    The Volume Shadow Copy service is used to manage backups/snapshots.

Processes

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\fd84c9c09358e721173725d0a1eeae08cd0c6d74b2f44646552adc4b19883e90.exe
    "C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\fd84c9c09358e721173725d0a1eeae08cd0c6d74b2f44646552adc4b19883e90.exe"
    1⤵
    • Drops startup file
    • Drops desktop.ini file(s)
    • Drops file in Program Files directory
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    PID:4092
  • C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe
    powershell.exe -Command "Get-WmiObject Win32_Shadowcopy | Remove-WmiObject"
    1⤵
    • Process spawned unexpected child process
    • Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
    • Suspicious behavior: EnumeratesProcesses
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:264
  • C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    C:\Windows\system32\vssvc.exe
    1⤵
    • Suspicious use of AdjustPrivilegeToken
    PID:3300

Network

MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v15

Replay Monitor

Loading Replay Monitor...

Downloads

  • C:\PerfLogs\akira_readme.txt

    Filesize

    2KB

    MD5

    f4b5c5917f7d7417f223bdb7dd98d6c2

    SHA1

    d1523fa6ebaf8be7602f4244b081928eac29c0ba

    SHA256

    dfb1791986a1d2ca25d04cf7500f23fb5f8b3323dd302545458951838a78055b

    SHA512

    3041d7e56913a35cbd69a2876a5ecf1447b5313941f13ae8222efca4901839f5039d45dbeba82a8020e216d8b692a76b5b8fcde5d4f2bc3918ae99403fc0d80b

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\powershell.exe.log

    Filesize

    3KB

    MD5

    2268c0e5992ed1b2ebeb3e94d1898e24

    SHA1

    43d0bcab721e24e5153a878dc8b14c38473bf6fd

    SHA256

    102acbb6d8c922a686dce753fb348db754defe8e72479f313b0a29616504876b

    SHA512

    cffe0361291f996661fde45a347d2c0eeb8491f802c1182015071ecd4484210e0a23f11b7379813a98b5cf78b07752d82a65a7ecf75787b12a78ebcf3c21da4a

  • C:\Users\Admin\AppData\Local\Temp\__PSScriptPolicyTest_vqucgh3m.hqc.ps1

    Filesize

    60B

    MD5

    d17fe0a3f47be24a6453e9ef58c94641

    SHA1

    6ab83620379fc69f80c0242105ddffd7d98d5d9d

    SHA256

    96ad1146eb96877eab5942ae0736b82d8b5e2039a80d3d6932665c1a4c87dcf7

    SHA512

    5b592e58f26c264604f98f6aa12860758ce606d1c63220736cf0c779e4e18e3cec8706930a16c38b20161754d1017d1657d35258e58ca22b18f5b232880dec82

  • memory/264-0-0x00007FFAE0793000-0x00007FFAE0795000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    8KB

  • memory/264-10-0x000002823CC70000-0x000002823CC92000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    136KB

  • memory/264-11-0x00007FFAE0790000-0x00007FFAE1251000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/264-12-0x00007FFAE0790000-0x00007FFAE1251000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    10.8MB

  • memory/264-15-0x00007FFAE0790000-0x00007FFAE1251000-memory.dmp

    Filesize

    10.8MB